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6Executive Summary
As the world slowly emerges from the 
devastating Financial Crisis, it is time to reflect 
on the lessons of this turbulent period and 
think afresh about how to prevent future 
crises. The Oxford Martin Commission for 
Future Generations focuses on the increasing 
short-termism of modern politics and our 
collective inability to break the gridlock which 
undermines attempts to address the biggest 
challenges that will shape our future. In Now 
for the Long Term, we urge decision-makers 
to overcome their pressing daily preoccupations 
to tackle problems that will determine the 
lives of today’s and tomorrow’s generations. 
Dr James Martin, the founder of the Oxford 
Martin School, highlighted that humanity is at 
a crossroads. This could be our best century 
ever, or our worst. The outcome will depend 
on our ability to understand and harness the 
extraordinary opportunities as well as manage 
the unprecedented uncertainties and risks.
Our report identifies what these challenges 
are, explains how progress can be made, and 
provides practical recommendations. The 
Commission outlines an agenda for the long 
term. Our case for action is built in three parts. 
The first, Possible Futures, identifies the key 
drivers of change and considers how we may 
address the challenges that will dominate this 
century. Next, in Responsible Futures, the 
Commission draws inspiration from previous 
examples of where impediments to action 
have been overcome, and lessons from where 
progress has been stalled. We then consider the 
characteristics of our current national and global 
society that frustrate progress. The final part, 
Practical Futures, sets out the principles for 
action and offers illustrative recommendations 
which show how we can build a sustainable, 
inclusive and resilient future for all.  
Part A, Possible Futures, identifies a number 
of interacting megatrends, grouped under 
seven headings: demographics (large, ageing 
populations); mobility (urbanisation and a 
growing middle class); society (inequality and 
unemployment); geopolitics (power transitions); 
sustainability (resource insecurity); health 
(shifting burdens of disease); and technology 
(information and communications revolution). 
These megatrends apply the world over, 
reinforcing old and generating new sets of 
challenges. 
The Commission then considers five categories 
of challenges that arise from these megatrends 
that are likely to shape our future:
1. Society: How can growth and development 
be made more sustainable and inclusive?
2. Resources: How can food, energy, water and 
biodiversity be made more secure?
3. Health: How can public health infrastructure 
and processes respond to the needs of all?
4. Geopolitics: How can power transitions be 
the basis for fresh forms of collaboration? 
5. Governance: How can businesses, 
institutions and governments contribute to 
more inclusive and sustainable growth?
Part A also highlights what is known about 
possible responses to these challenges. 
New targets on growth and employment, 
and a focus on youth workers and flexible 
workplaces are presented. The importance 
of resource transparency and information 
sharing is reiterated, as are measures to 
counteract climate change. Goals to reduce 
non-communicable diseases (NCDs), 
remedy deficiencies in public health systems, 
implement agreed best practice, and partner 
creatively with the pharmaceutical industry 
are stressed. Countries are advised to 
identify shared interests, update institutions 
and develop cybersecurity capacity as they 
navigate structural transitions in international 
politics. Better governance will aid this quest, 
particularly if technology is used creatively, 
indicators are improved, and business is rewired 
to invest for the long term. 
In Part B, Responsible Futures, the Commission 
examines historical drivers of transformative 
change, such as the existence of crisis, shared 
interests, leadership, inclusion, institutions and 
networks, partnerships, as well as goals and 
prizes. From campaigns to protect the ozone 
layer and reduce tobacco use, to the European 
Single Market and the Millennium Development 
Goals, there are many examples of where 
disparate groups have come together and made 
significant progress. At the other end of the 
results spectrum, the Commission considers 
less successful characteristics of modern 
politics, including the tragedy of the commons, 
a lack of intergenerational vision and awareness, 
the absence of global oversight, and vested 
interests. Following these insights, Part B sets 
out five shaping factors that make positive 
change so difficult:
1. Institutions: Too many have struggled to 
adapt to today’s hyper-connected world. 
2. Time: Short-termism directs political 
and business cycles, despite compelling 
exceptions.
3. Political Engagement and Public Trust: 
Politics has not adapted to new methods or 
members. 
4. Growing Complexity: Problems can escalate 
much more rapidly than they can be solved.
5. Cultural Biases: Globalisation can amplify 
cultural differences and exclude key voices.
7Part C, Practical Futures, contains the 
Commission’s Agenda for the Long Term.  
It is arranged around five principles, with 
practical examples proposed to illustrate each 
principle. Some build on possible responses 
to the challenges identified in Part A. Others 
respond to the shaping factors outlined in  
Part B, and seek to address deeper political and 
cultural factors that obstruct a longer-term 
engagement. We provide indicative examples 
of principles and proposals that advance the 
interests of future generations and promote 
resilience, inclusiveness and sustainability. The 
Agenda is as follows:
1. Creative Coalitions: Responding to this 
century’s challenges will require multi-
stakeholder partnerships. The Commission 
suggests three: 
• C20-C30-C40: a Coalition of the Working 
comprising countries, companies and cities to 
counteract climate change.
• CyberEx: a new early warning platform to 
promote a better understanding of common 
threats amongst government, corporate and 
individual users.
• Fit Cities: a city-based network to fight the 
rise of non-communicable diseases. 
2. Innovative, Open and Reinvigorated 
Institutions: Institutions and processes 
should be renewed for the modern operating 
environment. Five steps are suggested:
• Decades, not Days: invest in independent, 
accountable institutions able to operate 
across longer-term horizons.
• Fit for Purpose: incorporate sunset clauses 
into publicly funded international institutions 
to ensure regular review of accomplishments 
and mandates.
• Open up Politics: build on initiatives such as 
the Open Government Platform to optimise 
new forms of participation and transparency.
• Make the Numbers Count: establish 
Worldstat to improve the reliability and 
availability of statistics.
• Transparent Taxation: address tax abuse and 
avoidance through a Voluntary Taxation and 
Regulatory Exchange. 
3. Revalue the Future: Existing institutional 
incentives should be rebalanced to reduce 
bias against future generations. This can be 
done in four ways: 
• Focus Business on the Long Term: ensure 
companies and financial systems give greater 
priority to long term “health” and look 
beyond daily or quarterly reporting cycles.
• Discounting: future generations should not 
be discounted against simply because they 
are born tomorrow and not today. 
• Invest in People: remove perverse subsidies 
on hydrocarbons and agriculture, and redirect 
support to the poor.
• Measure Long-term Impact: create an index 
to track the effectiveness of countries, 
companies and international institutions on 
longer term issues. 
4. Invest in Younger Generations: Greater 
attention should be given to promoting a 
more inclusive and empowered society, 
particularly for younger generations. Two 
priorities should be:
• Attack Poverty at its Source: break the 
intergenerational cycle of poverty through 
social protection measures such as 
conditional cash transfer programmes. 
• A Future for Youth: countries should invest in 
youth guarantees to address unemployment 
and underemployment.
5. Establish a Common Platform of 
Understanding: The ability to address 
today’s global challenges is undermined by the 
absence of a collective vision for society. To 
remedy this, the Commission urges renewed 
dialogue on an updated set of shared global 
values around which a unified and enduring 
pathway for society can be built. 
The Commission applauds the remarkable 
progress of past decades: on balance, the 
world’s population is safer, healthier, more 
productive and cooperative than ever. 
Nevertheless, much work remains to be done. 
Now for the Long Term aims to stimulate 
action and debate. Commissioners look forward 
to engaging with governments, businesses, 
NGOs and civil society in order to take these 
ideas and recommendations forward in the 
months and years ahead. 
Introduction
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NOW is the best time in history to be alive. 
Our world has experienced a sustained period 
of positive change. The average person is 
about eight times richer than a century ago,1 
nearly one billion people have been lifted out of 
extreme poverty over the past two decades,2 
living standards have soared, life expectancy has 
risen, the threat of war between great powers 
has declined, and our genetic code and universe 
have been unlocked in previously inconceivable 
ways. Many of today’s goods are unimaginable 
without collective contributions from different 
parts of the world, through which more of 
us can move freely with a passport or visa, 
provided we have the means to do so. Our 
world is functionally smaller, and its possibilities 
are bigger and brighter than ever before. Never 
before have so many people been optimistic 
about their future.3 
While the future is full of opportunity arising 
from the extraordinary advances of recent 
decades, it is also highly uncertain and 
characterised by growing systemic risks. In 
many cases, these risks are the consequences 
of our success, arising from rising incomes, 
population growth, interconnectedness and 
technological advances. Risks arising from 
the plundering of our planet’s natural capital, 
growing inequality, and the potentially 
devastating results of accidental or deliberate 
use of new technologies are among the 
reasons we urgently need to deepen our 
understanding of the threats posed by 
business as usual. 
The empowerment of people through 
investment in education and other forms of 
human capital is critical for sustainable and 
inclusive growth. Entrepreneurs and investment 
thrive when not only infrastructure and 
innovative capacity is developed, but when the 
rules governing society are also transparent 
and fair.  Given the scale of the challenges 
and the prospect of very positive but also 
possibly disastrous change, the response of 
governments, businesses and citizens should 
not be to become more short-sighted. The scale 
of the opportunities and risks requires more 
attention to the future and a more far-sighted 
attitude. In an increasingly integrated and 
hyper-connected world, our individual future 
depends more than ever on our collective future 
and our capacity to work together to deepen 
our understanding of the critical challenges. 
We need to ensure that we have the skills, 
tools, institutions and social fabric necessary to 
navigate safely through the hazardous fog of 
the future.
As the late French politician Pierre Mendès 
France used to say, “gouverner, c’est prévoir” 
– governing is looking forward, or foreseeing. 
Preparing for the future, however, seems 
a luxury for today’s governments, who are 
increasingly preoccupied with the present; 
indeed, many governments even “live with their 
eyes on the rear-view mirror, refighting ancient 
battles and reigniting ancient enmities”.4 An 
inability to “look forward” characterises much 
of modern politics, especially in democratic 
countries. Government and business leaders 
tend to focus on the short term, which offers 
quicker and potentially easier payoffs at lower 
political cost. 
The aim of the Oxford Martin Commission for 
Future Generations (“the Commission”) is to 
identify the scale of the challenges humanity is 
facing and to offer suggestions as to how they 
may better be managed. We believe that we 
can and must do a much better job of securing 
the opportunities and mitigating the risks. 
The Commission seeks to draw attention to a 
growing gap between knowledge and action on 
many of today’s challenges, identify why action 
has slowed, and suggest pathways to move the 
global agenda forward.  
Governing for the future
The Commissioners have come together out 
of concern for the future. We agree governing 
requires a dual vision: a commitment to address 
current needs and to build the foundations for 
vibrant generations in the decades ahead. This 
responsibility transcends obligations to today’s 
citizens: it also relates to future generations and a 
broader societal ideal of trusteeship that requires 
us to leave the world better than we find it.5 
This is a unique time in history. Our younger 
generation is the first to live free of the scars 
of previous global wars. Given extraordinary 
advances in knowledge and scientific 
understanding, today we are more aware than 
ever of the implications of our actions on future 
generations, not least in areas like climate 
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change and biodiversity. And we could arguably 
be amongst the last generations able to do 
anything to stop the long-term devastation of 
our planet. Soon it may be too late. We hold a 
unique responsibility, arising from our advanced 
knowledge of the implications of our actions 
and the potential that our actions could create 
or prevent irreversible damage to the livelihoods 
of future generations. This report aims to help 
us step up to this unique responsibility for the 
benefit of those alive today and in the future.6    
Justice Weeramantry, former Vice President of 
the International Court of Justice, reminded us 
that civilisations across the ages have “refused 
to adopt a one-eyed vision of concentration on 
the present”.7 Sustainable development, he has 
argued, “is one of the most ancient ideas in the 
human heritage”.8 Evidence of long-term thinking 
comes in a variety of forms, whether it is in 
defence, health care, fiscal planning, demography, 
migration, the environment, or governance 
structures more generally. Governments 
regularly make long-term commitments, such 
as in education, welfare and infrastructure, 
though these are not necessarily guided by a 
longer-term view or explicitly mandated to 
address difficult long-term questions. 
Uncertainty about the future, the never-ending 
immediacy of pressures at our doorsteps and 
the rapidity of change in today’s society make it 
easier to rationalise living in the eternal present. 
Changing course towards the longer term 
requires society to devote sustained attention 
to the transformational changes which will 
characterise our lifetimes and shape the future 
for the next generations. Taking a longer view 
is no panacea; striking a sustainable balance 
between short-term and long-term interests is 
key. Currently, there is a lack of understanding 
on the conditions under which long-term 
thinking might be improved.9 Existing structures 
bestow a higher value to immediate returns on 
investment. Some of these returns exacerbate 
the risks and social consequences posed by 
longer-term challenges and delay collaborative 
action on them.
The debate about the future, however, is not 
simply about the virtue of long-term thinking. 
This is a debate about what is owed to future 
generations. The Commission does not intend 
to settle this debate. We accept there are 
a range of good reasons to care about the 
interests of future persons, and to reflect on 
the extent to which such interests should be 
protected, considered, restored or enhanced 
by those of us living today. No one system 
of government has a monopoly on thinking 
about, or governing for, future generations, 
even if certain systems may prove more 
adept than others. We, the Commissioners, 
drawn from different parts of the world, are 
united by a desire to harness the opportunities 
presented in today’s world for the benefit of 
current generations, whilst also ensuring that 
we leave the world in a better position for 
our grandchildren, and the generations that 
succeed them. 
One world; many cultures, 
perspectives and identities 
Globalisation is not new but the global breadth 
and depth of its impact has changed. Many 
asserted globalisation would result in greater 
homogenisation of customs and cultures, which 
may have assisted in developing a common 
understanding and agreement on how to 
address today’s challenges.10 In fact, in some 
cases, the opposite appears to have transpired: 
globalisation has not been “equated with 
homogenisation or uniformity” but has found 
“localisation as its counterforce”.11 
Since the Second World War, there has been 
great progress in building trust and momentum 
on a number of national and international 
challenges. This has often been done by focusing 
on mutual interests, not just between people 
but also among cities, nations and businesses. 
Such a capacity has been necessary “to perceive, 
recognise, and deal with differences, conflicts, 
and oppositions and to arrive at workable 
solutions to the problems and challenges 
that result from an accelerating process of 
globalisation”.12 For the most part, however, 
today’s challenges are even more intertwined 
and beyond the scope of national jurisdiction. 
Many of these challenges, not least those 
related to climate change, are the by-products 
of industrialisation and economic growth. 
While the already advanced economies have 
generated many of the externalities, much of 
the burden going forward will need to be shared 
by the developing world, whose rapid growth is 
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compounding challenges such as climate change 
and resource scarcity. Our hyper-connected 
world requires unprecedented collaboration. 
Reaching consensus on a path forward requires 
a deep understanding of “how the one world 
affects the many and how the many worlds 
affect the one”. This, in turn, necessitates a 
deep awareness of local and regional cultures, 
perspectives and identities, and how they are 
responding to each other in an era in which 
cooperation is a prerequisite for progress.13 
Individuals often take as a starting point difference, 
not likeness: we often define ourselves largely 
based on what differentiates us from those we 
encounter.14 This “precedence of difference 
over sameness” has important, and perhaps 
misunderstood, consequences for the conduct 
of multilateral dialogues and negotiations on the 
longer-term challenges identified in this report. 
As Commissioners, we have observed that 
globalisation can sharpen cultural contrasts and 
invoke stronger claims for localisation.15 While the 
interconnections made possible via a globalised 
world provide hope for “economical, ecological, 
educational, informational, and military forms of 
cooperation”, this environment can also trigger 
“a counter-reaction to what people experience 
as a threat”.16 Such a reaction – defensive 
localisation despite globalisation – might come 
from individuals, communities, or take place within 
institutions. This means the Commission cannot 
be starry-eyed about the prospect of broad, 
sweeping changes and position leaps on the 
challenges it identifies. Movement along pathways 
necessary to tackle challenges common to all and 
requiring national and wider cooperation may need 
to occur incrementally.
About this report
This report aims to contribute to the ability of 
national and local governments, international 
institutions, businesses and the broader 
community to understand and navigate these 
competing tensions in order to grapple with the 
major long-term issues of today. It examines five 
sets of challenges requiring concerted attention. 
The Commission does not attempt to provide 
one-stop solutions and we are aware of the 
wide-ranging arguments regarding the right 
course of action. Today’s challenges are deeply 
complex and interconnected, and will require 
multiple and sustained actions in order to be fully 
addressed. Our aim is to highlight areas where 
action could be taken if the political will were 
mobilised to do so, and how it could be taken. We 
try to understand why action has become more 
difficult and provide recommendations which we 
hope will be useful in terms of moving forward 
the agenda for future generations. 
The report comprises three parts:
PART A: Possible Futures gives a synopsis of 
global megatrends and introduces the key 
challenges on which action is essential. These 
challenges are introduced within five broad 
categories: society, resources, health, 
geopolitics and governance. This is by no 
means an exclusive or comprehensive list, but the 
categories are used to illustrate key challenges 
that need to be grappled with, the links between 
them, and how they might be addressed. 
PART B: Responsible Futures seeks to diagnose 
why gridlock and a lack of political will for change 
persist on many challenges where action is 
imperative. It draws lessons from examples where 
impediments to action have been overcome, 
and also considers why certain efforts have 
failed or stalled. Five shaping factors that impact 
the ability to get things done are identified: 
institutions, time, political engagement and 
trust, complexity and culture.  
PART C: Practical Futures builds from the 
possible and responsible futures suggested in 
Parts A and B, and offers practical, overarching 
recommendations to overcome the gridlock of 
modern politics and shift mindsets towards the 
long term. The recommendations are arranged 
around five key principles: creative coalitions; 
innovative, open and reinvigorated 
institutions; revalue the future; invest 
in younger generations and establish a 
platform of understanding.   
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Part A: 
Possible Futures
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Taking stock 
Megatrends mark important shifts in the 
evolution of society.17 They tend to persist 
over the long term, at times with impacts that 
are not immediately evident. Some are more 
reversible than others. Megatrends can be 
extremely positive, such as poverty reduction, 
the emergence of the Internet, longer lifespans 
and the decline of great wars. They can also be 
negative, as is evidenced by growing inequality 
and the rising threats of both infectious and 
non-communicable diseases (NCDs). Either 
way, megatrends can and often do generate 
profound and potentially permanent changes to 
the way societies are governed. 
Presenting a picture of the future can be risky. 
It can leave us jumping at “distant and fragile 
shadows” and unprepared when the real world 
knocks at the door.18 We know events are often 
unanticipated. The future is bound to be full of 
good and bad surprises. This does not mean we 
should be complacent about what is happening 
around us, and ignore what that might mean for 
the future. 
In this section, we identify a number of 
prominent global megatrends. Some date back 
to before the Industrial Revolution; others 
have become influential since the end of the 
Cold War. We do not seek to be too predictive. 
Ensuring that one is able to seize the positive 
opportunities and build resilience against the 
downside risks will require an open mind and 
constant commitment to discovery and learning.
The megatrends are grouped under seven 
headings but are highly interactive. Many 
megatrends are slow, whilst the direction of 
others may turn or accelerate unexpectedly. 
Globalisation underpins them all. Together, 
these megatrends are transforming the world 
and doing so in a manner that is distinct from 
the drivers of change in earlier times. 
Megatrends
Figure 1: Global megatrends in the 21st century
Source: Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations.
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Over the next century, changes in the world’s 
demography – the characteristics and 
composition of the global population – are 
likely to be dramatic. This is not just about 
gross numbers; it is also about the age, lifespan, 
distribution and activities of people. The world’s 
population has climbed from 1.6 billion in 1900 
to around 7 billion today, and is projected to 
exceed 8 billion by 2025 and perhaps 9 billion by 
2050. Over 60 percent of the global population 
is likely to live in Africa and Asia by 2050.19 
Approximately 70 percent of the growth is likely 
to occur in 24 of the world’s poorest countries.2 
Ageing nations 
The world’s population is getting older, with the 
population over 60 growing fastest.21 In less 
than 40 years, one in every five people will be at 
least 60 years old. Average lifespan is projected 
to be 83 years in the developed world and 72 
in the less developed world by 2050, compared 
with 78 and 67 today, and 66 and 42 in 1950.22 
The overall ratio of old to young is set to almost 
double from current levels, and total numbers of 
over 60s will more than double from 810 million 
to 2 billion. Ageing will impact certain parts of 
the world much earlier, transforming populations: 
the ratio of the old-age population to the 
working population (15-64 years) in Japan is 
already over 38 percent and is projected to reach 
almost 70 percent by 2050, for example,23 and 
half of Europe will be over 50 by the end of this 
decade.24 Discrepancies in sex ratios have also 
become more pronounced in some places. Whilst 
the longer life expectancy of females is gradually 
diminishing imbalanced sex ratios in many 
populations, Asia is experiencing an increased 
“masculinisation” of society. The difference 
between the numbers of men and women in Asia 
more than tripled from 1950-2005.25 
Europe
North 
America Oceania Asia
Latin 
America & 
Caribbean Africa
 2007    2050*  07         50  07         50  07         50  07         50  07         50
60-80 year olds over 80s    (as % of total population)
* Prediction
Figure 3: The ageing global population
Source: UN-DESA, World Population Prospects – The 2010 Revision: Highlights and Advance Tables (New York: United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs), p. 8.
Demographics
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population lives in  
this circle
Figure 2: Global population distribution, 2013
Source: Oxford Martin Commission for Future Generations.
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Figure 4: The rise of the global middle class 
Note: m = millions of people. “Middle Class” is defined as those households with daily expenditures of between USD $10 and USD $100 
per person. The light blue circle depicts the size of the middle class population in 2030; the dark red circle charts the 2009 middle 
class population. Source: Commonwealth of Australia, Australia in the Asian Century (Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, 2012), p. 63.
As a share of the world’s population, migration 
today is less prevalent than it has been in the past, 
such as during the age of mass migration in the 
19th century. Nevertheless, the total number of 
migrants has grown with the world’s population. 
The birthplace and destination of migrants is 
constantly changing. Currently, there are over 210 
million people living outside their country of origin, 
up from 150 million in 1990.26 Remittances 
to developing countries are estimated to have 
reached USD $406 billion in 2012.27
Urbanisation is also occurring rapidly within our 
populations.28 In 1950, only three of every ten 
people lived in cities. In 2008, the number of 
people in cities was greater than that in rural 
areas for the first time. Urbanisation generates 
opportunities particularly in the delivery of 
services and public goods but also presents 
sizeable challenges. By 2030, over two billion 
people may well be living in urban slums.29 A 
dramatic rise in the number of people living in 
urban floodplains is also expected, especially in 
Eastern and Southern Asia and in Africa.30 
Rise of the middle class
 
Mobility is not just about geography; there is 
also an integral socioeconomic dimension. Over 
the next 40 years, billions more people are 
expected to join the global middle class.31 The 
vast majority will come from emerging markets, 
which are projected to double their share of 
global consumption (from one third to two 
thirds) by 2050.32 Consumers will increasingly be 
concentrated in cities within emerging markets.33 
This emerging middle class could provide a 
much-needed impetus for balanced global 
growth by boosting consumption, investing 
in health, education and renewable energy, 
and driving higher productivity, sustainable 
economic development, and more political 
stability via increased demand for accountability 
and good governance.34 Whilst this constitutes 
a significant opportunity, there is also the risk 
of an increasing divide between the growing 
middle class and those left behind. At the same 
time, growth in consumption and incomes will 
add further pressure to our strained resources 
and environment. 
Empowerment through education
Access to primary education in particular is 
regarded as critical to socioeconomic mobility, 
and for this reason it has been an objective 
of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Substantial inroads have been made 
this past decade in reducing the number of 
out-of-school children (now about 60 million, 
down from 108 million 20 years ago, with a 66 
percent reduction in South and West Asia).35 
University enrolments in emerging countries 
doubled between 1996 and 2007, whilst 
student mobility globally also increased. Nearly 
four million students studied abroad in 2010, 
almost twice more than a decade earlier. The 
overall return on education is also climbing. 
Within OECD countries, tertiary-educated 
workers earn 55 percent more on average than 
those with upper-secondary and alternative 
post-secondary qualifications.36 As we will 
see, however, education helps but does not 
guarantee employment – connecting educated 
individuals with jobs remains a challenge.
Mobility
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Uneven and unequal
 
For the past three decades, there has been 
a steady decline in poverty rates in the 
developing world. As highlighted in Figure 5, this 
progress is anticipated to continue, not least 
in countries such as China and India. Yet the 
contrast between rich and poor remains stark. 
Despite overall progress on education, three out 
of every four illiterate adults are located in just 
ten countries (37 percent of them in India)37 
and about half of all out-of-school children 
are in sub-Saharan Africa.38 According to the 
World Bank, more than 1.2 billion people do not 
have access to electricity, including 550 million 
in Africa and 400 million in India.39 Societies 
and individuals are becoming increasingly 
unequal. The Gini coefficient – an imperfect 
measure of the gap between the richest and 
poorest – has risen by more than 10 percent in 
OECD countries since 1992. In some emerging 
countries such as China, India, Russia and South 
Africa, it is widening rapidly.40
Generational and gender divides
 
One third of the world’s labour force 
began 2012 poor or unemployed; global 
unemployment is expected to remain over 
200 million until at least 2015. According to 
the ILO, over the past five years long-term 
unemployment has increased in 60 percent of 
advanced and developing countries where there 
is available data.41 Young people are 3–4 times 
more likely to be without a job: the global youth 
unemployment rate (12.6 percent) is more than 
double the unemployment rate of the labour 
force as a whole.42 
While there has been solid progress on reducing 
extreme poverty (by 2050 it might only 
remain a concern in India and sub-Saharan 
Africa43), social exclusion persists (through 
unemployment, poverty or a lack of access 
to political, economic, educational or societal 
processes).44 Exclusion hits the old, the young 
and women hardest, especially in developing 
countries. Gender inequality remains a key 
barrier to economic growth and poverty 
reduction. Women and girls account for six out 
of ten of the world’s poorest and two-thirds 
of the world’s illiterate people. According to 
the UNDP, women perform 66 percent of 
the world’s work, but earn just 10 percent 
of the income and own only 1 percent of the 
property.45  
Society
Figure 5: The changing global poverty landscape 
Note: Numbers refer to individuals living below the international poverty line of USD $1.25 a day, figures rounded to the nearest million. The 2015 numbers are forecasts and for a number of 
countries the scale of improvement is indicative of the number of people clustered around the poverty line used in the figure. Source: Laurence Chandy and Geoffrey Gertz, Poverty in Numbers: The 
Changing State of Global Poverty from 2005-2015 (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2011), p. 8. 
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Geopolitics
Figure 6: Share of world output 
Source: Commonwealth of Australia, Australia in the Asian Century (Canberra: Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
2012) p. 52.  
Figure 7: Growth in world trade 1960–2010 
Source: Andrew McCulloch, “Globalisation and Protectionism Today”, Significance magazine, http://www.significancemagazine.
org/details/webexclusive/2528931/Globalisation-and-Protectionism-today.html. 
New world order
 
The shift of economic power to emerging 
markets is in full swing. Reports suggest that the 
GDP of developing countries is now at least equal 
to the developed world.46 Developing countries’ 
share of global exports has increased over the 
last decade from 33 to 43 percent. Their share 
of global foreign direct investments (FDI) inflow 
has grown from nearly 20 to over 50 percent.47 
China and India are on track to have 35 percent 
of the world’s population and 25 percent of its 
GDP by 2030.48 Brazil, Russia, India, and China’s 
combined share of world GDP is expected to 
match that of the original G7 countries by 
2030.49 Even if these projections prove too 
optimistic, the rise of new economic powers may 
be expected to lead to a new world order.50 
Shared networks now transcend state 
boundaries and render distinctions between 
North, South, East and West increasingly 
redundant. Networks of economic activity as 
well as of diaspora communities and students 
educated in foreign countries are vital to this 
transformation. Increased “brain circulation” 
enables the flow of capital, cultures, ideas, 
global connections and cutting-edge expertise 
around the world, whilst international research 
networks and collaborations have flourished. 
More than a third of scientific papers published 
in international journals are now internationally 
collaborative, up from one quarter of 
publications nearly two decades ago.51
The global marketplace 
 
The landscape of trade in goods and services 
has fundamentally changed since the Second 
World War, as the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) shepherded in a more open 
and connected global economy. Today there are 
nearly 160 members of GATT’s successor, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). From 1950–
2007 trade grew by an average of 6.2 percent 
per year.52 In 2011 the total value of world 
merchandise trade was estimated at USD$18.2 
trillion.53 Developing countries achieved a share 
of over 50 percent of global trade in 2012.54
Trade in value-added goods and global supply 
chains ensure exports rely on imports more than 
ever, a reality of the global marketplace that 
new OECD-WTO data has begun to capture.55 
Many of our most used goods and services 
are “made in the world”. The foreign content 
of “Korean” and “Chinese” electronic goods 
exported in 2009, for example, was around 40 
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percent.56 In many sectors, tariffs have declined 
sharply. Less prominent improvements include 
more flexible rules on access to key medicines, 
improved monitoring functions, and peaceful 
and robust dispute settlement procedures. 
Non-tariff barriers are becoming the principal 
impediment to the movement of a growing 
range of goods and services, and are becoming 
a bigger part of world trade.57 Despite the surge 
in global trade,58 disagreement remains between 
advanced and emerging economies on how 
to reconcile trade with the development and 
environmental agendas. 
More seats at the table
Whilst the state remains the principal actor 
in world politics, there are now almost four 
times as many states as there were in 1945. 
This increase in players makes international 
consensus on global challenges harder to reach. 
Demand for legitimate governance – often 
through democratisation and transparency – 
has grown, as has the concern about fragile 
states. Expectations regarding the roles and 
responsibilities of states reflect changing global 
norms and expectations. The responsibility 
to protect citizens against grave crimes is 
among recent advances. Others include the 
growing influence of international law in 
trade, investment and armed conflict. The 
rise of international institutions and NGOs as 
key players has also been associated with an 
increase in the complexity of geopolitical power 
and international arrangements.
Back to the future? 
It has been powerfully argued that the recent 
“decline of violence may be the most significant 
and least appreciated development in the 
history” of the human race.59 With two World 
Wars and the Cold War dominating the 20th 
century, it is remarkable that wars between 
the great powers appear increasingly unlikely. 
While overall violence has declined, conflict 
has not ceased. At certain times during the 
last decade, 15 major conflicts were taking 
place at once.60 The majority of wars remain 
civil wars or insurgencies, largely ethnic and 
nationalist conflicts. Potentially devastating 
tensions still simmer, increasingly driven by 
religious fundamentalism. The stalemate of the 
Middle East peace process provides continued 
instability. Increasingly, small networks and 
individuals have the capacity to create havoc on 
an unprecedented scale at low cost.
In today’s security landscape, issues of cyber 
or biological warfare are growing concerns for 
governments and businesses, not least due to 
the low barriers to entry. Old concerns – such 
as nuclear and chemical weapons – still remain 
serious threats. Nuclear powers operating 
outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
increase the risk of disaster, either by design, 
accident, or third party exploitation. The 
other lingering fear is a mismanaged power 
transition, whereby emerging powers repeat 
their predecessors’ mistakes by allowing military 
plans to become built-in escalators to war.61  
The “perfect storm”
 
Sustainability is inherently about the long term. 
It requires the reconciliation of environmental, 
social and economic demands necessary for 
the sustained survival of humankind and other 
organisms on our planet. Above all, living 
sustainably means grappling with the “perfect 
storm” associated with the inseparability of 
water, food, energy and climate.62
It takes 1,500 litres of water and almost 10 
megajoules of energy to produce 1kg of wheat, 
and 10 times more water and around 20 times 
as much energy for 1kg of beef.63 As incomes 
rise and the population grows, the pressure 
on these resources and the risk of resource 
insecurity increases rapidly. Climate change 
is a risk enhancer in this respect. If business 
continues as usual, and demand for natural 
resources race ahead of supply,64 the “perfect 
storm” will compound an unsustainable cycle.
Total energy consumption per year is almost 
six times what it was in 1950; per capita use 
has more than doubled.65 Food production 
accounts for close to one third of all available 
energy,66 and agriculture accounts for around 
70 percent of water withdrawals worldwide.67 
Global demand for energy and fossil fuel use 
has been projected to rise by as much as 50 
percent by 2030.68 Demand for coal (and 
associated emissions) has been reduced in the 
United States due to the shale gas revolution, 
but current indications show that this cannot 
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be replicated in the immediate future outside 
North America, and ultimately depends on the 
relative prices of coal and gas.69 Allied with 
this growing demand is the lack of new land 
available for agriculture: 80 percent of arable 
land in developing countries is already used.70
The energy sector is water intensive too.71 
Energy accounts for 27 percent of all water 
consumed in the United States outside the 
agricultural sector.72 Globally, three billion 
people still have inadequate access to water, 
even though the MDG of halving the proportion 
of the world’s population without sustainable 
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation 
has reportedly been met.73 Just 10 countries 
are home to two-thirds of the people without 
access to improved drinking water.74 The World 
Bank estimates two in every three countries 
will be water-stressed by 2025, at which time 
around 2.4 billion people will face “absolute 
water scarcity”. Yet, to feed the world in 2050, 
food production may need to rise by some 70 
percent,75 which may require 50 percent more 
water.76 Moreover, 40 percent of arable land is 
already degraded to some degree, a problem that 
will be exacerbated by global warming.
Figure 9: World energy consumption 1820-2010 
Note: Based on estimates from Vaclav Smil, Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects, (California: Praeger, 2010) 
together with BP Statistical Data.
Source: Our Finite World, “World Energy Consumption Since 1820 in Charts”, 12 March 2012, http://ourfiniteworld.
com/2012/03/12/world-energy-consumption-since-1820-in-charts/
Figure 10: Global water use for energy production  
Source: International Energy Agency, “Water for Energy”, http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/water-energynexus/. 
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It’s the green economy
 
Historical, carbon-intensive models of economic 
growth are unsustainable. Since the Industrial 
Revolution there has been a strong correlation 
of GDP per capita with CO2 emissions.
77 The use 
of carbon has yielded extraordinary benefits and 
none of the now advanced economies would have 
developed without it, but the negative costs arising 
from the consequent climate change now pose 
a rising threat. Warming of the climate system is 
unequivocal. Atmospheric levels of CO2, methane 
and nitrous oxide are “at levels unprecedented in 
the last 800,000 years”, and CO2 concentrations 
are 40 percent higher than pre-industrial times.78 
The IPCC is now highly confident that that the rate 
of sea level increase since the mid 19th century 
“has been larger than the mean rate during the 
previous two millennia”.79 If trends continue, 
cyclone intensity, extreme weather events80 and 
global rainfall totals are also expected to increase, 
with considerable regional variation.81 
Our ecological footprint now exceeds our 
biological capacity by a record margin.82 By 
2010, almost one in four plant species were 
reportedly threatened with extinction, and 
vertebrae species numbers have fallen by a 
third in the past four decades. Such biodiversity 
loss is made even worse by climate change.83 
Continued population growth will amplify 
already stretched human demand for land and 
water resources, as well as food production 
and energy, generating more emissions 
and heightening human pressures on the 
environment. As urbanisation continues, the 
focus of attention will increasingly be on our 
cities, which by one estimate are already 
responsible for around 57–75 percent of global 
greenhouse gas emissions.84 The effects of 
climate change and environmental degradation 
could well undo part of the enormous progress 
made in tackling poverty, particularly because 
poor people and poor countries are least able 
to cope.85 
The past century has delivered remarkable 
advances in health, as is illustrated by the 
increase of 4.7 years (male) and 5.1 years 
(female) to the average global life expectancy 
at birth between 1990 and 2010.86 The 
eradication of smallpox, the discovery of 
penicillin, the mapping of the human genome, 
the significant reduction in under-five mortality, 
developments in genetic technology, research 
and new treatments for HIV/AIDS, TB and 
malaria, and growing access to health services 
and insurance ensure that our potential to live 
longer and healthier lives is greater than at 
any other point in human history. However, 
translating public health knowledge into 
practice has been fragmented and fraught with 
difficulty. Whilst biomedical technology and 
capacity to enhance the quality of health care 
and prevention have improved significantly, 
access to health care remains vastly lopsided, 
with the poor and disadvantaged suffering a 
disproportionate burden of illness and disease. 
We are in the midst of experiencing multiple 
transitions which impact health. These include 
a demographic transition from a pattern of high 
fertility and high mortality to low fertility (with 
the exception of sub-Saharan Africa), an ageing 
population, and an epidemiological shift from 
infectious diseases associated with malnutrition, 
famine and poor sanitation, to chronic and 
degenerative diseases associated with longevity, 
urban and industrial lifestyles. These changes are 
also associated with a turning point in nutrition, 
where malnutrition can be both from famine and 
starvation as well as from high caloric, nutrient-
poor states, as in the case of obesity.87
Lifestyle choices, lifestyle diseases
The growing threat today is NCDs. Most are 
caused by preventable factors, including poor 
diet, obesity and inactivity. NCDs like diabetes, 
cancer, heart disease, stroke, and chronic lung 
disease were responsible for 63 percent, or 36 
million, of all global deaths in 2008. Described 
as the “invisible epidemic”,88 NCDs are now 
the leading cause of death in the world. Each 
10 percent rise in NCDs is associated with a 
0.5 percent lower rate of annual economic 
growth.89 The cost of treatment for NCDs over 
the next two decades, as our populations grow 
larger and live longer, is estimated to be about 
USD $30 trillion.90
The costs of lost productivity are even higher. 
Globally, projections suggest that there may be 
a cumulative economic output loss of USD $47 
Health
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Figure 12: Projected non-communicable diseases cost by income level based 
on economic growth forecasts   
Source: World Economic Forum & Harvard School of Public Health, The Global Economic Burden of Non-Communicable Diseases 
(Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2011), p.31.
trillion over the next two decades due to NCDs. 
This loss represents 75 percent of global GDP 
in 2010 (USD $63 trillion). It also represents 
“enough money to eradicate two dollar-a-day 
poverty among the 2.5 billion people in that 
state for more than half a century.”91
 
Although NCDs have traditionally been 
considered diseases of the affluent, it is in 
fact poor and disadvantaged populations that 
have the highest rates of NCDs in high-income 
countries.92 Approximately 80 percent of the 
36 million NCD deaths in 2008 occurred in low-
to-middle income countries. Many social factors 
play decisive roles in determining the health of 
individuals and communities, as was reflected 
in the 2011 Rio Declaration.93 The rate of 
increase of NCDs is, however, occurring much 
faster in low-to-middle income countries, as 
economic growth and life expectancy rise. Poor 
education and low incomes are associated with 
rising NCDs in both developed and developing 
countries.94 Sub-Saharan Africa is facing a 
particularly heavy dual burden of disease, where 
NCDs are rising95 but malnutrition, hunger 
and infectious diseases continue to be grave 
problems. Undernutrition is estimated to be 
responsible for 35 percent of all deaths of 
children under five.96 Although Africa has seen 
the greatest rate of decline in child mortality 
rates since 1990, it still has double the ratio of 
the next closest region.97
Interconnected and infectious
The focus on NCDs does not mean infectious 
diseases are a relic of the past. They remain a 
significant threat, particularly in today’s highly 
mobile, interdependent and interconnected 
world. Risks anywhere can be threats 
everywhere. With around 40 new infectious 
diseases discovered in the past 40 years, of 
which SARS, HIV and different types of influenza 
are but three, the concern about further new 
pandemics is not a case of if but when.98
There are concerning trends surrounding 
infectious diseases. Firstly, rapidly evolving 
viruses such as influenza, ebola, Middle East 
Respiratory Syndrome – Coronavirus, and 
HIV continue to thrive. Such threats are not 
new; the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic, 
originating towards the end of the First World 
War, had a devastating impact on populations 
around the world.99 Secondly, as predicted by 
Alexander Fleming, certain infections are re-
emerging as threats because of growing drug 
resistance. Antibiotics were hailed as miracle 
drugs but due to excessive use, misuse and 
poor adherence to antibiotic regimens, many 
infection-causing bacteria have developed 
resistance against existing antibiotics.100 
Combined with the HIV epidemic, this has 
resulted in the resurrection of diseases such 
as TB, creating new epidemics that are much 
harder to treat, such as multi-drug resistant TB.
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A dramatic megatrend of the last half-century 
has been the pace of technological change. 
Computing power has been doubling almost 
every 18 months, virtually matching Gordon 
Moore’s 1965 observation. This appears likely to 
continue for at least the next decade or two,101 
and will continue to revolutionise the way we 
lead our lives and the way societies are governed. 
The Internet’s emergence is one such outcome; it 
now boasts almost 2.5 billion users and there has 
been a sevenfold increase in total international 
bandwidth from 2007–2011. Such is its reach 
and nascent speed, the World Wide Web has 
been heralded “the most powerful force for 
globalisation, democratisation, economic growth, 
and education in history”.102 The information 
revolution has penetrated our lives in ways not 
entirely understood, and created a faster, smarter, 
“more personal and participatory” world.103 
 
The great leveller?
 
New information technologies are reaching the 
world’s poor much faster than food and toilets. 
A recent UN report suggested six billion people 
have access to mobile phones, while only 4.5 
billion have access to working toilets.104 There 
are around one billion mobile phones in both 
China and India. Africa is home to twice as 
many mobile phones as the United States105 
and is the most advanced continent when 
it comes to “mobile money”.106 Developing 
countries accounted for 80 percent of new 
mobile subscriptions in 2011, with the number 
of Internet users doubling over a four year 
period.107 Technology offers great potential to 
enhance education opportunities, dramatically 
improve health outcomes, promote free speech 
and democracy, and offer greater access to 
global markets. 
The Internet is the key driver of global 
connectivity and opportunity, but different 
bandwidth speeds, limited access, and 
contrasting levels of openness can mean that 
the Internet exacerbates rather than offsets 
inequality. Recent reports indicate, for example, 
that less than 15 percent of the Indian population 
(150 million) have access to the Internet, with 
only three percent connected at home.108 The 
WTO’s TRIPS Agreement commits developed 
countries to providing incentives to the private 
sector for technology transfer to developing 
countries, but implementation remains weak.109 
Once online, the inequalities persist. Data speeds 
in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and 
Asia will reach current North American speeds 
by 2017. In 2017, those regions will be home to 
Internet speeds that are roughly six times slower 
than networks in North America.110
Technology
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Figure 13: Mobile money users in Africa in 2011   
Source: The Economist, “The Bank of SMS”, 24 April 2012 http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/04/daily-chart-12. 
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Figure 14: Global mobile data traffic forecast by region 2012–2017   
Source: Cisco, “Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic Forecast Update, 2012–2017”, White Paper, (2013), p. 6  
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/ns827/white_paper_c11-520862.pdf. 
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Double-edged sword
 
A consideration of possible pathways to tackle 
new challenges requires an awareness that 
technology is deeply embedded in existing 
institutional and societal structures. To some 
extent, this can act as a barrier to more 
sustainable innovation, and favour incumbent 
technologies against newcomers or more radical 
interventions. Scholars point to our current 
carbon based energy and transportation systems 
as evidence of “technological lock-in”, reinforced 
by regulatory and incentive structures with 
substantial environmental consequences.111 
The pace of technological change in science, 
information and communications has been 
described as “an accelerating race into the 
unknown”.112 By 2020, there are expected to be 
four billion people online, 31 billion connected 
devices, 450 billion online interactions performed 
per day, and up to 50 trillion gigabytes of data.113 
The notion of the cyber world as a separate 
“space” is increasingly redundant as technology 
becomes more pervasive and we become more 
dependent through our business models, our 
working and social practices, and in the delivery 
of key services. Whilst technological advances 
have revolutionised our lives, and offer profound 
possibilities for tackling challenges, they also 
maximise vulnerability. Individual hackers now 
have the capacity to cripple public and private 
services, or cause havoc through the deliberate 
or unintentional spread of misleading information. 
Controversial developments in artificial life, 
genetic screening and enhancement, the global 
division of labour, and invasions upon privacy 
raise profound questions about the nature of 
human advances. Whilst the potential of big data, 
open sourcing and heightened transparency 
are generating excitement, in some cases the 
ubiquity of information technology has amplified 
public distrust in governments and science, 
instead of boosting social cohesion.
47.1%
18.7%
12.4%
7.7%
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24
Many of the megatrends present extraordinary 
opportunities, but they also generate acute 
risks and challenges unable to be contained 
by any single actor or institution. This section 
examines five areas where we believe action is 
imperative. Space prevents us from capturing 
all the nuances, trade-offs, uncertainties and 
complications inherent within each. Nor do we 
cover every challenge facing our world. We 
have been selective and drawn on our personal 
expertise in order to offer indicative pathways 
for action on key challenges with long-term 
impacts.
Our five areas of focus:
1. Society
Inclusion or exclusion?
Boosting youth employment, empowering 
women and reducing inequality.
2. Resources
Scarce or secure?
Tackling climate change, generating green 
growth and resource security.
3. Health
For richer or poorer? 
Raising access, changing consumption habits 
and preparing for pandemics.
4. Geopolitics
Compete or collaborate?
Managing change and uncertainty 
cooperatively, navigating power transitions 
productively.
5. Governance
Constructive or corrupt?
Accurate measurements, shared language and 
a longer-term focus.
Inclusion or exclusion? 
Boosting youth employment, 
empowering women and reducing 
inequality
Future jobs
Globalisation and automation are changing the 
workforce. Many manufacturing activities, along 
with other key supply chain activities, have 
moved to emerging economies.114 Labour-saving 
technologies are rendering an increasing number 
of jobs obsolete. Recent figures in the United 
States point to substantial structural shifts in 
the workforce, and reveal that large numbers 
of clerical jobs have been displaced by new 
technologies.115 Technological innovation has 
driven down demand for low and medium skill 
labour.116 Demand for employees to reskill quickly 
to keep pace with technological change continues 
to rise. Technology and structural shifts do not 
necessarily mean there will be fewer jobs in the 
future, but adapting to the new environment and 
generating future jobs is a challenge. 
The tech-boom has fuelled new employment 
opportunities in creative and innovative sectors, 
including computer network support roles, 
system architecture and web development.117 
Technology also democratises education 
and training by allowing many individuals 
to learn online and fast-track employment 
opportunities. Nevertheless, computerisation 
is spreading to sectors traditionally confined 
to human labour. Algorithms for Big Data are 
rapidly entering domains reliant upon storing or 
accessing information, and replicate the human 
ability to make sense of it. Robots are gaining 
enhanced senses and dexterity, allowing them 
to perform a wider range of tasks. New studies 
suggest significantly more employment could 
be vulnerable to substitution by computer-
driven equipment over the next two decades, 
in fields such as transportation and logistics, 
administrative support, and production.118
Current understanding of the relationship 
between employment and technological change 
is insufficient, and adjustment to this structural 
shift in the nature of work has been slow. Many 
countries, companies and institutions continue to 
believe that the market will correct employment 
disparities. This view may be too optimistic, 
especially with a deficit of high-skill workers and 
insufficient supply of jobs for low and medium skill 
workers forecast.119 More than ever, governments 
need to distinguish between jobs lost to other 
countries and jobs lost to the past. Protecting 
jobs in areas being replaced by technology is not 
a viable long-term solution. Even though issues 
surrounding employment and workforce structure 
are, first and foremost, national challenges and 
necessitate tailored approaches, many of the 
problems are common to the global workforce. 
Inadequate adjustment is also closely connected 
to broader questions about mobility, development, 
access to property, the cost of social services, and 
participation in civil society.120 
This evolution in the workforce provides the 
context for tackling the current unemployment 
crisis. A generation of workers is at risk. Almost 
30 million net jobs across all age groups were 
lost during the Financial Crisis and haven’t been 
recovered.121 Ageism is increasingly blamed 
for the non-retention or non-hiring of older 
workers.122 The gender gap in unemployment 
has increased once again, after significant 
improvements in the 1990s. Women remain 
squeezed by inflexible workplace arrangements 
and are poorly represented at the top of the 
private and public sector. Women are also paid 
much less than men for equal work, especially 
in certain areas of the globe: more than 80 
percent of female employment in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is unwaged, compared to less than 20 
percent in Eastern Europe and Central Asia.123
Young people remain the worst hit by the jobs 
crisis; they have been labelled the “Baby Bust” 
generation, destined to be poorer than their 
parents.124 Over 70 million young people are out 
of work, and the number is projected to grow. 
In advanced economies, 35 percent of young 
unemployed have not had a job in over six months. 
In Greece and Spain, the youth unemployment 
rate is over 50 percent.125 Some young people 
are dropping out altogether: youth participation 
in the labour force is down to 30.3 percent in the 
Middle East and 33.6 percent in North Africa.126 
The 2013 World Development Report stated 
“621 million young people are ‘idle’ – not in school 
or training, not employed, and not looking for 
work”.127
Economic models and political systems built 
upon a desire for “full employment” may require 
revision. There is evidence of movement 
“towards a more fluid employment relationship”, 
whereby “people are holding portfolios 
of activities, including paid employment, 
unpaid employment such as internships or 
volunteering, self-employment, and caring for 
children or the elderly”.128 Steady adoption of 
a portfolio of activities may lead to a different 
view on economic output and performance 
generated by the workforce, and shift tax 
and regulatory burdens away from labour in 
Challenges Society
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order to facilitate an inclusive, productive and 
flexible workforce fit for this century. It is worth 
cautioning, however, that increased fluidity in 
employment can reduce both the security and 
the self-respect that unskilled workers deserve.
Understanding inequality
 
Economic growth can be unstable if wealth is 
too tightly concentrated.129 Millions have been 
raised out of extreme poverty over the past 
few decades (especially in China and India, as 
highlighted in Figure 5), yet economic growth 
has not been shared inclusively. Globalisation 
has been associated with growing inequality. 
Incomes of the world’s top 1.75 percent of 
earners reportedly exceed the combined total of 
those of the bottom 77 percent.130 As shown in 
Figure 15, 39.3 percent of the world’s wealth is 
reportedly held by 0.6 percent of its adults.131 In 
the United States, despite continued economic 
recovery, incomes have stagnated for all but the 
most highly-educated and affluent Americans.132
Evidence suggests global inequality may have 
begun to decline, perhaps for the first time since 
the Industrial Revolution, but the gap between 
rich and poor countries and the percentage of 
wealth shared by the top one percent remains 
high.134 Inequality is more pronounced between 
rich and poor countries; indeed, location and not 
class now appears to be the decisive indicator 
of inequality.21 Christine Lagarde, Managing 
Director of the IMF, has described inequality as 
corrosive to growth and to society, suggesting 
that the economics profession and policymakers 
need to focus more attention on inequality.135 
Generating an inclusive economy that properly 
and productively shares the benefits and 
opportunities of economic growth has proved an 
elusive goal. Inequality, in particular, is a complex 
phenomenon. Its pathology is especially intricate: 
one has to be careful of broad generalisations 
about present and historical data. Drivers of 
inequality and unequal access to opportunity 
differ across borders. So, too, do sets of 
cultural beliefs, norms and institutions on which 
communities have been built. Income disparity is 
simply one example of inequality, but it may also 
be evidenced by a lack of access to health care, 
malnutrition, poor education, and, increasingly, 
the lack of internet connectivity.
 
The absence of data in poor countries, particularly 
in Africa (where availability of household surveys 
has reportedly declined), makes it difficult to 
understand the true level of inequality and its 
significant drivers.136 Knowledge on the evolution 
of global inequality is said to be “very tentative”, 
even if levels of global inequality remain “much 
greater than inequality within any individual 
country”.137 Big winners in recent decades have 
been the “global top one percent and the middle 
classes of the emerging market economies”.138 
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There are signs for optimism. For some countries, 
within country inequality looks to have plateaued 
over the past two decades, and real incomes for 
those in the bottom third of the global income 
distribution have risen substantially. 
What could be done?
• New targets: To enable a deeper 
understanding of global inequality, it is 
time to shift the focus away from GDP and 
increase attention on measures of household 
income and distribution. Job targets should be 
reconsidered in light of the changing nature 
of employment, including by considering 
the adoption of new metrics, which take 
into account informal and voluntary working 
arrangements.139 Adjustments are required 
to the relative tax and insurance burdens 
operating on labour, capital and consumption. 
• Young workers: Proven interventions designed 
to get young people back into work need 
to be championed. Businesses could be 
encouraged to hire long-term job seekers 
via tax rebates, wage subsidies and loans. 
Governments can consider greater provision 
of one-on-one support for the long-term 
unemployed, including through extended 
unemployment insurance and providing “youth 
guarantees”.140 Improving quality and access 
to basic, higher and vocational education, as 
well as apprenticeships and retraining, should 
be prioritised. Understanding the constraints 
on geographical mobility is vital too, and 
may require support for finding jobs and the 
provision of accommodation in different cities 
and towns. Creative partnerships between 
governments, companies and educational 
institutions can provide direct routes from 
learning to work and out of long-term 
unemployment. 
• Flexible workplaces: Private and public 
sector partnerships should institute flexible 
parental leave, supportive childcare policies 
and mobile workplaces. Different telework 
initiatives to foster flexible and productive 
working arrangements should be studied 
and experimented with in order to achieve 
an appropriate balance for employers and 
employees. The 2002 European Framework 
Agreement on Telework is a model that may 
be replicated elsewhere, as are social security 
and tax rebates designed to promote telework 
schemes. Improving female access to higher 
education and support for equal pay and 
treatment instruments needs to be prioritised. 
Older workers should not be forced out; 
raised retirement ages and longer part-time 
participation in the workforce is necessary 
and desirable, given demographic changes. 
Scarce or secure? 
Tackling climate change, generating 
green growth and resource security
Overall and per capita consumption of food, 
water, minerals and energy is rising rapidly.141 
Resources such as biofuels and shale gas may 
ease pressures on energy supply, but there 
are environmental concerns and uncertainties 
surrounding both techniques that need to be 
fully explored.142 There remains a worrying lack 
of willpower and momentum in the private and 
public sector to change existing approaches 
on the scale required. Policy uncertainty, 
particularly in areas like wind energy or carbon 
pricing, is a key impediment to industry 
investment.143 Investment in carbon free 
energy technology of between USD $48–80 
billion per year is required over at least the 
next two decades if we are to pursue a more 
sustainable path. The reality, however, is that 
perverse subsidies into fossil fuels continue at 
even higher levels: the IMF recently calculated 
the current total after tax subsidies to be  
USD $1.90 trillion.144 Trade practices, including 
industry subsidies, continue to restrain progress 
on resource security. Vital knowledge on 
waste reduction, agricultural yields and energy 
efficiency is insufficiently shared. The waste 
problem remains acute: between 30–50 
percent of the food produced worldwide is 
never consumed and it is feasible, with the 
right policies, to prevent the waste or loss of a 
substantial fraction of this figure.145
Policymakers and academics have historically 
treated water, energy and food separately, 
with governance and research isolated in 
unhelpful silos.146 The absence of close 
coordination between policies that impact 
energy, water supply, land use, the oceans, 
ecosystem services and biodiversity is a barrier 
to a sustainable resource future. Practices 
across all areas need to be integrated and 
ultimately incorporated into systems designed 
to maximise resource efficiency, counteract 
carbon emissions, and minimise waste and 
environmental damage.147 
Sustainable intensification
Food supply is one area especially hampered 
by the “separate silos” approach to resources. 
The global food system (including agricultural 
production as well as distribution, storage, 
and packaging and consumption) directly 
produces 16 percent of total greenhouse 
gas emissions (with the same amount being 
released through the conversion of land to 
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agriculture) and is a considerable drain on water 
resources (approximately 75 percent of the 
water we use globally is for agriculture).148 As 
populations grow, it will become increasingly 
important to manage landscapes in a way that 
reflects their multifunctionality – as places 
where food is produced, carbon is stored and 
sequestered, water is purified and its flow 
regulated, biodiversity thrives, and humans 
find recreation and cultural fulfilment. Higher 
yields in some places will reduce the pressure 
on land that has other important functions in 
addition to, or instead of, agriculture. 149 Greater 
information sharing and assistance between 
countries and across sectors will be vital.150 
Policy on food production cannot solely focus 
on yields and the environment; it must also help 
to improve human nutrition and rural economic 
development.151 Sustainable intensification and 
the attainment of food security will require 
both closing the yield gap – the difference 
between yields that are possible and those 
that are achieved – as well as investing in new 
knowledge to raise maximum yields. This will 
require increased investment in the agricultural 
sciences, not just in advanced biotech. 
Genetic modification is potentially a very 
valuable technology, but not a magic bullet. 
Its advantages and disadvantages should be 
evaluated together with other approaches and a 
more open public dialogue to build trust.152 
Valuing biodiversity and  
ecosystem services
Preserving the variety of natural life – 
biodiversity – is a key element of sustainability. 
All species, especially humans, rely on 
ecosystems and their services. Such services 
are underpinned by biodiversity and generate 
ecological, socio-cultural and economic goods 
and benefits.153 The Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment discovered 60 percent of such 
services “have been degraded or are being 
used unsustainably”, and that “over the last 50 
years human activity has altered ecosystems 
at a faster rate and on a larger scale than 
at any other time in human history”.154 The 
International Union for the Conservation 
of Nature’s Red List of Threatened Species 
(“IUCN Red List”) has been a trusted source of 
information on the status, trends and threats to 
species.155 It is used to support policymaking, 
guide financial investment, raise public 
awareness and track progress in achieving global 
targets to reduce biodiversity loss. Today, the 
IUCN Red List contains records for over 70,000 
species, 29 percent of which are threatened 
with extinction, including one in four mammals 
and one in three amphibians. The IUCN Red List 
shows alarming trends for several groups of 
species. Its sample indicates how life on Earth is 
faring, how little is known, and how urgent the 
need is to know more. 
Biodiversity loss threatens clean water 
provision, food production, climate stability 
and water regulation, reducing the resilience 
of the natural environment in adapting to 
change. Work is being done to enhance 
mapping and modelling of biodiversity and 
ecosystem services, create mechanisms for 
their protection, and ensure fair exploitation.156 
Central to this task are monetary and non-
monetary valuations of biodiversity and 
ecosystem services, along with partnerships 
between businesses, markets and government 
agencies. Payments for Ecosystem Services 
(PES) schemes, including REDD (Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Developing Countries), play a 
role by rewarding local communities who are 
dependent on ecosystems but often struggle to 
interact with them in a sustainable manner.157 
Considerable work remains to be done, 
however, so that governments can distinguish 
between the different benefits generated by 
biodiversity. Tripling the number of species 
assessed by the IUCN Red List so that it 
better represents life on Earth would help to 
guide better policy decisions. Both the public 
and private sector will need to make difficult 
choices in developing landscapes so that they 
can service multiple functions. It will not be 
possible to save all species, but the interests 
of future generations and the need for careful 
stewardship should be kept closely in mind.
Critical, controversial and complicated
The science underpinning climate change is 
complex. Whilst recent evidence suggests there 
may be a current hiatus in global warming,158 
over 97 percent of scientists support the tenets 
of human-induced climate change as outlined 
by the IPCC.159 In 2008, the Stern Review 
suggested a 75 percent chance of global 
temperatures rising by between 2–3°C. The 
most recent IPCC report, released in September 
2013, confirmed that global average land and 
sea temperatures are continuing to increase, sea 
levels are rising and glaciers and polar ice caps 
are melting. It suggests that unless greenhouse 
gas emissions are strongly reduced, the average 
temperature could rise by more than 2°C, and 
perhaps by over 4°C, this century compared 
with its pre-industrial level.160 As Rajendra 
Pachauri, Chair of the IPCC has warned, there 
is still little time left to act decisively: “we have 
five minutes before midnight”.161  Reorienting 
climate change drivers, controlling pollutants, 
and capping CO2 emissions at manageable levels 
is one of the most pressing challenges of the 
21st century. The actions required are of the 
scale of a new Industrial Revolution: we need to 
cut CO2 emissions by 70–80 percent or face 
a drastically hotter planet. As climate change 
impacts are non-linear, the faster we act, the 
safer we will be.
Current modelling tools are unable to predict 
accurately the exact impact of climate changes 
on specific countries and communities. Evidence 
suggests they may eradicate certain plant and 
animal species; cause severe flooding and other 
extreme weather events with crippling impacts 
on people in low and marginal lands, particularly 
poor people; and threaten critical infrastructure 
worldwide, including energy supplies and 
agricultural yields.162 Left unchecked, climate 
change will exacerbate tension across the 
resource mix and potentially increase the risk of 
conflict.163 
An international climate prediction facility similar 
in scale to CERN’s Large Hadron Collider may 
be required to comprehend fully the scale of 
these threats and steer adaptation.164 Climate 
modelling requires improvement so feedback 
effects, temporary slowdowns and regional 
manifestations can be better understood. This 
will improve capacity to communicate climate 
change impacts and ensure this informs policy 
development. Geoengineering – involving 
deliberate attempts to manipulate the Earth’s 
climate on a large scale – cannot be discounted, 
but models, methods and feasibility remain 
uncertain. Geoengineering is unlikely to supply 
an easy or alternative solution to climate 
change, but detailed analysis of possible 
methods and the development of governance 
frameworks are needed to guide the research 
and its application.165 
Signs of change
The safest and most effective response is to 
reduce carbon emissions and turn economies 
away from carbon dependency. There are 
positive signs of change. Over 90 countries, 
responsible for over 75 percent of current 
carbon emissions, have made mitigation pledges 
for 2020 under the Cancun Agreements.166 The 
most recent Chinese Five Year Plan highlights 
the need to modify practices and consume less 
carbon, including by imposing strict quotas on 
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total energy consumption and targets on energy 
efficiency.167 Trial cap-and-trade systems 
have begun in five Chinese cities and two 
provinces.168 Other countries and regions have 
adopted or are designing comprehensive carbon 
taxes or cap-and-trade systems.169 The United 
States has introduced tougher standards for 
power plants and taken steps to end financial 
support for new coal-fired plants overseas.170 
Collectively, however, we remain some distance 
from where we need to be. 
Whilst it is  impressive that many countries, cities, 
provinces, firms, communities and individuals 
are acting, overall progress is far too slow. 
International undertakings and agreements, 
together with national and local action, support 
each other. Debates about climate change 
need to be recalibrated so that their focus is 
opportunity, and to ensure progress does not 
rely disproportionately on a unanimously agreed 
outcome at the UNFCCC. Internationally, the best 
case scenario is a multilateral agreement by 2015 
that will come into effect by 2020. This might 
be too late. Fortunately, much can happen in the 
interim if communities, businesses, governments 
and the media work together to shift individual 
and market behaviour towards a safer trajectory. 
New actors should be engaged, and other 
pollutants tackled.171 There are understandable 
tensions between developed and developing 
countries about the burden of mitigation, 
particularly at the cost of economic development 
in poorer countries. Similarly, how poor countries 
withstand the devastating effects of climate 
change, arguably caused by richer countries, 
is also a major challenge. The architecture of 
a global agreement is complex, much more so 
than the Montreal Protocol, which addressed the 
depletion of the ozone layer. Concerted action at 
the city, company and country level will be vital 
in creating the necessary dynamics for effective 
multilateral action. 
What could be done?
On resource futures: 
• Transparency: There should be greater 
transparency, including in commodity 
trading, declaration of national reserves, and 
land purchases in less developed countries. 
Phasing out fossil fuel and agricultural 
subsidies is well overdue.172 If taken up, 
Chatham House’s proposal for a new 
Resource 30 (or R30) group comprising the 
leading importers and exporters of natural 
resources to enhance transparency, security 
and accessibility across the food, water, and 
energy sectors would provide a significant 
step forward. This should be complemented 
by greater commitment to initiatives like the 
Natural Resource Charter and the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative, which 
foster sustainable and transparent extraction 
of minerals and other natural resources.173
• Technology: Government and business 
investment into integrated research and 
development (R&D) and long-term systems 
approaches uniting food, energy, water and 
land use and biodiversity preservation need 
to increase considerably. Incentivising new 
technologies that offer alternatives to existing 
resource-intensive “locked-in” technologies, 
and measuring available “stockpiles” of 
renewable energy would make a significant 
contribution.174 Large prizes to drive 
innovative solutions on pre-defined climate 
and sustainability goals could be considered, 
perhaps as a substitute (or top-up) for 
intellectual property rights.175
• Transfer and consumption: Excessive 
consumption in the developed world must 
be reduced, whilst food waste in developing 
countries should be addressed in order to 
close the yield gap. Global food, water and 
energy systems need to work together 
to generate sustainable pathways that 
enhance resource security. Agriculture holds 
vast potential for rural development, yet 
landscapes need to be managed to support 
multiple functions and the fair exploitation of 
natural resources.176 Yields could potentially 
be benchmarked and regulated alongside 
carbon sequestration, nutrient density, 
biodiversity conservation, and resilience to 
climate fluctuations. 
On carbon:
• New actors, multiple targets: A global 
carbon price, reflecting the extent of 
adjustment required to achieve an agreed 
amount of total or per capita CO2 that 
can be emitted over time, will be vital to 
drive the scale of investment needed in 
low-carbon infrastructure.177 Realistically, 
this is sometime off and will require 
greater support and more concerted 
action from China and the United States. 
(Although the United States has reduced 
its emissions, a sharper reduction in United 
States per capita emissions and a more 
rapid slowing of the growth in China’s per 
capita emissions is required.)178 Action by 
groups of cities, countries and companies, 
aided by international coordination, could 
spur renewed momentum toward a global 
agreement. Initiatives can include domestic 
carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems, 
temporary border carbon adjustments 
(removed upon the assumption of a global 
price), a moratorium on new coal stations 
that do not use the most effective available 
technologies for reducing emissions (except 
in rare economic circumstances), halting 
deforestation and other land conversion, 
reforestation, promotion of renewable 
energy, public transport improvements, 
tighter rules on energy efficiency, and 
more investment into R&D. The focus need 
not solely be on CO2 emissions: tackling 
other pollutants is an important, and often 
overlooked, part of the overall effort.179 
• International collaboration and exchange: 
Credible incentives for, and investment in, 
cleaner energy infrastructure for poor and 
developing countries is urgently required. 
The Green Climate Fund, established in 
2010 and aimed at helping developing 
countries transition to low emission and 
climate resilient economic development, 
promises much on this, but fundraising has 
been slow and the operational system needs 
to be scaled up. Technology sharing must 
also be prioritised, particularly on waste and 
clean energy. The creation of a “Manhattan 
project” on new energy and support of a 
step-up in modelling would add greatly to 
understanding the uncertain and uneven 
dynamics and consequences of climate 
change, as would clearer communication on 
the science and possible consequences of 
climate change.
• Smaller groupings: The United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) needs reform. A few 
countries are holding up vital progress 
for all. Mechanisms need to be found to 
allow multi-track solutions and coalitions 
of like-minded countries to begin to make 
progress on common agreements. Technical 
expertise and smaller group meetings to 
advance negotiations must be prioritised. 
The unbundling of different dimensions of 
the agreement, to reduce complexity and 
allow progress on certain tracks, may also be 
helpful. 
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For richer or poorer? 
Raising access, changing 
consumption habits and uniting 
against pandemics
The past two decades have witnessed significant 
changes in the burden of disease: NCDs now 
take the greatest toll on life, even if infectious 
diseases (especially HIV/AIDS) continue to pose 
a major threat to health. For the time being, 
resources remain stretched or unavailable in 
the developing world, whilst the health issues 
associated with older and heavier populations 
dominate health sector spending in the 
developed world.180 Deep global inequalities 
persist in access to food, sanitation, vaccines and 
health care. Demographic changes – principally 
ageing and population growth – in conjunction 
with longer life expectancy will produce a rising 
dependency ratio between workers and non-
workers over the coming decades. Chronic 
disease, increasing levels of dementia and 
mental illness already impact public finances 
significantly, but will do so to an even greater 
degree in the decades ahead, not least in many 
developing countries. Managing these changes 
requires difficult spending choices and challenges 
governmental capacity to provide basic health 
care and other vital services. Decisions and 
allocations will raise hard questions about both 
the redistribution of resources within populations 
and issues of intergenerational fairness. Health 
systems can no longer be constructed based 
on historical needs; they must be developed 
cognisant of the changing disease burden profile 
that is likely for the future.181
For every eight people in the world today, 
one still goes to bed hungry each night.182 
Consumption of food in other parts of the world 
is well above the level that can be sustained.183 
It is estimated we will “need two or three 
Earths” if everybody adopted “Western” levels 
of consumption over the coming century.184 
Bigger than tobacco 
Almost 60 years ago Richard Doll and Austin 
Bradford-Hill identified smoking as a reason 
for excess risk of various diseases, especially 
lung cancer.185 Increasing recognition of the 
harmful effects of smoking facilitated a growing 
anti-smoking campaign. Awareness culminated 
in the UN Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control, the most widely and rapidly embraced 
treaty in history, now boasting 176 signatory 
states.186 Countries that have implemented the 
Convention have tackled tobacco better than 
others. Nevertheless, one billion people (one-
seventh of the world’s population) still smoke, 
with rates as high as 52 percent of adult men in 
East Asia and the Pacific.187 
Nowadays, NCDs like diabetes, heart disease, 
stroke and cancer similarly threaten health. The 
reality is that there is no single cure or cause 
for NCDs. Yet “common, modifiable risk factors” 
are known about many NCDs, including obesity, 
overconsumption of unhealthy foods and 
alcohol, and lack of physical activity. Solutions 
focused on risk prevention are said to be “highly 
cost-effective”,188 including the promotion of 
good nutrition, regular exercise and avoiding 
excessive consumption. NCDs are extremely 
expensive. Illnesses related to obesity cost the 
United Kingdom’s National Health Service (NHS) 
over GBP £5 billion per year and generate 70 
percent of health costs in the United States,189 
where obesity prevalence is increasing for all 
adult income and education levels.190 In Samoa, 
roughly 75 percent of adult deaths come from 
NCDs. If the government paid for dialysis for 
everyone that needs it, the bill would total more 
than twelve times the country’s Gross National 
Income.191 
It is unclear whether education campaigns 
and interventions placing responsibility on 
the individual will make a great impact on 
NCDs.192 No single action or policy – a tax 
on certain foods, school menus, advertising 
restrictions, calorie labelling or size limits – is 
itself sufficient.193 The challenge becomes more 
difficult when one realises the food industry is 
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1990 Mean rank 2010 Mean rank % Change 
1 Lower respiratory infections 1 Ischemic heart disease 29%
2 Diarrheal diseases 2 Lower respiratory infections -44% 
3 Preterm birth complications 3 Stroke 19%
4 Ischemic heart disease 4 Diarrheal diseases -51% 
5 Stroke 5 HIV/AIDS 354%
6 Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 6 Low back pain 43% 
7 Malaria 7 Malaria 21%
8 Tuberculosis 8 Preterm birth complications -27%
9 Protein-energy malnutrition 9 Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease -2%
10 Neonatal encephalopathy 10 Road injury 34%
11 Low back pain 12 Neonatal encephalopathy -17%
12 Road injury 13 Tuberculosis -19%
33 HIV/AIDS 20 Protein-energy malnutrition -42%
  Communicable, maternal, neonatal, and nutritional disorders  
  Non-communicable diseases
  Injury
Figure 18: Changes in the global burden of disease 1990–2010   
Note: These rankings refer to “Disability Adjusted Life Cycles”: the number of years lost due to early death, disability or poor health.  
Source: Information adapted from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, “GBD 2010 Change in Leading Causes and Risks Between 1990 and 2010”,  
http://www.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/gbd/visualizations/gbd-2010-change-leading-causes-and-risks-between-1990-and-2010.
30
three times bigger than the tobacco industry.194 
As Margaret Chan, Director-General of the 
World Health Organization (WHO), commented 
recently: “It is not just Big Tobacco anymore. 
Public health must also contend with Big Food, 
Big Soda, and Big Alcohol”.195 New York City 
provides a good example of a major city’s 
successful response to NCDs. The city has 
implemented a smoking ban in public places, 
banned trans-fat in food, and pushed for the 
display of calories counts in restaurants.196 
As good nutrition, sustainable development 
and GDP are closely related, developing 
healthier lifestyles is a responsibility not just 
for individuals but for societies as a whole, 
with increasing healthcare costs and decreased 
productivity representing the major negative 
externalities of the obesity epidemic.197 
Infectious diseases
The extreme danger of a population-crippling 
pandemic remains very real. SARS, swine flu, the 
prevalence of HIV and Hepatitis C infections, 
and the persistence of malaria and cholera 
demonstrate the need for enhanced systems 
management to deal with worldwide threats 
to health. The threat posed by infectious 
diseases will only grow with up to two billion 
people projected to be living in slums by 2030, 
urbanisation concentrating human contact, 
antimicrobial resistance on the rise198 and 
bioterrorism an increasing danger.199 Another 
looming concern is new and re-emerging 
diseases evolving to become drug resistant, 
such as drug resistant tuberculosis.200 
The International Health Regulations, negotiated 
by the WHO and binding 193 States Parties, 
present a mechanism for states to “prevent, 
protect against, control and provide a public 
health response to the international spread of 
disease” and “avoid unnecessary interference 
with international traffic and trade.”201 In 
addition, several global outbreak detection 
systems are now functioning, using traditional 
and social media monitoring and allowing 
evermore prompt detection of outbreaks. 
Should another pandemic arise, however, it 
is doubtful sufficient global capacity exists 
to deal with the loss of life, resulting panic 
and the potentially crippling effects on the 
world economy.202 The connectivity and just-
in-time pressures generated by globalisation 
make these threats more acute, and magnify 
the ramifications of poor coordination.203 Too 
much of the current focus appears reactionary, 
despite evidence showing “a breakdown or 
absence of public health infrastructure was the 
driving factor” in nearly 40 percent of infectious 
disease outbreaks internationally.204 
Competing bedfellows
Tension persists in health between creativity, 
cooperation and control. Without a belief 
that the investment will deliver adequate 
returns, private innovation slows. Fewer 
drugs are hitting the market and those that 
do are marketed as “super-drugs” that can 
be used by a broad middle-class consumer 
base, such as cholesterol lowering statins. 
Pharmaceutical companies are increasingly 
focused on incremental variations to existing 
drugs, rather than new innovations for today’s 
health challenges. The last few decades have 
been described as a “persistent antibiotic-
development drought”, with only two new 
classes developed in the past 30 years.205 
While 75 percent of new molecular entities 
created in the past 10 years can be traced back 
to state-funded labs or university research, it 
is industry that develops new medicines and 
brings them to the market.206 Countries have 
different priorities and relative power in dealing 
with the pharmaceutical industry. A report 
by the Grattan Institute suggested Australia 
pays AUD$1.3 billion too much per year for 
prescription drugs, with one particular drug in 
New Zealand costing less than 4 percent of the 
Australian price.207 A number of countries, such 
as Brazil, have provided access to cheaper drugs 
through the use of generics.208 Uncertainty 
surrounding access and profit were influential 
in Indonesia’s reluctance, beginning in January 
2007, to cooperate on a vaccine during the 
avian flu crisis.209 
Solid strides have been made over the past 
century in improving access to key medicines, 
but the competing demands outlined 
above have meant that progress has been 
inconsistent. The creation of a separate and 
relatively successful Global Fund to tackle AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria was a response to 
this, as is the GAVI Alliance’s important work on 
immunisation and the United States President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.210 Trilateral 
cooperation between the WTO, the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation and WHO to 
promote greater access to health technologies 
and innovation is working towards a further 
harmonisation of interests.211 Over the last 
decade, major pharmaceutical companies have 
fostered greater access to new medicines in 
low-income countries, particularly for drugs 
combating infectious diseases such as HIV and 
tuberculosis. Today, nearly all of the biggest 
pharmaceutical companies practice tiered 
pricing (however, this is not yet the case for 
non-communicable diseases, notably cancer). 
Notwithstanding these efforts, some reforms 
appear to be too slow or piecemeal.212 
Enhancing cooperation and coherence 
Historically, health has been a great role model 
for international cooperation and coherence 
between domestic and global systems.213 
Such synergies, however, have not kept pace 
with globalisation. The WHO is the most likely 
candidate to streamline global health governance, 
but regional subsidiaries and a handful of donors 
have a powerful influence on its finances and 
programmes. The WHO’s primary power is in 
setting and suggesting standards, not enforcing 
them, and in data collection and dissemination. 
The private sector plays an increasing role, 
while philanthropists and NGOs ensure there are 
multiple, though not always complementary, 
avenues for aid. New and reinvigorated avenues 
of cooperation are necessary to stem the burden 
of disease, including through greater sharing of 
knowledge by individuals and networks. In an age 
of strained public research budgets, incentives 
for both private and public sectors to encourage 
new innovations and foster greater collaboration 
are much needed, particularly as technology 
enables the physiology and granularity of disease 
to be better understood. Action cannot only be 
top-down: priorities and responsibilities must be 
embraced at a national, local and individual level, 
and must be coordinated to ensure needs are 
met and resources are well spent. 
What could be done?
• NCDs: Measurable targets for reducing NCDs 
– such as a 30 percent reduction in relative 
mortality from NCDs by 2030 – could be a 
core part of the post-2015 development 
agenda,214 with networks and institutions 
responding to the social determinants 
of health.215 The WHO could convene 
negotiations among interested partners to 
establish a Framework Convention or Code 
of Practice on Alcohol Control.216 Regulatory 
interventions are only one possible course of 
action. Attention could be directed towards 
initiatives, including within education, 
infrastructure and markets, that prompt 
changes to diets and lifestyles over the long 
term, particularly those that stretch demand 
for the most resource intensive types of 
food and energy.217 
• Infectious diseases: Renewed focus on 
infectious diseases in the post-2015 
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agenda should encourage ongoing action in 
the area of HIV, TB, malaria and neglected 
infectious diseases such as dengue fever 
and different worm infections, with new 
targets and partnerships.218 The WHO’s 
2005 International Health Regulations 
(IHR) need to be made operational at both 
the national level and across borders to a 
much greater extent, given the nature of 
the epidemics. Further IHR revisions could 
be considered in order to provide specifics 
on immediate action; rapid diagnosis and 
intervention teams; shared R&D on animal 
and human pathogens; a regulatory regime 
for safety and security; and consistency in 
local, national and international practices. 
The WHO should consider setting up 
regional rapid response teams that can 
better connect with outbreak alert 
networks monitoring social media and local 
rumours. Correcting deficiencies (or voids) 
in infrastructure (such as surveillance, 
diagnostic capacities, individual awareness, 
reporting avenues, sanitation, and control 
provisions) in the event of threats to public 
health should be prioritised.219 Encouraging 
innovations in vaccine distribution, such 
as creating vaccines that are stable in 
fluctuating temperatures, or utilising pre-
existing infrastructure such as refrigeration, 
as well as the mass production of dry 
vaccines,220 will enable greater penetration 
of immunisation programmes into the most 
remote parts of the world.221 
• Pharmaceuticals: More pharmaceutical 
companies could commit to tiered prices 
based on national income, and grant voluntary 
licenses to enable local production in low-
income countries. Further reforms to the 
pricing of drugs to incorporate outcomes 
should also be considered, along with public-
private partnerships to share the costs and 
revenue of drug development. Pharmaceutical 
companies could give access to drug trial 
results, provided privacy concerns are 
respected, for greater insight into negative 
as well as positive results. Rights to patent 
natural DNA, as opposed to its exploitation, 
could be restricted, as demonstrated by the 
United States Supreme Court in its June 2013 
decision.222 Reforms to IP rules should be 
developed to ensure adequate protection and 
enforcement of rights alongside incentives 
for innovation and faster access to cheaper 
medicines in poor countries. 
Compete or collaborate? 
Managing change and uncertainty 
cooperatively, navigating power 
transitions productively
Nations have historically tended to pursue 
self-interest instead of working together for 
mutual benefit. Since the Second World War, 
the balance has slowly shifted: the incidence 
of cooperative behaviour, particularly within 
institutions and through international rules and 
regulations, has grown. Although traditional 
security threats remain, unconventional security 
dilemmas are on the rise and require greater 
levels of international cooperation. Adversaries 
continue to emerge in greater numbers from 
individuals or networks and seek to cause or 
provoke violence on an industrial scale. Risks 
arising from natural and synthetically created 
pandemics, climate change, cyber attacks and 
other cross-border threats are more intense, 
rapid and complex than many previous threats, 
with increased integration and rising populations 
and incomes compounding the risks of contagion 
and cascading failures. New age connectivity 
necessitates new age solidarity.223 States will 
have legitimate claims to put themselves first, 
but this century’s challenges cannot be dealt with 
by states acting alone. Outward looking policies 
and collaboration are required. 
Sharing power
China looks set to overtake the United States 
as the world’s biggest economy, potentially 
as early as 2016.224 While few doubt the 
continued strength of the United States, 
especially in per capita terms, emerging powers 
are gaining prominence on the global stage. 
History tells us power transitions present 
immense geopolitical challenges. In this respect, 
the Sino-American relationship is this century’s 
most important bilateral partnership. We concur 
with the experts who suggest China’s rise need 
not be seen as threatening, and would welcome 
wider recognition that China and Asia’s stake in 
the world necessitates greater engagement in 
global institutions and cooperation to address 
critical challenges.225 Although power shifts 
do not have a good track record, no aspiring 
great power resembles Germany in 1914 or 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Peace 
prospers to a far greater degree. Power is 
more diffuse than ever. The convergence 
should be embraced, not resisted. More global 
conversations, less anachronistic policies and an 
agreed global ethic are essential for a one-world 
theory to emerge triumphant.226 
Virtual tensions
When President Obama met the new Chinese 
President, Xi Jinping, in California in June 
2013, cyber security was high on the agenda. 
The potential for cybercrime and cyber 
aggression within the digital world is relatively 
unconstrained by jurisdictional boundaries 
and virtually unregulated by government 
agencies or frameworks. State-directed 
cyber espionage is alleged to target political 
and military enterprises, and many states 
assert their private sector is subject to cyber 
attacks. Individuals are increasingly victims of 
cybercrime. There is renewed suspicion about 
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the reach of surveillance tools used by states 
to monitor cyber interactions, just as there is 
greater fear on the part of governments about 
the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to 
cyber attack. The cost of cybercrime in just 
24 countries is estimated to cost the global 
economy USD $274 billion per year.227 Threats 
emerging from cyberspace are considered one 
of the most serious economic and national 
security challenges states will face this century. 
Online aggression could trigger conventional 
military conflicts. 
Action to enhance cyber security will require 
collaboration. Coordination within and across 
national boundaries (not least in evidence 
gathering) will be vital if cyber threats are to 
be addressed. This is not an issue where cyber 
capacity, be it offensive or defensive, can 
be easily compared to security threats that 
existed during the Cold War; this is not like 
building a warhead, maintaining a military, or 
enriching uranium. Low costs of entry could 
well mean the cyber domain is the predominant 
site for asymmetric warfare: combatants are 
just as likely to be non-states, who exploit 
deficient infrastructure elsewhere. Threats 
could emanate from places where information 
on cyber protection is insufficiently shared or 
inadequately developed. This is particularly the 
case in African and South American markets 
where technology is spreading fast. Deficient 
cyber infrastructure is not just an issue in 
developing countries; recent reports indicate 
“four in five of the United Kingdom’s largest 
quoted companies are not prepared for cyber 
attacks”.228 The need to develop capacity 
throughout the world to enhance the security 
of the cyber domain is paramount. 
Reflecting power
China is not the only new power this century. 
India, Brazil, Germany, Nigeria, South Africa 
and Indonesia are just some of the others 
touted as emerging powers. Most international 
institutions, however, operate under 20th 
century geopolitical arrangements, with two 
serious shortcomings. The first is countries 
with a diminishing stake retain disproportionate 
power. The second is there are almost four 
times as many countries, along with new 
networks and NGOs, at many decision-making 
tables. Both realities endure at a time when the 
issues are more connected and complicated.229 
They combine to shut important countries or 
institutions out of key decisions and undermine 
meaningful dialogue. Longevity does not 
necessarily make institutions redundant – indeed, 
some thrive due to their endurance – but it 
is clear many current institutions could be 
reformed to better reflect the demands of the 
new century. Should this occur, countries might 
be more willing to delegate greater power to 
them. They will also be in a better position to 
decide which forum is best for which issues, and 
generate the authority and legitimacy to match. 
This will reduce forum shopping and ensure 
activities can be optimised for the issues at hand.
Opening up
The international community remains divided on 
the direction of trade opening. The vast increase 
in trade opportunities has not been matched 
by a commitment to update trade rules for the 
21st century. Paralysis rather than progress 
has been the norm in the 12 years since the 
launch of the Doha Development Round, which 
has revealed stark differences over precisely 
how to progress the trade agenda, especially 
in the developing world. Although there was an 
increase in protectionist measures following the 
Financial Crisis, they remained minor irritations 
rather than a frontal assault on trade. Instead, 
bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements have 
meant that trade advances have come through 
these achievements, rather than what was 
thought to be possible via the Doha Round, the 
conclusion of which is estimated to be worth 
an additional USD $280 billion annually to 
global GDP.230 As of January 2013, over 540 
regional trade agreements have been received 
by the WTO, with over 350 of these in force. 
Some of these buttress and boost momentum 
on multilateral trade efforts; others are alleged 
to undermine them.231 Several commentators 
have found hope in the renewed commitment 
of the European Union and the United States 
to push for a free trade agreement by 2015,232 
along with the Trans-Pacific Partnership in the 
Asia-Pacific and the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership in East Asia between 
ASEAN and its Free Trade Partners. Such 
initiatives have potential if all countries work 
together cooperatively and collaboratively; if 
they do not, they risk damaging global trade 
even further. 
The Doha Round has broken down because of 
the differences among just a few advanced 
and emerging economies, not because of the 
“consensus” problem. Our Commission Chair, 
the former Director-General of the WTO, Pascal 
Lamy, argues that those who declare Doha 
dead are missing the point of a process that is 
unique amongst trade negotiations in having 
development at its core.233 Key disputes include 
the lead time required before the commitments 
of emerging economies match those of the 
advanced economies, and what sort of support 
should be extended to the poorest countries to 
hasten their development. Momentum has also 
stalled partly because of a flawed but powerful 
belief that open borders hurt local economies 
and increase poverty, despite strong evidence 
to the contrary. Rising restrictions on the 
movement of people can also be an obstacle to 
economic growth, compromising the dynamism 
of many economies and efforts to reduce 
poverty.234
What could be done?
• Sharing power: The United States and China 
should work together to set a safer and 
sustainable course, establishing agreements 
in areas such as climate change, and 
maintaining regional peace and stability. 
• Reinvigorated institutions: Reform of our 
20th century global governance institutions 
is overdue. Measures could include new 
permanent members and semi-permanent 
members of the UN Security Council; voting 
changes in the Bretton Woods institutions 
and other multilateral organisations 
so that emerging economies possess 
proportionate power; using merit instead 
of geography to determine the leaders of 
multilateral institutions; and reinvigorating 
the G20 so it is effective outside times of 
crisis and influential on issues like climate 
change.235 This could include reassessing and 
strengthening the role of sherpas to ensure 
leaders focus on priority issues, and ensuring 
a portion of each G20 meeting is devoted to 
establishing a common agenda for the longer 
term.236
• Modernising trade: Immediate action with 
long-term benefits could be taken by 
cutting customs red tape (reducing this by 
half would have the same economic effect 
as removing all tariffs); rolling back the 
trade restrictive measures imposed during 
the Financial Crisis;237 and coming to a 
quid pro quo on agricultural and industrial 
tariffs. Completing the Doha package 
would renew global trade systems, whilst 
further important actions are required with 
regards to investment competition, export 
restrictions, corruption and energy. 
• Confronting cyber: Work must continue 
on developing rules for cybercrime and 
cyberwar, building on recent UN progress 
which affirmed that international law is 
applicable in cyberspace.238 There are 
considerable gaps in the emerging legal 
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architecture that need to be addressed, 
alongside further harmonisation of existing 
regional treaties.239 States should step up 
their efforts to build cyber capacity and 
resilience in developing regions. Increasing 
efforts could be directed to remedying 
deficient governance structures that have 
implications for digital lives, and updating 
regulations (including in taxation and data 
protection) to clarify where responsibility 
lies.240 Systems should be designed with 
citizens firmly in mind, assisting them to 
maintain optimal security and protect their 
online activities and information.241
Constructive or corrupt? 
Accurate measurements, shared 
language and a longer-term focus 
Two myths about governance and corruption 
have been dispelled over the past two decades. 
One is that they cannot be measured. The 
World Bank now examines over 350 variables 
on governance across more than 200 
countries, principally through its Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGIs). They measure 
how authority is exercised across six indicators: 
voice and accountability; political stability 
and the absence of major violence and 
terror; government effectiveness; regulatory 
quality; rule of law; and control of corruption. 
Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) and the Ibrahim Index 
of African Governance (IIAG) provide additional 
examples of efforts to measure standards of 
governance and corruption, difficult though 
that task may be. Another myth dispelled is 
that good governance and anti-corruption 
efforts are “overrated”. The WGIs, developed 
by Daniel Kaufman and others, revealed a 
significant “development dividend” from 
improved governance. One estimate suggests 
an improvement of one standard deviation 
can nearly triple per capita income across a 
population, delivering substantial reductions 
in infant mortality and illiteracy.242 What has 
become clear, however, is that countries follow 
quite different transition paths (even those 
within the same region); one needs to dig into 
the data and conduct in-depth, in-country 
diagnostics to determine what remedial action 
is necessary for improved governance.243 
Pathway from poverty 
Kaufman’s latest initiative, the Resource 
Governance Index (RGI), measures transparency 
and accountability in the oil, gas and mining 
sectors of 58 countries, which collectively 
produce 85 percent of the world’s petroleum, 
90 percent of diamonds and 80 percent of 
copper.244 The 2013 RGI revealed 80 percent 
of those countries “fail to achieve good 
governance in their extractive sectors”, a gap 
that “extends to state-owned companies, 
natural resource funds and subnational 
transfers”.245 Of course, the world’s natural 
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resources do not only flow from rich countries 
such as Australia, Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Zambia, 
Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and Angola are examples of 
poorer countries with large amounts of natural 
resources. Large, untapped resource pools will 
likely be found elsewhere. Natural resources can 
be transformative if appropriately harnessed. 
This can lead to an effective pathway out 
of poverty or prove to be a curse on poor 
countries. Too many resource rich countries 
have remained poor despite their endowment: 
poor governance structures and short-sighted, 
often corrupt, decisions on the part of both 
foreign and local players can ensure countries 
miss “one-off” chances to foster a prosperous 
and economically sustainable future before 
resources are depleted. Here, the priority cannot 
be simply to diagnose gaps in good governance, 
it must primarily be to develop governance 
capacity in response to such deficiencies. 
Accurate measurements
A recent World Bank study of Africa called 
on governments to invest the benefits of the 
resources “windfall” to increase economic 
opportunities and improve health and 
education, especially for young and future 
generations.246 The report claimed that the 
benefits of recent economic growth in Africa 
had failed to reach the poorest segments of 
society, with the number of impoverished 
people increasing in some resource rich 
countries. A natural ally in this quest is 
improving governance capacity. Experts 
have identified “complexity and corruption of 
bureaucratic procedures”, “instability of national 
regulations” and “low levels of political stability” 
as the top three barriers to renewable energy 
investment in Africa.247 Governance indicators 
have the potential to shift decision-making 
by correcting information asymmetries and 
changing incentive structures. Such indicators 
have provided crucial information to decision-
makers and helped focus attention on good 
governance in policymaking. The growth 
of governance indices has also generated 
momentum and awareness about reducing 
corruption. 
Despite great intentions, the diagnostic tools 
are not enough. Current indicators suffer from 
several challenges, both in data quality and 
theoretical grounding, and are often based on 
perceptions.248 Such indicators can also obscure 
the subtleties of difference between sector 
specific forms of governance and disregard 
potential varieties in what good governance 
may entail. It has been suggested that many 
indicators should come with a “health warning”, 
emphasising their caveats and limitations.249 
The measurements and data matter most 
where countries or companies feel vulnerable 
and are motivated to reform existing practices. 
The governance gap is still holding too many 
countries back, particularly in the management 
of natural resources. The targeting of corruption 
(including legal corruption) as an impediment to 
good governance needs particular attention. 
Corporate governance
The June 2013 G8 and July 2013 G20 
declarations on tax evasion challenge long-
standing practices of shifting profits to avoid 
taxes, a lack of transparency on tax havens, 
insufficient clarity on company ownership, 
and the non-reporting of payments made by 
extractive companies to governments.250 These 
realities combine to exacerbate the governance 
gap and prevent much-needed growth within 
developing countries. Action to address such 
long-standing practices along with further 
cultural, structural and procedural changes 
remain overdue. This includes addressing 
the short-termism that dominates much of 
the private sector and reorienting company 
priorities and performance towards a longer 
time horizon.
The public sector does not have a monopoly on 
poor governance. Dominic Barton, Managing 
Director of McKinsey & Company, has explained 
that “much of what went awry before and after 
the Financial Crisis stemmed from failures of 
governance, decision-making, and leadership 
within companies”.251 The problem, however, 
did not start and certainly did not end with the 
Financial Crisis. The private sector remains the 
strongest source of growth and jobs (creating 
9 of every 10 jobs in the developing world),252 
but some businesses continue to undermine the 
sustainability of the planet. Vested interests and 
“legal corruption” in the form of pork barrelling 
and tax avoidance play a negative role. 
Private sector governance reform is especially 
important for resource sustainability. 
Unsustainable growth models continue to 
heighten instability across financial systems and 
threaten geopolitical unrest. Without a greener, 
longer-sighted growth model, the environment 
will become increasingly unbalanced, expensive 
or extinct. The recent auction of a Bluefin tuna in 
Tokyo for a record amount of GBP £1.09 million 
(USD$1.7 million), for example, heightened 
concerns that market signals could result in 
certain species being viewed as “too valuable to 
save”.253 Put simply: businesses can no longer 
operate within a “business as usual” mindset that 
prejudices short-term returns over longer-term 
sustainability. Longer-term planning timeframes 
must be ingrained into our business practices, 
planning and cultures. Several companies have 
already taken significant strides; Unilever is 
one that has taken the lead in shifting its focus 
towards sustainability and the long-term.254 
Tackling the future requires systemic reform of 
the current capitalist growth model and providing 
a pathway for the financial sector “to reassert 
a client service culture that values long-term 
relationships and emphasises the duty of care”.255 
Shared language
During the last century, shared language 
became increasingly important. By this we do 
not mean Chinese, English or Arabic, but the 
language contained in international treaties and 
regulations. International law is now ubiquitous: 
shared language on law and human rights has 
been essential to humanitarian progress. Agreed 
standards on aviation ensure air travel is safer 
than ever before. Coordination on radiation 
enables levels around the world to be compared 
and exposures regulated. Shared answers on 
the risks posed by halogenated hydrocarbons 
enabled agreement on protecting the ozone 
layer. On the other hand, a lack of shared 
language and coordination can be divisive. 
To take just one example: migration. States 
that have ratified at least one of the three 
international instruments related to migrant 
workers hosted less than a third of the total 
global migrant population in 2010. In other 
words, states that had ratified none of the 
applicable instruments hosted over two thirds 
of the world’s migrants, ensuring many were 
insufficiently protected.256
As the challenges become more complex and 
connected, the world’s capacity to agree a 
common legal and rights language to make 
this century more peaceful and prosperous is 
vital. Here, leaders and lawmakers must think 
carefully about the type of legal regulation most 
conducive to progress. Shared language need 
not prevent devolution to the lowest levels to 
ensure communities can tackle agreed problems 
in their own fashion, but towards a collective 
end. This requires a certain level of discretion, 
flexibility and perhaps even simplicity to be 
built into national and multilateral rules and 
agreements.257 At a minimum, however, agreed 
rules must be implemented effectively at the 
domestic level. 
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What could be done?
On public sector governance 
• Improving indicators: Attention must be 
devoted to improving the transparency, 
consistency, scope and availability of 
baseline governance indicators, with 
particular focus on making more governance 
indicators results-based. Existing indicators 
should also give countries greater ownership 
of the process. The Ibrahim Index is a useful 
model in this respect for assisting regions 
to create data autonomy. Producers of 
existing indicators should make explicit 
the theoretical assumptions behind their 
variables so that users are more aware of 
their limitations. 
• Governance guidance and transparency: 
Multi-stakeholder groups could be formed 
to help countries that do not improve 
governance and anti-corruption scores 
and request assistance. Remedial action 
should be decentralised where possible to 
local actors, with countries facing similar 
challenges “paired” to ensure useful lessons 
from comparable past transitions are 
properly shared.258 The Natural Resource 
Charter provides a powerful template “to 
help governments and citizens harness 
natural resources wealth by making decisions 
that will provide the maximum sustained 
economic benefit”.259 Efforts to reduce 
tax evasion and improve transparency 
begun at the June 2013 G8 meeting and 
carried forward at G20 meetings in July 
and September 2013 should be actively 
pursued.260
• Embracing technology: The possibilities 
presented by smart phone applications, 
social media, big data and other technologies 
should be leveraged to enhance transparency 
and accountability within governments and 
community organisations. Most simply, this 
might involve reaching the widest audience 
by making information available in as 
many formats and institutions as possible. 
More ambitiously, technology can be used 
to increase civic engagement in policy 
development, enabling a more inclusive and 
empowered society.
On private sector governance
• Rewire businesses for the long term: Business 
incentives could be realigned towards a longer 
horizon by rolling back the weight attached 
to mark-to-market accounting, quarterly 
earnings and short-term incentive bonuses.261 
A rethinking of corporate governance so that 
owners and boards embrace longer-term 
responsibilities is also required.262 This involves 
smarter regulation, remuneration tied to long-
term performance, and voting structures that 
reward long-term growth. There is a pressing 
need for a market recalibration of private 
and societal interest that properly accounts 
for their interdependence. This necessitates 
reforming accounting frameworks and 
performance measurements – including by 
developing long-term “health” metrics263 
– so that they respond to social needs, 
foster innovation and investment towards 
sustainable ends, and appropriately engender 
a longer-term view.264
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Responsible Futures
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This Commission believes the scale of today’s 
challenges means countries and organisations 
need to enhance, and prioritise, their capacity to 
think and act with a longer-term perspective. In 
Part A, we identified a number of the 
megatrends and challenges that will shape our 
future, and explored some of the responses 
that are already available. In Part B, Responsible 
Futures, we aim to shed light on why gridlock 
prevails where action is imperative. We seek to 
understand the factors that are undermining 
political will to act, despite the urgency and 
extent of the problems. In this first section, we 
begin by identifying key lessons from historical 
examples where impediments to action have 
been successfully overcome. The elements 
contributing to success include the necessity 
for action created by crisis, the power of 
mutual interests, individual leadership, and the 
establishment of effective partnerships. By 
contrast, the elements which have contributed 
to gridlock and failure to act include the 
“tragedy of the commons”, vested interests, 
lack of intergenerational oversight and an 
absence of vision. By drawing on these historical 
examples of success and failure, the second 
section of Part B draws out the implications for 
bridging the gap between knowledge and action 
and enabling a longer-term focus. 
While gridlock and inaction persist in a number 
of spheres, it is important to draw inspiration 
from the remarkable progress made last century 
in addressing seemingly intractable challenges. 
The following examples were not unequivocal 
successes, but they illustrate key factors that 
contributed to meaningful action on apparently 
insurmountable challenges. 
Crisis 
As the creation of the UN and the Bretton 
Woods system after the Second World War 
illustrates, crisis is often a stimulant for action. 
Crises provide moments of opportunity. They 
can propel ideas from the margins to the 
mainstream and lead to the acceleration of 
much needed reforms.1 Even in the context 
of deep ideological division during the Cold 
War, leaders reached across the Iron Curtain 
following the Cuban Missile Crisis to promote 
international security. The resulting Limited Test 
Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty of 1968 contained the spread of nuclear 
weapons. 
More recently, in the aftermath of the 2008 
global Financial Crisis, the G20’s action to avert 
a global depression and restore confidence in 
the international financial system was hailed as 
a watershed for multilateral cooperation.2 The 
G20 arose out of the Asian Financial Crisis of 
the late 1990s in order for finance ministers 
and central bank governors to deliberate 
about issues impacting the global economy.3 
Following the 2008 Financial Crisis it evolved 
into a forum for heads of government. The 
flexibility, speed and scope of international 
cooperation to lower interest rates and 
recapitalise the banking system in the midst of 
the crisis was unprecedented.4 Moreover, the 
establishment of the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB) in 2009 provided an additional lever for 
global governance of the financial sector, even 
if subsequent developments have dampened 
expectations about the transformative power 
of either the G20 or FSB.5 
Outside finance, sometimes tragedy is the 
price paid for reform. In the early 1990s, the 
international community failed to respond 
adequately to civil war and genocide in Somalia 
and Rwanda. The humanitarian community 
has since worked to improve accountability, 
strengthen peace-building processes, and 
better integrate humanitarian interventions 
across the UN system, including through The 
Sphere Project.6 Meanwhile, the doctrine of 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) gained greater 
traction and was formally enshrined by the UN 
World Summit in 2005.7 On a related front, 
temporary ad hoc tribunals established in the 
1990s strengthened support for a permanent 
international court for the prosecution of war 
criminals.8 Although such proposals had been 
floated since 1948, the International Criminal 
Court was formally established in 2002. 
Mobilisation in response to crises has not always 
been reactive: the international community 
has also anticipated major disasters. Action 
has often been predicated upon the threat 
of potential crises, rather than a crisis itself. 
The prospect that all of the world’s digitised 
systems would malfunction at the stroke of 
midnight ushering in the year 2000 (due to the 
abbreviation of four-digit dates to two digits) 
was perhaps magnified by parties who sought 
to encourage business to spend on mitigation. 
The so-called Y2K problem, which many argue 
was overstated, was nevertheless seen to 
constitute enough of a threat to prompt the 
Basel Committee, the Bank for International 
Settlements and other partners to create the 
Year 2000 Network. The Network was charged 
with developing coordinated national strategies, 
publishing policy papers, and providing guidance 
and recommendations to the public and private 
sectors to help Y2K preparations.9 In the span 
of six months of swift and effective action, the 
Network coordinated efforts between different 
nations and sectors to guard against the feared 
Y2K collapse. 
 
Shared interests
Mutual interests have long been a key 
ingredient of cooperation and progress. A 
confluence of interests between nations, 
businesses, and trade unions was a key factor 
underpinning the Single Market Programme’s 
(SMP’s) success in transforming the European 
Union “from an organisation in crisis to one 
that was able to attain some remarkable 
agreements”.10 The SMP attracted businesses 
by reducing non-tariff trade barriers and 
limiting changes to industries that were 
already highly interconnected. It also preserved 
individual state sovereignty over property rights 
and governance, opting instead for a system of 
mutual recognition that allowed nations to more 
easily exchange goods and services. 
Combining related interests (and flexibility in 
design) was also vital to the passage of the 
Helsinki Accords. Signed in 1975 to improve 
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diplomatic relations between Eastern bloc 
countries and the rest of Europe, the Accords 
were welcomed by the Soviet Union because 
they acknowledged the territorial integrity 
of states, thereby lending legitimacy to the 
USSR’s post-war boundaries. At the same 
time, the Accords appealed to the European 
Community and to the United States partly 
because they established human rights as 
norms in diplomatic relations.11 The human 
rights provisions proved to have a lasting 
impact, establishing a framework for citizens in 
the Eastern bloc to challenge the legitimacy of 
the Soviet regime.12
Overlapping interests have been important 
in generating action on the environmental 
front. The 1989 Montreal Protocol to prevent 
ozone depletion was based on the shared 
interest of each of its initial signatories, and, 
in turn, all 197 parties. Scientific modelling 
had projected that without action “nearly 
two-thirds of the earth’s ozone layer would 
be gone by 2065, with UV radiation up by 
650 percent and catastrophic consequences 
for life on Earth”.13 The Protocol achieved a 
complete phaseout of chlorofluorocarbon 
(CFC) production by 199614 and has resulted 
in a gradual restoration of the ozone layer.15 
Professor Bob Watson, whose research 
influenced the Protocol, argues that one of 
the key elements of the Protocol’s success 
was the interplay between scientific experts, 
the private sector, social scientists and 
large funders.16 There were other important 
elements beyond shared interests, of course, 
including the impetus provided by the clarity 
of the scientific evidence, the flexibility of 
the instruments, the accompanying trade 
provisions, industry involvement, and the 
commitment by developed countries to assist 
developing countries to phase out production 
and consumption of CFCs and halons.17 
Progress was also helped by the fact that most 
ozone depleting substances were produced in 
industrialised countries and there were clear 
benefits in moving away from their use.18 
Taking the lead
Leadership can be decisive in translating 
shared interests into definitive action. The 
achievements of Nelson Mandela, Deng 
Xiaoping, Martin Luther King Jr, Winston 
Churchill and Mahatma Gandhi reveal the 
importance of courageous, visionary and skilful 
leadership, capable of seizing the opportunity 
to propel action. Europe’s SMP, for example, 
originated within the ranks of the European 
Community in 1981 as a proposal drafted by 
Karl Heinz Narjes, Commissioner for the Internal 
Market.19 Yet it was the election of Jacques 
Delors as President in 1985 that provided 
the leadership necessary to develop this idea 
and implement the SMP. After accepting his 
nomination, Delors looked at a number of 
possible projects to revitalise the European 
Community; of the options on the table, 
including institutional reform and monetary 
union, the SMP received the most support.20 
In his inaugural address to the European 
Parliament, Delors declared “the total abolition 
of internal frontiers remains the ultimate 
objective”.21
Leadership also played an important role in 
the ratification of the Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control (FCTC), adopted in 2003 
as the world’s first global public health treaty. 
The idea of regulating tobacco production and 
marketing faced significant resistance, but the 
election of Gro Harlem Brundtland in 1998 as 
WHO Director-General gave the FCTC overdue 
traction. Brundtland made tobacco control 
one of her two main priorities and successfully 
overcame resistance to negotiate the 
Convention.22 The FCTC represented a paradigm 
shift in regulating addictive substances by 
emphasising the need to reduce demand.23 
As of 2012, two thirds of the 177 countries 
party to the FCTC had instituted tax policies 
to limit tobacco consumption; 85 percent had 
introduced policies requiring tobacco products 
to contain warnings about health risks; and 86 
countries had established comprehensive bans 
on advertising, promotion and sponsorship.24 
Eighteen of the 25 countries that have 
provided the WHO with data tracking tobacco 
consumption have seen decreased rates of adult 
tobacco consumption.25 
Inclusion
Once there is a catalyst for action, a number of 
factors contribute to successful implementation. 
Many prominent interventions have been 
characterised by inclusivity, which has secured 
broad buy-in from the international community. 
In the post-Second World War period, for 
example, the UN and GATT (now the WTO) 
significantly expanded global decision-making 
by bringing the majority of the world’s countries 
to the negotiating table. 
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) provides an illustration of how 
the UN’s emphasis on inclusiveness enabled 
a paradigm shift in global engagement. The 
Commission on Human Rights, which was 
charged with drafting the document, included 
a broad set of global representatives, with 
China’s P. C. Chang and Lebanon’s Charles Malik 
playing central roles. Although spearheaded by 
the United States, the UDHR acquired additional 
momentum from support by activists, religious 
groups and politicians from smaller nations. The 
Commission’s emphasis on global representation 
paid off in consolidating broad support and 
adherence to the declaration, with most of the 
UDHR’s provisions adopted unanimously by UN 
member nations. 
Today, even the world’s more exclusive 
collaborative platforms have made substantive 
attempts to extend decision-making power to a 
broader base. The G20, for example, is viewed 
as a platform that brought rising economies 
such as China, Brazil and India into high-level 
consultations previously the domain of the G8.26 
The broader reach of the G20, and notably its 
incorporation of emerging economies, was vital 
in stabilising the financial system in 2008.27 
Taken together, G20 nations represent over 80 
percent of the world’s GDP, two thirds of the 
global population, and comprise 80 percent of 
the world’s trade.28 
Institutions and networks 
Inclusivity is meaningless if actors do not 
have an effective medium within which to 
collaborate. Such platforms might include “sets 
of practices and expectations rather than 
formal organisations,”29 which function through 
soft power engagement without imposing legal 
obligations on states.30 In this respect, networks 
have become vital. As Anne-Marie Slaughter 
has written, networks counter the paradox of 
globalisation: “We need more government on a 
global and a regional scale, but we don’t want 
the centralisation of decision-making power 
and coercive authority so far from the people 
actually to be governed.”31 As non-hierarchical 
platforms for governance and dialogue, 
networks create a framework for government 
without requiring a sacrifice of sovereign 
power.32 Inter-governmental networks facilitate 
flexibility, speed, and information sharing. Their 
egalitarian nature allows for more democratic 
decision-making. By including developing 
nations, and lending legitimacy to peripheral 
players through collaboration, networks 
facilitate equal and open dialogue and trust 
between participants.33 
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Formal institutions, even when their modus 
operandi is informality, remain vital. The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC)34 are two examples of diverse but 
effective institutions working to build unity 
through inter-governmental agenda setting 
and coordination. ASEAN is a particularly useful 
example. Established in 1967 to promote 
national reconciliation in the context of regional 
conflict,35 ASEAN has evolved to become a 
highly flexible institution central to stability and 
cooperation in Asia. It was able to mobilise in 
the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
to develop regional surveillance mechanisms, 
shore up financing to support regional 
currencies, and subsequently enact successful 
programmes to prevent future crises.36 ASEAN’s 
historic engagement of Myanmar, even as other 
states retreated and imposed sanctions, helped 
facilitate the recent opening up of the country. 
It will likely provide further encouragement for 
reform when Myanmar chairs ASEAN in 2014.37 
ASEAN’s emphasis on information sharing and 
consensus building38 has reduced levels of 
distrust and increased goodwill between diverse 
nations in the region.39 
The coordination and flexibility that networks 
facilitate can also occur within more formalised 
settings. The UN Economic and Social Council’s 
(ECOSOC) ad hoc advisory groups on African 
countries are one such example. First endorsed 
in 2002, these groups are semi-formal 
instruments to mobilise peace-building efforts 
in African countries emerging from conflict, 
such as Guinea-Bissau (2002) and Burundi 
(2003). By facilitating cooperation between 
various UN agencies, including the Security 
Council, and other key in-country stakeholders, 
these groups provide a voice for countries 
mired in conflict and bolster the UN’s capacity 
to promote peace through activities such as 
disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration 
of former combatants.40 
The campaign to eradicate smallpox is 
another example in which informal networks 
operating within institutional structures have 
facilitated successful interventions. The last 
case of smallpox was reported in Somalia in 
1977, marking an extraordinary achievement 
in global health. Smallpox killed millions of 
people annually before becoming the only 
major human disease to have been completely 
eradicated. When the WHO launched the 
Intensified Smallpox Eradication Programme in 
1967, it planned to pursue a campaign of mass 
vaccination in smallpox-prone countries. As the 
campaign proceeded, however, this strategy 
gave way to a programme of ring vaccination, 
in which outbreaks of infection were targeted, 
isolated and contained through the vaccination 
of all potentially exposed individuals. The 
campaign exhibited adaptability and flexibility, 
as independent national programmes developed 
their own operating procedures based on 
local conditions. These programmes formed 
network-like connections with the WHO, which 
developed a set of performance measures 
and standards informed by local and national 
practitioners. The campaign illustrated the value 
of information exchange along vertical axes of 
power and the importance of self-governance 
amongst national and local stakeholders.41 
Partnerships
Some of the most renowned collaborations, 
responsible for shaping new paradigms 
in the face of grave problems and 
international crises, have been generated by 
partnering stakeholders from government, 
business, academia and civil society. The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), for example, was established in 
1988 to provide scientific assessments of 
technical, social and economic research on 
risks, consequences and ways to address 
climate change. The IPCC’s major “assessment” 
reports, produced every five to seven years, 
bring the scientific community into policy 
conversations and help facilitate consensus. 
The reports have faced criticism, but their 
collaborative and inclusive nature means 
they “undergo more scrutiny than any other 
documents in the history of science”.42 
Similarly, the Intergovernmental Science-
Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services, established in 2012, facilitates the 
integration of information from governments, 
academia, NGOs and indigenous communities 
to address reductions in biodiversity and 
ecosystem services. 
Inspired by the smallpox success, the Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisations (GAVI) 
and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria are examples of public-private 
partnerships that align different constituencies 
working on a common problem. GAVI and the 
Global Fund work with governments and in-
country actors to channel resources based on 
locally determined needs. GAVI collaborates 
with health ministries in developing countries 
to contribute to national vaccine programmes 
through co-financing,43 while the Global Fund 
relies on Country Coordinating Mechanisms 
comprised of government, NGOs, donors, 
private sector, academic representatives and 
others to develop grant proposals for individual 
countries.44 The boards of both organisations 
bring together representatives from different 
sectors including civil society, the UN system, the 
private sector, developing, and donor nations.45 
These bodies have been successful in shoring up 
financing to fight critical health challenges: GAVI 
has disbursed over USD $5 billion in over 70 
countries while the Global Fund has disbursed 
over USD $17 billion. By their own estimates, 
GAVI and the Global Fund have helped prevent 
5.5 million and 6.5 million deaths from their 
respective diseases of focus.46  
Partnerships forged by and between the 
World Bank, the Global Fund, the United States 
President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief 
and the Gates Foundation have also been 
instrumental in the global response to HIV/AIDS. 
These collaborations have increased access to 
funding opportunities for governments with 
weak public health infrastructure and high HIV 
prevalence rates, and have endeavoured to 
integrate the work of national governments, 
multilateral and bilateral agencies, NGOs, national 
representatives, and the private sector.47 
Thanks in part to these interventions aimed 
at prevention and antiretroviral treatment, 
there were an estimated 700,000 fewer HIV 
infections globally in 2011 than in 2001, with 
a 50 percent reduction in HIV incidence rates 
across many low and middle-income countries 
over the same period. There were also 600,000 
fewer deaths due to HIV infections in 2011 than 
in 2005.48 Public-private partnerships have 
played a significant role in enabling greater access 
to antiretroviral drugs for HIV/AIDS patients, 
pushing down prices in some countries from USD 
$10,000 per person per year a decade ago to 
around USD $100 today.49 
At a more local level, partnerships are also 
proving a powerful tool in knowledge sharing 
and policy influence. Innovative networks 
such as C40, the International Council for 
Local Environmental Initiatives and the World 
Association of Major Metropolises are enabling 
city based partnerships on issues ranging from 
climate change and disaster relief, education 
schemes and IT hubs.50 As city leaders become 
increasingly assertive on the global stage, 
there are likely to be further mechanisms for 
partnership and exchange on global challenges. 
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Goals and prizes 
 
In addition to having the right participants, 
successful interventions also require the setting 
of clear, well-defined, and realistic objectives. 
The MDGs provide a useful example of clear, 
concrete targets that can make even the 
largest aims – such as eradicating extreme 
poverty – seem more attainable. Adopted 
in 2001, the scale of global acceptance of 
and commitment to the MDGs has been 
remarkable: almost all national governments and 
international agencies incorporated the MDGs 
as central components of their development 
agendas.51 Broad challenges like ensuring 
environmental sustainability (Goal 7) are 
effectively translated into tangible targets such 
as halving the proportion of people without 
access to safe drinking water by 2015 (Target 
10) and improving the lives of 100 million 
slum dwellers by 2020 (Target 11). The GAVI 
and Global Fund health initiatives, explored 
above, are other examples where effective 
targeting has helped to achieve measurable 
outcomes. With the process now well underway 
to develop a set of Sustainable Development 
Goals to succeed the MDGs, it is vital that clear, 
concrete and attainable targets are maintained. 
Encouragingly, the UN Secretary General’s High-
Level Panel on the Post-2015 Development 
Agenda has already set out comprehensive 
recommendations to eradicate extreme 
poverty by 2030 and deliver more sustainable 
development52, whilst the UN Open Working 
Group of 30 member countries and associated 
taskforces are working to ensure that the 
new goals complement national development 
priorities.53 
Prestigious “recognition” awards, such as 
the Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African 
Leadership, honour individual excellence and 
highlight the importance of good role models. 
Founded in 2007 by Commissioner Mo Ibrahim, 
the Ibrahim Prize is the largest annually awarded 
honour, with the winner receiving USD $5 
million and an additional USD $200,000 per 
year for life.54 The prize is focused on former 
African heads of state or government who 
have left office in the past three years, enabling 
exceptional leaders to continue to play a public 
role on the continent after they relinquish 
office.55 Importantly, since its establishment in 
2007, the prize has only been awarded three 
times; the annual process has proven to be an 
instructive tool in heightening attention on 
leadership challenges within Africa. 
As opposed to “recognition” prizes that award 
past accomplishments, “challenge” prizes 
reward the person or organisation that first, 
or best, meets a defined challenge.56 Awards 
such as The Google Lunar XPrize57 promote 
innovation, encourage the examination of 
neglected challenges, and provide commercial 
opportunities.58 There has been considerable 
growth in the number of new challenge prizes in 
recent years,59 with notable examples including 
the Shell Springboard,60 the Virgin Earth 
Challenge,61 and the Microsoft BlueHat Prize.62 
Challenge prizes are not a new phenomenon; 
they have been credited as contributing to the 
invention of the British Spitfire aircraft,63 famed 
for its role in the Allied victory in World War II, 
as well as the introduction of manned private 
spaceflight and the invention of margarine,64 
amongst many other innovations. 
Like prizes, indices can play an important role 
in promoting best practice. As highlighted in 
Part A, Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) and the Mo Ibrahim 
Index of African Governance (IIAG) are 
examples of using indices to draw attention 
to issues of corruption and encourage good 
governance. The 2012 CPI measured perceived 
levels of public sector corruption in 176 
countries and territories around the world. 
Using a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very 
clean), the latest index found two-thirds of 
countries scored below 50, highlighting how 
the global fight against corruption requires 
far greater attention.65 The IIAG provides an 
annual assessment of governance in every 
country in Africa, examining safety and 
rule of law, participation and human rights, 
sustainable economic opportunity, and human 
development.66 It therefore not only serves as a 
yardstick for governments, citizens, businesses, 
and other institutions to measure different 
countries’ progress, but also acts as a tool that 
can assist African governments in determining 
key policy priorities.67 Similarly, another leading 
initiative is the World Economic Forum’s Global 
Competitiveness Report. Since its launch in 
2004, this annual report ranks countries based 
on a comprehensive assessment of national 
competition worldwide, looking at the drivers of 
productivity and prosperity.68 
National transformation
Lessons can also be drawn from transformative 
changes and progressive interventions on the 
national level. Countries such as South Africa 
and Rwanda have made strides to overcome 
deep social divisions engendered by internal 
conflict and oppression. In South Africa, 
following the end of the apartheid system 
in 1994, the establishment of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in 1995 created a 
platform through which deep-seated historical 
subjugation could be addressed.
In the economic sphere, South Korea has 
been internationally lauded for its economic 
turnaround following the Korean War. Beginning 
in the 1960s, government-orchestrated 
industrialisation and export-led economic 
growth transformed South Korea from one 
of the poorest countries in the world to a 
modernised and highly educated economy 
with a per capita GDP higher than that of 
the European Union.69 This transformation, 
facilitated largely by technological and industrial 
innovation, has been so significant and so quick 
that it has been dubbed the “Miracle on the 
Hangang River”.70 
Beyond South Korea, many governments 
are seeking transformative change through 
progressive and innovative poverty alleviation 
initiatives. For example, Brazil’s poverty 
alleviation campaign, headlined by the Bolsa 
Família (Family Grant) programme, has 
contributed to a decline in Brazil’s absolute 
poverty and inequality.71 Formally established 
in 2003, Bolsa Família is the largest Conditional 
Cash Transfer in the world. It utilises targeted 
social safety nets to provide assistance to 
vulnerable populations based on qualifying 
requirements that incentivise investment in 
health, nutrition and education.72 
India is in the process of establishing a unique 
identification scheme which seeks to assign 
a 12-digit number, known as Aadhaar, to 
every Indian resident. Under the leadership 
of our Commissioner Nandan Nilekani, this 
ambitious programme aims to “improve the 
delivery of government services and welfare, 
reduce fraud and corruption, facilitate robust 
voting processes, and improve security”.73 
Such reforms will be critical in helping poorer 
communities access basic political rights, as 
well as key services such as healthcare and 
other welfare measures. Capitalising on India’s 
renowned technology industry, the scheme 
has been called the most technologically and 
organisationally complex federal identification 
effort in the world.74 Since the programme was 
rolled out in 2010, over 415 million people 
have been allocated a unique identification 
number.75 
India’s neighbour Bangladesh has made dramatic 
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progress over the past two decades, and has 
done so partly because it has successfully 
targeted gender inequality. Women’s 
participation in the workforce is now more than 
double that of India, and school participation 
and literacy rates are now higher for girls than 
boys. Although it remains poorer, Bangladesh 
has overtaken India in many aspects of human 
development, including life expectancy, child 
immunisation and child mortality.76 
Several countries in Latin America, Europe, 
Africa, and Australasia have legalised same-sex 
marriage in the past decade, often overcoming 
strong resistance from some sections of 
society, including powerful religious institutions. 
In 2010, Argentina became the first country 
in Latin America to permit same-sex marriage, 
with President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner’s 
government narrowly winning a senate vote in 
spite of the Roman Catholic Church’s opposition, 
led by Cardinal Jorge Bergoglio, now Pope 
Francis.77
 
On the environmental front, Germany has led 
the way in growing its renewable energy sector 
and promoting renewable energy since the 
passage of its Renewable Energy Sources Act.78 
Utilising a policy of feed-in tariffs, renewable 
energy accounted for 23 percent of Germany’s 
gross energy consumption at the end of 
2012.79 Germany is now one of the world’s 
largest solar energy markets,80 and accounts for 
30 percent of installed European wind capacity 
(12 percent globally). The government’s current 
goal is to increase the share that renewable 
energy sources contribute to Germany’s 
electricity production to 80 percent by 2050. 
While celebrating these successes, it is vital 
to reflect on the lessons from the numerous 
failures to address major challenges. As Part A 
demonstrates, increased interconnectedness 
means that there are a rising number of 
challenges that cannot be resolved by nations 
acting on their own. Yet, “multilateralism’s 
ability to achieve collective and cooperative 
action has eroded relative to the challenges it 
faces”.81 Next, we consider the elements that 
have contributed to undermining much-needed 
action at both national and international level. 
Tragedy of the commons
Individuals, communities and nations, acting 
rationally, can generate collective failure. 
This is particularly true when we consider 
natural resources and the environment. When 
actors seek to maximise their consumption 
(or production) of a scarce resource, thereby 
benefiting in the short-term, the resource is 
threatened with ultimate collapse in the longer 
term. The shrinking of the Aral Sea, described as 
“one of the greatest man-made environmental 
disasters in history”, provides a stark example 
of such a tragedy.82 By 2007 it had shrunk 
to 10 percent of its original size: it was once 
the fourth largest inland body of water with 
a surface area of 66,000km2. Its relatively 
swift destruction has been caused by irrigation 
and agricultural demands of bordering Central 
Asian states and the countries of the former 
Soviet Union. Individual policy decisions of 
these countries led to large irrigation projects, 
with little regard for long-term or downstream 
impacts.83 This collective failure has meant that 
water levels have declined to the extent that 
what was once a sea is now just three lakes, 
two of which are too salty for fish. Thousands 
of jobs have been lost as “once thriving fishing 
fleets have disappeared and former shore towns 
have collapsed”.84 Salt and toxic substances 
blown from dry seabeds are now reported to 
be causing significant health problems.85 While 
it may have seemed rational for an individual 
country to feed its population with irrigation 
water from the sea, too many countries have 
followed this path, with disastrous effects. 
Overfishing is another example of the “tragedy 
of the commons”, as public fish stocks are 
exploited due to a lack of coordination among 
commercial fishing operations and the absence 
of effective governance of the high seas. 
Widespread overfishing began in the mid-20th 
century, as governments seeking to create 
jobs and incomes for fishing communities 
and develop thriving fishing industries passed 
favourable laws, including loans and subsidies, 
which encouraged the rise of large-scale 
industrial fishing operations. Global gross 
revenue from the market value of marine 
fisheries was conservatively estimated at an 
annual USD $80–85 billion in 2010.86 The 
global industry reached its peak harvest in 
1989, yielding 90 million metric tonnes of 
catch. Since then, harvests have stagnated 
or declined and, for some of the most highly 
demanded species, fisheries have reached the 
point of collapse.87 For sustainability to be 
achieved, some 65 percent of the boats now 
active will need to be retired, leading to the 
potential loss of jobs of up to 22 million people 
currently employed in the fishing industry.88 It 
may be rational for an individual to fish, but the 
current scale of fishing, driven by increasing 
individual and industrial competition as well as 
rising income levels, is unsustainable. 
The rapid increase in global fishing has led to the 
decline of marine biodiversity, with ecosystem 
sustainability and ocean resilience also 
compromised.89 The UN, the WTO, the Marine 
Stewardship Council and other international 
bodies are working to develop appropriate rules, 
standards and intervention measures. Yet the 
global failure to anticipate the collective impact 
of large-scale commercial fishing operations 
before substantial damage was incurred 
provides a painful lesson. It is also a symptom 
of broader inaction on the environmental 
front. In 2010, the Global Biodiversity Outlook 
confirmed the world “had failed to meet its 
target to achieve a significant reduction in the 
rate of biodiversity loss” and that tipping points 
destructive to human societies would only be 
avoided if “effective and coordinated action is 
taken to reduce the multiple pressures being 
imposed on biodiversity”.90 The seemingly 
rational choices of individuals and countries 
in the short term frequently have severely 
negative effects when aggregated over the 
long term, leading to collective failure. As 
consumer power and freedom rise rapidly 
across the globe, the spillover effects of 
our interconnected behaviours also rise. The 
tragedy of the commons – a concept that was 
developed in relation to the commons shared 
by villagers – is now relevant in the national and 
world context as we inhabit a global village. 
Lessons from Failure
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Lack of intergenerational vision
The inability or reluctance of decision-makers 
to look ahead to the long-term horizon can 
lead to gridlock in global negotiations. Former 
Irish President Mary Robinson described 
the much-anticipated Rio+20 Summit in 
2012 as a gathering of leaders “without an 
intergenerational vision” who “failed to rise to 
the challenge”.91 The Summit’s final statement 
was described as “an outcome that makes 
nobody happy”. Others, like Kumi Naidoo, 
Executive Director of Greenpeace International, 
were more scathing, calling it “a failure of 
epic proportions… the longest suicide note in 
history”.92 Rio+20 is not the only high profile 
forum to disappoint. Other critical environmental 
negotiations, including those on climate change 
and biodiversity, have fallen far short of their 
ambitions, largely due to a failure of vision and 
commitment to binding agreements amongst 
global leaders and their advisors. 
The 2009 UN Climate Change negotiations in 
Copenhagen are worthy of particular reflection. 
After two years of multilateral discussions at 
the expert level, world leaders descended on 
the Danish capital, and were widely expected to 
agree a global deal to combat climate change. 
Expectations were high, yet, despite the world’s 
attention, “the conference produced perhaps 
the most ambiguous outcome in diplomatic 
history, leaving governments and observers 
alike wondering how to assess the results”.93 
Negotiations arrived at a stalemate mainly due 
to irreconcilable differences between developed 
and developing countries. In the final days, 
a smaller alliance of 25 countries, led by the 
United States and China, tried to piece together 
an agreement. The resulting Copenhagen 
Accord was described as a weak political 
declaration, intended to mask the international 
community’s “political failure” to negotiate a 
legally binding global climate change treaty.94 
Leaders were criticised for a lack of ambition 
and for “failing to seize the opportunity and rise 
to the challenge”, despite the gravity of the 
problem.95 Although there is evidence voluntary 
targets made at Copenhagen are being met, 
including China’s mitigation commitments to 
2020,96 the skeletal path forward agreed in 
Denmark set back the agreement of a global 
pact until at least 2015. 
A lack of intergenerational vision is not a 
problem confined to the environmental 
sphere. In an age of longer life expectancy, a 
continued international propensity towards 
early retirement ages means pension financing 
is increasingly unsustainable. Few governments 
and pension providers explicitly recognise 
this risk, and even fewer are prepared for it. 
According to the IMF, if everyone in 2050 
lived just three years longer, society would 
“need extra resources equivalent to one to two 
percent of GDP per year”.97 
Absence of global oversight 
Prior to and during the Financial Crisis, the 
inadequacy of the institutional interventions 
in the most powerful advanced economies, 
coupled with the dearth of adequate multilateral 
financial instruments, hampered both the 
prevention and resolution of the crisis. This 
is despite the oversight of three major global 
financial institutions: the IMF, the Bank of 
International Settlements and the Financial 
Stability Forum. Given that the multilateral 
financial system is arguably the most developed 
and best equipped within the global governance 
system to manage such vulnerabilities, its failure 
provides a particularly troubling lesson about 
global governance. And whereas there has been 
some progress with the reform of financial 
governance, in other areas, such as trade, 
taxation, migration and intellectual property, 
progress has been stymied. 
Part of the challenge for global institutions 
is keeping up with the rapid pace of changes 
in technologies and the global economy. The 
period between 1998 and 2007 saw explosive 
growth in sophisticated financial instruments 
and innovations, along with a dramatic increase 
in the interconnection and complexity of the 
global financial system. There was a genuine 
failure by even the most sophisticated 
regulators to understand the complexities of 
new instruments arising from technological 
changes and newly globalised flows. This, 
combined with conceptual failures amongst 
economists and the undue influence of the 
lobbyists of private financial institutions, meant 
that overall financial stability was compromised. 
Banks prioritised “optimising and minimising 
their individual risks instead of taking into 
account the system effects of their actions”.98 
The collective impact of this deregulation was 
a growing gulf between global oversight and 
market innovation. In many cases, national 
regulations and standards were lowered as 
competing state regulators played off each 
other. In the absence of a global rule-making 
authority or collective understanding of the 
deep structural changes and vulnerabilities 
across the financial system, the key institutions 
responsible for financial governance failed to 
predict and ultimately prevent the devastating 
Financial Crisis. As our connectivity leads to 
increasing vulnerability to future financial 
contagion, as well as to pandemics, climate 
change, cyber and other cascading shocks, it is 
vital that we learn lessons from this crisis so as 
to more effectively manage global systemic risk 
in the future.99
Resistance of vested interests
Resistance from powerful financial institutions 
and a number of powerful countries, along 
with a lack of understanding and awareness, 
undermined international attempts to regulate 
financial transparency and accountability 
standards in the years preceding the Financial 
Crisis. This is not new; vested interests have 
fought attempts to limit tobacco consumption, 
tighten gun control, and mitigate climate 
change.100 Major tobacco corporations, for 
example, have been accused of creating 
organisations to publish biased scientific reports 
and funding politicians who support tobacco 
use as part of their campaigns against action.101 
Food conglomerates have similarly lobbied 
against food regulations.102 
Sir John Houghton, former co-Chair of the 
IPCC, has spoken out against the role played 
by those with something to gain from denying 
anthropogenic climate change, stating “a lot of 
resistance comes from vested interests, coal 
and oil interests in the United States which are 
very strong and which employ thousands of 
lobbyists in Washington to try and persuade 
members of Congress that climate change is 
not happening”.103 This is not a phenomenon 
limited to the United States; it has been argued 
that Australia’s initial reluctance to sign the 
Kyoto Protocol was largely due to successful 
lobbying by the Australian coal industry.104 
Thus, while many parties may advocate financial 
regulation, tobacco legislation, or climate action, 
the strength of organisations who benefit from 
the status quo often outweighs this desire for 
reform.
Lack of awareness
Lack of awareness of critical issues by 
governments, corporations, and the wider 
public can lead to difficulty and, in some cases, 
disaster. In the decade preceding the Financial 
Crisis, Standard & Poor’s gave a triple-A 
rating to many Collateralised Debt Obligations 
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(CDOs), advising investors that there was a 
mere 0.12 percent probability that they would 
fail to pay out over the next five years; in fact, 
28 percent of triple-A rated CDOs defaulted, 
constituting what Nate Silver calls “about as 
complete a failure as it is possible to make in 
a prediction”.105 Economists, journalists, and 
members of the public expressed concerns 
over the housing bubble as early as 2000.106 
Awareness of the risk existed, but was either 
unwittingly, or perhaps wilfully, overlooked 
within the financial sector.
Albert Einstein is quoted as saying “Information 
is not knowledge”. The dawn of the digital age 
and the proliferation of global media outlets 
mean that current generations, or at least 
those with unrestricted internet access, cannot 
complain about a lack of information. A surfeit 
of information does not, however, always mean 
sufficient awareness of key global issues and 
challenges; in fact, too much information can 
cloud public judgement as to which issues are 
particularly important and which are less so, 
with people tending to become passive in the 
face of too much information.107 Awareness 
is particularly challenging when many of the 
issues confronting us are anticipatory; it is 
often difficult for policymakers and citizens 
alike to conceptualise challenges like pandemic 
preparedness or cyber warfare, and their local 
impacts. For some individuals, communities, 
and countries, however, the issue is not lack 
of awareness as much as lack of voice; as we 
explore later in Part B, too many conversations 
are closed to too many people.
Lessons from success and failure
The examples and lessons identified above are 
not comprehensive. Positive examples, such as 
successes with nuclear non-proliferation, the 
European Union Single Market, HIV and human 
rights, remind us that seemingly intractable 
problems can be addressed. We have seen that 
certain contributing elements have historically 
facilitated progress. These include situations of 
crisis; shared interests; leadership; inclusiveness; 
institutions and networks; public-private 
partnerships; goal setting and prizes. 
Negative examples, such as the Aral Sea and 
overfishing, the failure to come to agreement 
at Copenhagen, and the Financial Crisis serve 
to remind us of the old cliché that those who 
ignore history are destined to repeat it. Looking 
forward, antibiotic resistance, fossil fuel usage 
and fishing practices are just three examples 
of the need to balance short-term and longer-
term interests and individual and communal 
rationality to ensure sustainable collective 
outcomes.108 Many of today’s challenges 
transcend generational and geographical 
boundaries. Drawing inspiration and caution 
from our examples, we now seek to explore the 
common factors that underpin or undermine 
our ability to take action. 
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In this section, we seek to identify five shaping 
factors that must be taken into account in 
efforts to generate positive change and close 
the gap between knowledge and action. 
As our global institutions have struggled to 
reform at the pace required, governments 
and business leaders have lowered their eyes 
from the horizon, preoccupied by 24/7 media 
cycles, electoral pressures and short-term 
performance measures. As a society, we face 
“a lack of trust in institutions and a lack of 
confidence in existing ideas and models”.109 
In part, this is because issues have grown 
in terms of their interconnection, spill-over 
across sectors and boundaries and complexity, 
reducing our capacity to act decisively. Our 
ability to understand and embrace system and 
cultural differences requires greater effort. 
However, the potential to modernise our 
political conversations and models to embed 
global necessities and the long term into our 
decision-making structures provides enormous 
opportunities. 
 
20th century structures and institutions 
are poorly equipped for 21st century 
challenges, and suffer from legitimacy, 
authority and effectiveness deficits. 
Built for yesterday
International organisations and structures 
have had difficulty keeping pace with today’s 
hyper-connected, globalised world.110 Iconic 
20th century global institutions, born in the 
aftermath of two brutal world wars, a global 
pandemic, and a worldwide depression, were 
created in the hope that humanity would 
never again face such unimaginable horror 
and destruction. As reflected above, these 
institutions have enjoyed some successes, 
not least in their role in preventing a global 
or nuclear war, rebuilding our international 
system post-1945, largely eradicating smallpox 
and polio, tackling tobacco reforms, reducing 
AIDS, and, until 2008, averting another 
global depression. Yet the 21st century, as 
illustrated in Part A, presents far more complex, 
interconnected and interdependent challenges, 
which today’s global governance institutions 
seem unfit to tackle within their current 
configurations and cultures. 
Ultimately, these 20th century structures and 
institutions suffer from legitimacy, authority and 
effectiveness deficits. Countries with diminishing 
geopolitical strength in the 21st century still 
hold disproportionate power, with governance 
structures that do not reflect the new world 
order. The pace of reform has been painfully slow, 
and in many cases has been actively resisted or 
stymied by vested national, corporate or other 
powerful interests. Traditional powers have been 
reluctant to cede their influence in international 
institutions, whilst also demonstrating a 
frustrating ambivalence or even reluctance to 
strengthening them. This reluctance to cede 
power is in part due to perceptions that the 
biggest beneficiaries of a shift in power are 
likely to be emerging economies such as China 
or India.111 Although some emerging powers are 
willing to assume leadership responsibility that 
is proportionate to their capacity, many lack 
experience in global governance arenas and need 
a new participatory and flexible framework in 
order to play an active role. It is the Commission’s 
view that the rebalancing of the global economy 
should provide an opportunity to strengthen 
multilateral institutions. Both traditional and 
emerging powers need to take ownership of the 
multilateral system and work together to identify 
new approaches to address our increasingly 
complex and interconnected challenges. A 
number of our Commissioners have already 
contributed to numerous reports, expert panels, 
and review groups which have been charged 
with assessing how different global governance 
institutions might be made fit for purpose. Few 
have had substantial impact, and none at the 
scale or pace required. Whilst the reform of 
global governance is of fundamental importance, 
our report is not focused solely on reform of 
the international system. In Part A we included 
a number of suggestions on how specific global 
institutions might be empowered to confront 
pressing issues including reform of the WHO 
to enhance pandemic preparedness; reform of 
the G20 to realise its potential; and increasing 
the effectiveness of the UN Security Council. In 
Part C, we suggest some additional institutional 
reforms, designed to help ensure international 
institutions are fit for purpose.
 
Global meetings 
From Copenhagen to Kyoto, and Doha to Durban, 
certain cities have become synonymous with 
particular stalled points in modern diplomatic 
history. The elements are familiar, whether it is 
trade, climate or arms control talks. Thousands 
of participants representing states, NGOs, 
businesses, foundations, and media outlets 
descend on the chosen city for extended 
meetings, side room talks, lobbying and wrangling. 
Too often the results are disappointing. 
The entrenched positions of participants has 
resulted in a narrowing of the possibilities for 
consensus, while the increase in the number 
of participants has resulted in heightened 
fragmentation. While the number of actors 
and voices has multiplied on the international 
stage, so too it has in domestic politics, so 
that domestic ratification of international 
agreements has also become more fraught. 
Meanwhile, the increasing number of linkages 
and complexity makes attribution of cause and 
effect ever more difficult, compounding the 
difficulty in agreeing a course of action.
Many representatives attend major summits 
not only with a determination to hold their 
position, but wielding requirements that make 
any meaningful action virtually impossible.112 
Such entrenchment can be compounded by 
deliberate pre-meeting leaks to the media, 
which means that states are reluctant to waver 
from pre-publicised negotiating positions. The 
increased complexity of the issues means that 
contemporary diplomacy also involves numerous 
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government departments. Whilst traditionally the 
domain of foreign affairs departments, today’s 
diplomatic delegations must follow positions 
forged by compromise between different 
domestic ministries,113 which can reduce scope 
for critical negotiation and often results in 
watered-down agreements. Where prolonged 
debate does take place, it often fixates on lesser 
details; indeed, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki 
Moon expressed uncharacteristic frustration 
during the Rio+20 conference preparations, 
pleading "this is not the time to argue against any 
small, small items”, asking delegates to focus on 
the bigger picture instead.114
New players, more representatives
Whilst greater inclusivity, transparency 
and democratisation is in many ways to be 
welcomed, the escalating number of parties 
involved raises questions about the efficacy of 
world summits in addressing global challenges. 
This is partly attributable to the increased 
number of member states in the UN; with only 
51 members upon its founding in 1945, there 
are 193 member states today.115 Growth is 
also due to the pronounced rise in civil society 
involvement in international diplomacy. In 1948 
only 40 NGOs held consultative status with 
ECOSOC; in 2010, the figure was 3,345.116 In 
December 2009, around 15,000 delegates, 100 
world leaders, and 5,000 journalists descended 
on Denmark’s capital for the UN Climate Change 
Conference. Figure 21 shows the extraordinary 
growth in representatives at the Rio Earth 
Summits of 1992 and 2012. The presence of so 
many participants raises questions as to whether 
these international summits, which represent so 
many diverging interests, have become unwieldy 
and unworkable. This is particularly challenging 
given that consensus remains the most 
frequently used decision-making mechanism in 
these forums. 
Electoral cycles, media pressures, company 
reporting timetables and just-in-time 
systems encourage short-sightedness
Embedded short-termism
Mario Monti, speaking at the 2013 World 
Economic Forum, wearily remarked, “Leadership 
is the opposite of short-termism”.117 The 
outgoing Italian Prime Minister was speaking 
from experience, his country having lived 
through an extraordinary 62 governments since 
1946.118 Italy provides an extreme example 
of short-termism, but increasingly short-term 
considerations drive our political, business and 
other decision-making bodies. 
In his reflections at the end of his tenure as 
Director-General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, 
our Chair, asserted that “short-term politics... 
are becoming increasingly incompatible with 
the setting of the medium and longer term 
goals essential for designing consistent trade 
policies”.119 Such frustrations are not unique 
to trade. This Commission believes that it is 
vital to raise our horizons to address a series of 
critical global challenges, both immediate and 
longer term. Government leaders necessarily 
need to respond swiftly to dramatic events 
on their doorstep. However, they also need to 
be concerned with slow, cumulative trends. 
The Arab Spring, the Icelandic volcano and the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster are all examples of 
unexpected events that demanded immediate 
policy attention. But this is no excuse to be 
unprepared for those challenges requiring a 
longer-term perspective.
The Commission is concerned that a culture of 
short-termism pervades political life. Today’s 
leaders seem increasingly distracted by 24/7 
media pressures, election timetables and 
the “urgency of now”. As our Commissioner 
Arianna Huffington has highlighted, the 
immediacy enabled via new technological 
tools like smart phones, Twitter, YouTube, 
Facebook and, more broadly, the Internet is 
dramatically changing how media is produced, 
consumed and reported. The public can now 
circulate images, anecdotes and video clips 
to a significant international audience at the 
press of a button. Such immediacy calls for 
immediate responses, as governments are 
increasingly put on the spot by journalists, 
and are expected to provide commentary 
with limited time for appropriate reflection, 
clarification and analysis of the facts. 
200
190
180
170
160
150
Rio Rio  + 20
172
188
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
Rio Rio  + 20
2400
9800
Number of governments  
present 
Number of civil society 
representatives
Figure 21: A comparison of participation at the Rio Earth Summit, 1992 and 
the Rio + 20 Summit, 2012   
Source: Based on data from the United Nations, “UN Conference on Environment and Development 1992” http://www.un.org/
geninfo/bp/enviro.html and the United Nations, “United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development Concludes with World 
Leaders Renewing Commitments to Save Planet” http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/envdev1310.doc.htm.
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Political and social realities
Within democracies, there are clear tensions 
between the capacity of governments to deliver 
long-term solutions in the collective interest 
and more short-term political demands. As 
many European leaders can attest, politicians are 
increasingly punished in times of crisis, making it 
harder to take difficult long-term decisions that 
produce immediate pain. Since mid-2010, the 
leaders of more than 75 percent of the European 
Union’s 28 states have fallen or been voted out 
of office, including the leaders of France, Spain 
and Italy.120 Increasingly difficult decisions, 
particularly on controversial reforms such as on 
carbon taxes, nuclear power or abortion, are 
often delayed or are beset with uncertainty. 
Whilst formal political structures vary, all 
societies face increasing demands for political 
accountability, higher living standards, economic 
opportunities and a more sustainable and 
healthy environment. Both representative 
democracies and countries with more 
hierarchical governance face challenges with 
long-term planning, as, for example, studies 
of regime type and ecological management 
highlight.121 Sensitivity to immediate public 
concerns and perceptions are pressing 
everywhere, and not least in China. One of 
Xi Jinping’s first moves as Chinese President 
was to impose a ban on lavish banquets, red 
carpet receptions, wasteful travel122 and, 
more recently, the construction of any new 
government offices for the next five years.123 
In a speech to an official party gathering in 
January 2013, President Xi warned colleagues 
that “if we don't redress unhealthy tendencies 
and allow them to develop (in how we work), it 
will be like putting up a wall between our party 
and the people, and we will lose our roots, our 
lifeblood and our strength".124
Meanwhile in democracies, more frequent opinion 
polls, longer election campaigns, the pressures of 
increasingly vocal and well funded lobbies and the 
preference for sound bites over detailed analysis 
can mean the capacity to think and articulate a 
vision beyond the electoral term are increasingly 
limited. The immediate political pressures are 
compounded in countries like the United States 
by the lengthening of political campaigns. In 
the 2008 presidential election, Barack Obama’s 
campaign ran for 21 months125, compared to 
the already significant 10 month campaign of 
John F. Kennedy in 1960.126 Similarly, much has 
changed since George Gallup published the first 
random sample public opinion poll in 1935. The 
proliferation and increased sophistication of 
polling has lead to many politicians becoming “too 
responsive to public opinion in the short run”.127 
While becoming increasingly alert to sudden 
changes in opinion and surface discontent, 
leaders have placed much less reliance on such 
techniques to understand opinion and frame 
issues for the longer run. 
Corporate myopia
Responsibility to think and act in the longer-
term interest is not confined to the political 
sphere. The global business community also has 
a vital role to play. Yet with notable exceptions, 
businesses are failing to show leadership and 
grasp responsibility on the scale required. Some 
businesses, often through their corporate 
social responsibility activities or philanthropy, 
have sparked action, but these are only 
rarely mainstreamed within the firm. This is 
particularly acute in the financial sector where 
Andy Haldane, Executive Director of the Bank 
of England, argues that there is evidence that 
“myopia is mounting”.128 
Times have dramatically changed since the 
Rothschilds reportedly used carrier pigeons to 
trade on the outcome of the Battle of Waterloo 
back in 1815.129 Today the average speed of order 
execution on the New York Stock Exchange has 
fallen from 20 seconds a decade ago to under 
one second. From 1975 to 2010, the average 
period for stock holdings on the New York Stock 
Exchange dropped from six years to nearly 
six months. As highlighted in Part A, Dominic 
Barton, the Managing Director of McKinsey & 
Company, has been particularly vocal on the issue 
of increasing short-termism within corporations. 
He, along with Mark Wiseman, President and 
CEO of Canada Pension Plan Investment Board, 
argue that firms are under increasing pressure 
to be short-term at the cost of longer-term 
strategic decision-making. Performance metrics 
of CEOs based on share prices arguably encourage 
a focus on short-term stock prices, rather than 
long-term value creation. Meanwhile short-
term investors who often hold shares for a few 
days (or potentially just a few seconds) have the 
same voting power as those who hold shares for 
a longer period, with this perversely rewarding 
those who want to make a quick return and are 
not necessarily committed to a company’s long-
term well-being.130 
Quarterly earnings targets, “hyper-speed” 
trading systems, and impatient stakeholders 
reinforce short-termism in business. A 2012 
United Kingdom Government study into the 
future of computer trading in financial markets 
noted the benefits of such technological 
advances, but underlined the need for better 
surveillance, timestamps and evidence-based 
regulatory action to minimise market instability 
and periodic illiquidity.131 The influence of 
multinational corporations over both national 
and global policymaking at times can also be 
a source of concern, as certain global firms 
have proved themselves adept at transcending 
national tax, employment or regulatory 
jurisdictions. In a globalised commercial world, 
ensuring compliance requires coordination 
between countries that often are competing for 
investment. 
There are positive signs. Many companies have 
embraced corporate social responsibility and 
other long-term impact targets. The Chartered 
Institute of Management Accountants has 
noted the “retreat from shareholder value as the 
dominant business philosophy and increasing 
interest in alternative corporate models, such as 
those common in India and China”.132 The World 
Bank has instituted procedures, through a new 
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman, to provide 
an “independent, ‘bottom-up’ accountability 
and recourse mechanism” that, among other 
things, works to ensure compliance with social 
and environmental safeguards.133 Another key 
initiative is the UN Global Compact, which works 
with companies to enhance commitment to 
principles in the areas of human rights, labour, 
the environment and anti-corruption. The World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development 
complements this work by helping to galvanise 
the global business community towards 
sustainable ends. Arising out of the Financial 
Crisis and challenges similar to those identified 
by this Commission, business led initiatives which 
focus on the longer term sustainability of the 
firms and the planet are gaining traction. The 
B-Team, founded by Sir Richard Branson and 
Jochen Zeitz, is among the most recent of this 
new wave of private sector responses to the 
short-termism of firms, calling on businesses to 
prioritise people and the planet alongside profit. 
Governmental approaches for the  
longer term
Just as there are some inspiring initiatives 
emerging within the business sector, it is 
also useful to reflect on existing models and 
methods used by some governments to 
embed the longer-term into decision-making 
structures. Some are constitutional. Albania, 
Argentina, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burundi, 
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Cuba, Ecuador, France, Germany, Kenya, 
Poland, South Africa and Sweden all include 
substantive provisions for future generations 
within their constitutions. Increasing numbers 
of international instruments (at least 29 at 
last count) directly refer to future generations. 
Considerable judicial attention is now devoted 
towards “generations unborn” and what 
intergenerational justice might entail.134 Some 
methodological commitments that negatively 
impact future generations are under greater 
scrutiny (discounting is one particular example, 
especially following the Stern Climate Change 
Review135). Other political and legislative 
mechanisms that could be adopted include 
lengthening electoral cycles and the tenure 
of representatives, and avoiding frequent 
Ministerial reshuffles which undermine capacity 
to think longer-term.136 A strong, independent 
civil service is also critical in this respect. Other 
initiatives that require governments to outline 
the impact of policies on future generations 
(such as Intergenerational Reports and 
Posterity Impact Statements137) and involve 
more young people in the decision-making 
process (including youth parliaments and youth 
representatives) warrant further attention.138 
Cultural norms and institutional practices also 
need to resist an exclusively short-term ethos, 
including in auditing and budgeting.139
There is considerable variance in best practice 
amongst the different approaches, which may 
be grouped into three types of arrangements. 
The first, and most common, emphasise 
environmental sustainability. Commissions or 
commissioners responsible primarily for the 
environment or sustainable development exist 
in Brazil, Canada, Chile, Germany, Hong Kong, 
New Zealand and, until recently, the United 
Kingdom. Several of these bodies, such as those 
in Brazil and Chile, are permanent organs of the 
national parliament, and their authority extends 
to proposing or reviewing parliamentary bills 
and promoting community debates. 
Bespoke institutions are the second type 
of intervention created to advance the 
interests of future generations. These have 
a varied track record. Leading examples are 
Finland’s Committee for the Future (“FCF”), 
Hungary’s Parliamentary Commissioner for 
Future Generations and Israel’s National 
Commission for Future Generations. Hungary’s 
model inspired the proposal from the World 
Future Council at the Rio+20 Summit for 
an International Ombudsperson for Future 
Generations.140 In the wake of this summit, 
the UN is currently considering proposals to 
enhance intergenerational solidarity and address 
the rights and needs of future generations.141 
The FCF appears particularly promising; it 
is one of the Finnish Parliament’s sixteen 
standing committees, with members drawn 
from different political parties and the power 
to shape its own agenda. Its specific task is to 
create policy to advance future interests and 
provide a longer-term assessment of policy 
choices such as in healthcare.142 
Hungary’s Parliamentary Commissioner and 
Israel’s National Commission no longer function. 
The same is true of several longer-term 
strategy units, designed to be far-sighted in 
consideration of trends and political direction, 
but dispensed with as political priorities have 
changed. The United Kingdom’s Strategy Unit 
and the French Commissariat de Plan are two 
additional examples of forward-looking groups 
at the heart of government which have been 
closed down. The strength of these models 
was their capacity to provide strategic, long-
term and confidential advice to leaders, whilst 
being separate from the immediate pressures 
of day-to-day politics.143 There are reasons for 
optimism, however, within the French system. 
A replacement of Commissariat de Plan, called 
the Commissariat général à la stratégie et à la 
prospective was created in April 2013 at the 
request of President Hollande. In announcing his 
intention to develop a 10 year vision strategy 
for France, Hollande explained that “certainly, 
not everything can be anticipated; conflicts, 
natural disaster, crises. Still, it is France’s 
responsibility to help to prevent these.”144
The third type of national initiative represents 
a whole of government approach to long-term 
planning, often driven by strategic priorities in 
economic development. Of these approaches, 
National Planning Commissions (NPCs) are the 
most widely applied. China’s and India’s are the 
best known, with South Africa’s – headed by 
Commissioner Trevor Manuel – among the 
most recent. NPCs vary in terms of authority, 
coordination, and representation. Some are 
skewed towards planning without comparable 
attention to implementation; others have 
been unable to insulate themselves from 
short-term demands. The rate and success of 
implementation varies per country. In China, 
our Commissioner Minister Liu He is also Vice 
Chairman of the National Development and 
Reform Commission, an institution many regard 
as one of the most significant and effective 
modern planning organisations. Within the 
Chinese system, the planning process is central 
to all key elements of decision-making and 
investment and sets the stage for China’s long-
term development. Other NPCs have been 
described as an “exercise in wish fulfilment 
as much as anything”,145 but many remain 
vital trendsetters in long-term planning. 
Intergenerational reporting146, sovereign wealth 
funds147 and long-term budgeting and fiscal 
planning148 are other significant reflections of a 
whole of government approach to thinking and 
governing long-term.149 Research embedded 
within the broader structures of government 
is also valuable. Foresight, established by the 
United Kingdom government in 1994, supplies 
a useful template. It takes a cross-departmental 
approach to “thinking systemically about the 
future” and conducts detailed studies of long-
term issues, drawing on expert networks of 
academics and practitioners.150
The different models outlined above have a 
mixed record in terms of providing an effective 
means to advance the interests of future 
generations. The more successful models 
empower through a combination of centralised 
and more decentralised approaches, whilst 
also providing appropriate incentives and 
institutional structures to ensure accountability. 
Appropriate safeguards that allow these 
arms of government to thrive without being 
drawn into day-to-day politics improve the 
chance of success. Openness and transparency 
help mobilise long-term support. The World 
Future Council has proposed that domestic 
action on future generations would ideally 
combine the best elements of the Israel, 
New Zealand and Hungary models, thus 
ensuring integrative coverage of relevant 
issues (Israel), independence (New Zealand), 
and a shadow of enforcement (Hungary). 
Our review suggests successful mechanisms 
are integrated and cross-cutting; possess a 
degree of independence from government 
and other bodies with short-term goals; have 
enforcement power; provide clear incentives 
for long-term thinking; ensure horizontal and 
vertical consistency; prioritise inclusiveness 
and transparency; delegate where possible to 
countries, cities and local governments; seek 
external advice, including by working with the 
private sector; and are aligned with global 
reform efforts.
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Limited opportunities for constructive 
engagement and declining trust in politics 
and institutions undermine citizens’ 
involvement in policy. Yet new online 
tools and methods of participation are 
potentially widening opportunities for 
discussion and debate.
Partied out 
The end of the era of tight affiliation to political 
parties appears to be approaching. Many 
democracies are grappling with declining political 
party membership, reduced opportunities for 
political engagement, and increasing political 
indifference. Political party membership 
across 13 European democracies declined by 
40 percent between the late 1970s and the 
late 1990s.151 In 1951, the United Kingdom 
Conservative Party’s membership stood at 
2.9 million; by 2011, it had fallen to less than 
180,000, despite the United Kingdom population 
growing by more than ten million over the 
same period.152 The members that do remain 
are less active and typically older members of 
society. Whilst it is true that small parties and 
independents are growing – albeit from a limited 
base – and new political parties and informal 
political street movements have emerged in the 
wake of the Arab Spring and recession in Europe, 
the long-term viability of these groupings is 
questionable. 
Some analysis suggests less partisanship can 
result in more political volatility, with recent 
elections in Britain, Pakistan, India and New 
Zealand all resulting in hung parliaments.153 
Several countries that were led by single party 
majority governments for generations, have 
recently seen the installation of ruling coalitions, 
notably in the United Kingdom and Greece, where 
single-party leadership has dominated the past 
six decades of politics. Like political parties, trade 
unions have experienced a considerable decline in 
membership in many countries.154 For example, 
in 2012 the union membership rate amongst 
workers in the United States was 11.3 percent, 
compared to 20.1 percent in 1983.155 
Engaging young people in politics is vital to 
solving the great challenges of this and future 
generations. Yet the evidence suggests that 
young people are less and less interested in both 
party politics and politics more generally. In the 
United Kingdom, the proportion of young people 
who supported or felt close to a particular party, 
or who wanted a particular party to win a general 
election, fell from 68 to 39 percent between 
1994 and 2003156; and while 88.6 percent of 
18–25 year olds in the United Kingdom voted in 
the general election of 1964, in 2005 the figure 
was only 44.3 percent.157 Japanese people in 
their 20s cast ballots less than half as often as 
those citizens in their 60s.158 Elsewhere, voter 
turnout rates for those in their 20s – 63 percent 
in Latin America, 59 percent in East Asia, and 58 
percent in Africa – are also lower than for those 
in their 50s and above (with rates of 88 percent 
in Latin America and 89 percent in East Asia 
and Africa for those between 51 and 60 years 
old).159 
Young people are increasingly disillusioned 
with “politics as usual”. The perception gap 
between those in power and the wider citizenry 
appears to be widening, with polls suggesting 
a growing mistrust of leadership. Yet rather 
than simply being looked upon as the passive 
subjects of policy formation, young people 
“should be recognised as social actors with 
skills and capacities to bring about constructive 
solutions to societal issues that directly affect 
them”.160 This makes sense, not only because 
young people know the most about the 
realities of their own lives, but because such 
engagement also encourages young people 
to become active members of society and 
may foster a greater sense of belonging.161 
In today’s climate where tough decisions are 
required on issues of inter-generational equity, 
particularly in relation to employment, greater 
emphasis on public discussion and engagement 
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Figure 24: Changes in party membership in 25 countries  
1989–1999 to 1999–2004
Source: Paul Whiteley, “Is the Party Over? The Decline of Party Activism and Membership across the Democratic World”, Party 
Politics, 17 (2011), p. 6.
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with younger generations is much needed. 
In this regard, initiatives such as One Young 
World, established in 2009, play a critical role 
in empowering youth. The organisation brings 
together young people from around the world 
in an annual summit to debate and formulate 
solutions to pressing global challenges. Since its 
establishment, One Young World Ambassadors 
have set up over 130 projects and initiatives 
in over 100 countries, from campaigns to raise 
awareness of disability rights in Nepal to raising 
funds for the UN World Food Programme.162 
 
Lack of trust and engagement
A Democratic Party poster deployed in the 
1960 United States presidential campaign 
memorably featured an image of Republican 
candidate Richard Nixon alongside the words: 
“Would you buy a used car from this man?”163 
Rightly or wrongly, politicians have long 
been “synonymous with sleaze, corruption 
and duplicity, greed, self-interest and self-
importance, interference, inefficiency and 
intransigence”, yet public distrust of our leaders 
and our institutions seems to have grown visibly 
in recent years.164 Some scholars argue that as a 
society, our healthy scepticism is fast becoming 
a rather more corrosive cynicism.165 According 
to a Guardian/ICM poll conducted across 
France, Britain, Germany, Poland and Spain in 
2011, only 9 percent of Europeans thought 
their politicians – either in opposition or in 
power – acted with honesty and integrity.166 
In Britain, the proportion of the public who said 
they trust governments “just about always” 
or “most of the time” fell from 40 percent in 
1986 to just 16 percent in 2009, whilst the 
proportion saying they “almost never” trusted 
government rose from 12 percent to 40 
percent.167 Faith in government institutions, 
too, has declined. Trust in Congress amongst 
United States citizens dropped from 42 percent 
in 1973 to just 10 percent in 2013.168 Similarly, 
the European Commission reports that the view 
that “my voice counts in (my country)” received 
overwhelming support in Denmark (96 percent) 
and Sweden (89 percent) but fewer than one 
in five citizens in Greece (15 percent), Lithuania 
(16 percent) and Italy (18 percent) agreed.169
Trust is viewed as an essential component of 
effective policymaking because trust bestows 
legitimacy, and thus facilitates greater public 
willingness to abide by decisions and proposals 
made by politicians.170 This, in turn, “creates 
a fiduciary relationship between government 
and the governed, allowing the former to make 
decisions that provide long-term benefits to 
citizens even if those decisions are unpopular 
in the short run”.171 The absence of public 
trust therefore implies decreased likelihood 
of governments taking difficult but necessary 
decisions. A further potential consequence 
of public distrust in government is decreased 
engagement in political participation; Robert 
Putnam says it is “not coincidental” that a 
decline in Americans’ engagement in politics, via 
public meetings, rallies, and political parties, has 
emerged at the same time as rising distrust of 
government.172 As citizens become increasingly 
disillusioned with politics, the fear is that 
their interest in key issues and challenges will 
diminish. This disillusionment and scepticism 
coincides with the increasing difficulty of 
governments to engage in conversations about 
values based principles which transcend more 
populist, day-to-day political agendas and 
strive to articulate a broader vision for society.
Another consequence of reduced trust in the 
state is a reluctance to heed governmental 
advice. A good example is anxiety surrounding 
the consequences and motivations of large-
scale vaccination programmes. In the United 
Kingdom, concern over a (discredited) link 
between autism and the measles, mumps, 
and rubella (MMR) vaccine meant low 
vaccination uptake in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, and a subsequent rise in the number 
of reported measles cases.173 In northern 
Nigeria, political and religious leaders halted a 
polio immunisation campaign in 2003, citing 
spurious claims that the vaccines could be 
contaminated by anti-fertility agents, HIV and 
cancerous elements.174 In Pakistan, the United 
States Central Intelligence Agency admitted 
a ruse whereby it sponsored a hepatitis 
vaccination campaign in order to secure Osama 
Bin Laden’s DNA profile175; it has been reported 
that local aid workers and public health officials 
consider that this undermined Pakistan’s 
efforts to eradicate polio.176
Modernising political conversations
Whilst political party membership may have 
slumped, there is some encouragement to 
be found in the way single issue campaigns 
are thriving in today’s political landscape. This 
suggests some appetite remains for political 
activism which might be harnessed through 
new and alternative means. From grassroots 
campaigns against new airport runways and 
mass protests in India about the treatment 
of women, to bottom-up campaigns to keep 
a female face on British currency, single 
issue groups can prove highly effective in 
assembling coalitions of active organisations 
to block particular policies, or draw attention 
to government inaction or damaging company 
behaviour. Campaigning on single issues 
emphasises individual choice over ideology, and 
enables people to build a portfolio of political 
engagement without being tied to any one 
party. The increasing availability of the necessary 
technology, low costs of data and smart phones 
have all helped to mobilise people and make 
coordination easier. With most platforms now 
free and open sourced, more ad hoc groups are 
expected to start up across the world.177 
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Helping to facilitate this shift are organisations 
such as the online global campaigning platform, 
Avaaz, as well as more local initiatives like 
MoveOn and Change.org in the United States 
and GetUp! in Australia. These groups provide 
platforms for multiple campaigns and the 
know-how required to coordinate campaigns 
and campaigners online. Avaaz was established 
with the lofty goal of closing the gap between 
“the world we have and the world most people 
everywhere want”. After only six years, it 
purports to have 20 million followers who 
receive weekly emails asking them to support 
campaigns ranging from protecting tigers and 
saving Russian girl band Pussy Riot to stopping 
Rupert Murdoch’s quest to gain full control of 
BSkyB.178 “Support” can range from signing 
online petitions to calling for submissions, to, 
more controversially, fundraising for on the 
ground activism. Similarly, GetUp! describes 
itself as “a ground-up movement of real people 
who are putting participation back into our 
democracy”. Established in 2005, it has over 
half a million members in Australia and has 
campaigned on issues such as civil liberties, 
freedom of the press, mental health reform and 
corporate responsibility.179 
Given their declining memberships, political 
parties are envious of the capacity of issue 
driven groups to foster public support, and are 
trying to enlist them on particular issues for 
political gain. Meanwhile, there is increasing 
competition for attention as the number 
of single issue campaigns rises and groups 
use celebrities and the media to champion 
their cause. These changes have important 
implications for how people are engaging 
with politics. Single issue campaigns provide 
a more fluid, often softer, engagement where 
people move from one cause to another or 
lend their support to a campaign by signing a 
petition, instead of getting actively involved and 
committed over a longer period. 
Old and new media
Newspapers, and journalism more broadly, 
have typically served as an important check on 
governments and other powerful interests in 
business and the broader community. Yet with 
the decline in newspaper readership, increasing 
closed “paywalls” online, and reduced numbers 
of trained, independent journalists, many fear 
that a key pillar of political accountability is 
at risk. Whilst newspaper circulation only 
reduced by 2.2 percent globally between 2008 
and 2012, across Western Europe and North 
America there were far steeper declines of 25 
percent and 13 percent respectively.180 In the 
United Kingdom, circulation fell in all national 
daily newspapers in 2011, with over 30 
regional weekly papers forced to shut down.181 
In South Africa, 16 out of 19 daily newspapers 
recorded declines in their circulation between 
2006 and 2011, with newspapers suffering 
circulation drops ranging from 8 percent to 
31 percent.182 Newspapers are not in terminal 
decline across the globe; in Asia, circulation 
increased by 1.2 percent in 2012.183 Yet as 
more providers have turned to online content, 
access is now increasingly restricted, either to 
subscribers only or via complicated paywalls. 
In 2012, nearly one in three United States 
national daily papers began charging for 
online content or announced plans to do so.184 
Meanwhile, newsroom staff and reporting 
resources are shrinking, as newspapers grapple 
with declining readership, increasingly tighter 
advertising revenue, and competition from 
online sources.185 
Although it is a positive development that 
more information is available to citizens online 
via social media tools and blogs, the lack of 
reportage and often sub-optimal use of reliable 
sources, objectivity, and editorial control are a 
cause for concern. The role of the news media is 
not simply the dissemination of information, but 
the filtering and interpreting of that information. 
Industry experts question the value of some 
online alternatives which “indiscriminately mix 
press releases and genuine reporting without any 
standards of significance or trustworthiness”, 
and worry about the increasing gap “between 
the small minority who take an intense interest 
in public life and the considerably larger 
number who drop out of the public sphere all 
together”.186 With the decreasing prominence 
of newspapers, the fear is that only those 
who are particularly motivated will still seek 
out news; many other citizens may leave the 
sphere of political engagement, increasing the 
gap between knowledge of key challenges and 
societal action to overcome them. Another 
concern is that people may increasingly seek out 
the news that fits in with their existing opinions 
and interests without gaining exposure to a 
deeper array of ideas and information, leading to 
a growing inability to see alternative perspectives 
and a climate of decreased consensus and 
increased gridlock. 
In an environment of declining newspaper 
readership, we are also reminded of the 
importance of artists, film-makers, authors, 
musicians and other cultural leaders in building 
public awareness and mobilising the public 
on critical issues. The arts are instrumental 
for challenging commonly held perspectives, 
whilst also raising awareness about social 
issues, breaking down barriers to cross-cultural 
understanding, and inspiring creative solutions.187 
The potential of new social media 
Beyond the impact on news reporting, there is 
much broader debate about what new online 
social media networks mean for power, the 
state, and the citizen. Cyber-optimists like 
Clay Shirky claim that a “denser, more complex 
and more participatory” communications 
landscape provides the networked population 
with “greater access to information, more 
opportunities to engage in public speech, and 
an enhanced ability to undertake collective 
action”.188 Cyber-pessimists like Malcolm 
Gladwell argue that social media can never 
act as a catalyst to lasting change in the way 
that direct action has in the past. He contends 
that its “weak ties” mean that while levels of 
participation might rise, this is only because of 
a decrease in the motivation that participation 
requires.189 Evgeny Morozov argues that binary 
classifications and debates of cyber pessimism 
and optimism are deeply unhelpful, smothering 
meaningful critique of the Internet beyond 
populist analysis and hype.190 
As these debates rage on, the reality is that 
social media is now a permanent fixture of 
our political discourse. While there are many 
limitations, a range of new or emerging social 
media examples provide some useful inspiration 
of the potential of social media to engage, 
empower, alert and amplify often unheard 
voices. Examples include Ushahidi.com, a 
collaboration of Kenyan citizen journalists who 
created this online platform to map incidents 
of violence as well as peace efforts that 
followed the Kenyan election of 2008.191 With 
over 45,000 users in Kenya, the site collated 
vital information which was then used by the 
media and other groups to uncover and stop 
violence. Ushahidi, which means “testimony” in 
Swahili, has provided the inspiration for similar 
platforms elsewhere. Today, this non-profit tech 
platform has been adapted for use in monitoring 
elections or disaster situations in the Congo, 
Haiti and Chile.192 In Zambia, for example, 
BantuWatch is a crowdsourcing platform 
which allowed citizens to monitor and report 
concerns around the 2011 elections regarding 
the electoral process, such as intimidation, vote 
buying, voting misinformation and violence.193
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In 2008, Barack Obama led the first political 
campaign in history to effectively harness the 
power of social media. Promoting the man 
dubbed the first “Facebook President”, Team 
Obama used up to fifteen different social 
networking tools in a grassroots campaign 
designed to mobilise volunteers, target new 
voters quickly and efficiently, and build a 
broader base of financial contributors. By the 
end of the campaign, Obama had attracted 
over 2.5 million Facebook supporters, 115,000 
Twitter followers, and more than 50 million 
views on his YouTube channel.194 Governments, 
more broadly, are increasingly realising the 
significance of social media as a potent 
communications tool; when Egypt’s president 
Mohamed Morsi was toppled in July 2013 his 
acknowledgment and condemnation of the 
“military coup” was delivered via Facebook and 
Twitter. In countries like Egypt, Yemen, and 
Tunisia, social media has been widely credited 
for its role in the downfall of dictatorships 
during the Arab Spring. One must be careful, 
however, not to overstate the power of 
social media: it was less significant in the 
campaign against Muammar Gaddafi in Libya 
and has had little traction during Syria’s civil 
war. Furthermore, an asymmetry has begun 
to emerge between the ease of identifying 
problems and the difficulty of solving them. 
Citizens are now able to raise issues and 
mobilise in protest more quickly and easily 
than ever before, yet the complexity and 
plethora of issues has weakened the capacity of 
governments to solve problems. With the speed 
of protest accelerating ahead of the speed 
of problem solving, the demands on leaders 
have shifted. New capabilities of leadership are 
required, able to manage public expectations, 
uncertainty, rapid change and an increasing 
complexity of issues. 
Social media’s strength lies in its capacity to 
organise interested individuals and groups to 
coalesce around specific issues. The March 
2013 #standwithRand Twitter hashtag 
garnered thousands of tweets supporting 
United States Senator Rand Paul’s 13-hour 
filibuster protesting the potential use of drones 
against American citizens on American soil; 
the #everydaysexism Twitter hashtag and 
website act as a database of misogynistic 
incidents across the globe, gaining 50,000 
Twitter followers and 30,000 posts in its 
first year of operation.195 The speed at which 
information, incidents and ideas can be spread is 
also transformative. The killing of 26-year-old 
Iranian Neda Agha-Soltan during street protests 
in 2009 was captured on video by bystanders 
and gained global exposure on the Internet, 
becoming “probably the most widely witnessed 
death in human history”.196 
Online platforms are also proving increasingly 
powerful in response to global emergencies, 
providing rapidly updated information for the 
benefit of the public and first-responders alike. 
The use of Twitter increased by 500 percent 
following the 2011 Japan earthquake and 
tsunami, as individuals sought to reach out 
to loved ones.197 Pioneered during Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005, Google’s “Crisis Response 
Centre” has been instrumental in disseminating 
critical information during disasters including 
earthquakes in Turkey and New Zealand, 
floods in Thailand and hurricanes in the United 
States.198 
The causes and issues being addressed might 
not be new, but social media networks can 
be game changing tools of communication. 
The new networks and participants have, at 
the very least, more potential power than 
ever before, constituting “the most active, 
outspoken and globalised civil society the world 
has ever known”.199 Whether this translates into 
more effective government and engagement 
of citizens in meeting the challenges outlined in 
this report remains to be seen. 
Issues are becoming more complex and the 
evidence base can be uncertain, whilst an 
emphasis on consensus undermines our 
ability to act. 
Scale, speed and spread
If aliens had been watching our planet for its 
entire 4.5 billion years, they would have seen 
remarkably little change in the Earth’s appearance 
for the vast majority of that time.  Yet, as our 
Commissioner Martin Rees has reflected, in just 
a tiny sliver of its history – the last few thousand 
years – aliens would have started to witness an 
accelerated pace of change as human populations 
rose and agriculture began. Fast forward to 
just the last 50 years – little more than one 
hundredth of a millionth of the Earth’s age – 
and the changes have been far more dramatic 
and abrupt. Levels of CO2 rising anomalously 
in the atmosphere; radio waves emitting from 
televisions, cell phone and radar transmissions; 
and almost every aspect of the earth’s system 
– from the surface temperature, to sea and 
CO2 levels, to arctic ice depletion – changing 
dramatically as populations continued to grow, 
energy demand skyrocketed and pressures on 
our natural eco-systems rose exponentially.
Rees ponders what our hypothetical aliens 
might see 20, 50 or 100 years from now. 
Just as the pace of change has accelerated 
significantly in the last 50 years, the scale, 
speed and spread of change going forward 
is likely to be even more extraordinary. We 
know that humans are the primary cause 
of this change, having significantly altered 
the Earth’s biological, chemical and physical 
processes. Many argue that our activities 
are putting our planet at unprecedented risk, 
increasingly driving the Earth’s system towards 
dangerous thresholds or tipping points.200 Yet 
there is remarkably limited comprehension 
or acknowledgement of the scale, urgency 
and connectivity of the problems. All of the 
megatrends and challenges outlined in Part 
A are interconnected. Understanding the 
connections between food, water and energy 
security; poverty alleviation; climate change; 
population growth; economic inequality; 
pandemic preparedness; and pollution control 
is crucial for tackling today’s challenges and 
improving the well-being of all societies. 
This interconnection does, however, compound 
the difficulties in addressing these challenges. 
No one challenge can be seen in isolation and 
4. Growing 
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solutions for one issue can exacerbate negative 
effects in another. Nations, regions and the 
global community lack the capacity, knowledge, 
resources and institutional frameworks to 
respond to, manage, and resolve all of these 
competing interlocked challenges. Yet even 
though today’s challenges know no borders, 
international cooperation and coherence is often 
undermined by fears of diminished domestic 
control, and can be difficult to justify due to fiscal 
pressures at home. Science is occurring in more 
and more places than ever before201, yet the 
ability of international collaboration to enable local 
solutions and empower individuals is currently 
under-utilised and poorly understood. It should 
also be recognised that, whilst scientific research 
is increasingly a global activity, occurring in more 
and more places than ever before, concerns 
remain that certain parts of the world, not least 
many countries in Africa, are largely excluded 
from today’s global knowledge society.
Grappling with uncertainty
In a toast to Albert Einstein, George Bernard 
Shaw once claimed that “science is always wrong. 
It never solves a problem without creating 
ten more”.202 Compared to Einstein’s day, our 
collective breadth of scientific knowledge has 
grown extraordinarily, yet the depths of what 
we do not know remain immeasurable. Scholars 
such as Stuart Firestein argue that “somewhere 
along the superhighway of progress, we seem 
to have developed a kind of fact-fetishism that 
shackles us to the allure of the known” and 
makes us uncomfortable with what is uncertain 
and unknown.203 The reality is, however, that 
from fracking to famine, climate change to 
cybersecurity, poverty to pandemics, scientific 
advice has never been in greater demand, nor 
has it been more uncertain and contested,204 
not least due to a growing recognition of the 
interconnections and complexities involved. Yet 
scientific uncertainty, an absence of consensus, 
and unclear relations between cause and effect 
too often are excuses for inaction.
Effective action to confront global challenges 
requires “not only a greater knowledge about 
the state of the planet and its resources, but 
also awareness that many aspects will remain 
unknown”.205 This necessity is in contradiction 
with increasing political pressures to identify 
an often artificially unambiguous evidence base 
for policy decisions today. Whilst reasoned 
scepticism and open disagreement about 
uncertainties are amongst the most crucial 
distinguishing qualities of science, Andy 
Stirling argues that “when science comes into 
contact with economic and political power, 
there develops a strange kind of uncertainty 
denial”.206 In meeting global challenges 
and considering the prospects for future 
generations, we necessarily must be tolerant of 
uncertainties. It is the balance of evidence, not 
least on the implications of inaction, rather than 
the certainty of outcomes, which should inform 
our judgements. Yet governments and citizens 
increasingly clamour for certainty. 
Ironically, our discomfort with uncertainty does 
not apply in relation to other aspects of our lives. 
People insure their houses, cars and other assets 
against fire, flood, robbery and other incidents 
of low probability. For those that can afford it, 
and where it is available, insurance is commonly 
taken to cover health needs, travel, accidents, 
unemployment, and even weddings. Yet on other 
risks, like climate change, uncertainty is used as 
an excuse not to act. This is despite estimates, 
outlined in the Stern Review, that the probability 
of an abrupt climate catastrophe increases by 10 
percent for every additional degree of warming, 
once the threshold temperature is reached 
(which our Commissioner Nicholas Stern argues 
averages five degrees above pre-industrial 
temperatures).207 
No consensus on consensus
Coupled with this discomfort with uncertainty 
is a growing focus on consensus. Some scholars 
argue that the IPCC’s emphasis on building 
consensus amongst climate scientists has had 
the unintended consequences of distorting 
the science, failing to reflect the complexity 
and inherent uncertainties of the problem, 
elevating the voices of scientists that dispute 
the consensus and undermining people’s trust in 
the IPCC.208 The concern about this consensus 
approach relates to the oversimplification of 
what is a very complex and uncertain issue, 
even if the fundamental principle of climate 
change is well accepted. 
Expectation of a linear relationship between 
expertise and power – whereby, first, science 
or the broader research community has to “get 
it right” and then policy comes into play – is 
unhelpful in relation to many of today’s global 
challenges, given the inherent uncertainty 
embedded within.209 Though undoubtedly 
politically inconvenient, we need to accept and 
identify new ways to cope with uncertainty 
in tackling global challenges, whilst strictly 
upholding scientific rigour and accountability. 
Entrenched barriers shut many women and 
young people out of critical conversations 
and activities, whilst cultural differences 
provide barriers to change. 
Cultural differences 
In 2011, Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman 
published the bestseller, Thinking, Fast and 
Slow. Kahneman’s insights into how psychology 
shapes judgment and decision-making – how 
individual thinking is impacted by cognitive 
biases – highlight the relevance of cognitive and 
cultural influences on the collaborative decisions 
required for action on the challenges introduced 
in Part A.210 The attention given to Kahneman’s 
work is encouraging as a richer understanding 
of how societal and cultural factors in decision-
making may prove critical in helping us to 
overcome the current failure to meet critical 
global challenges. As our Chair, Pascal Lamy, 
argues, countries lack the capacity to speak 
to each other openly, and explain their views 
on critical challenges, such as development, 
social justice, sovereignty and environmental 
sustainability. What is lacking, Lamy argues, “is a 
bedrock of common values capable of bringing 
about a shared ambition for civilization”.211 
“Hyperglobalisation”212 has transformed the 
core of modern societies, resulting in new 
interactions that create both opportunities 
and tensions between individual and collective 
cultures and identities at local, national and 
global levels.213 Yet simply because greater 
numbers of people are living in the “contact 
zones”214 of other cultures and societies does 
not mean their thinking on the big issues is 
shared. In many instances, local cultures and 
ways of life have been asserted and in some 
cases strengthened.215 One of Kahneman’s 
contemporaries, Dan Kahan, has compiled 
useful evidence on the way individuals and 
groups think, paying special attention to 
the importance of culture. While some have 
touted the “end of ideology” and the arrival 
of greater homogeneity,216 Kahan and others 
suggest cultural commitments still impact 
how people process information, including on 
public policy matters. Their research revealed 
that cultural worldviews predicted individual 
beliefs about the seriousness of environmental 
and technological risks more powerfully than 
any other factor, including gender, race, 
income, education, and political ideology.217 Of 
course, culture does not explain everything. 
It may directly explain very little and must be 
contextualised; still, culture often orients the 
5. Cultural 
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prism through which individuals and groups 
interpret and formulate beliefs around means 
and ends.218 
Developing a deeper appreciation of how 
political, religious and moral intuitions similarly 
bias our thinking, thus influencing our ability to 
be objective, is necessary if we are to overcome 
the obstacles to a shared understanding of the 
problems and solutions. Jonathan Haidt, for 
example, has recently argued conservatives 
and liberals have equal sincerity in wanting the 
best for society, but fail to uncover mutual 
agendas because they do not understand each 
other’s motivations.219 Academic disciplines, 
particularly from the natural and social sciences, 
are now increasingly encouraged to work across 
boundaries to draw new insights and alternative 
ways of framing questions. Given the multi-
faceted complexity of global challenges, this is 
encouraging news. An enhanced understanding 
on subjects straddling multiple academic areas is 
also needed, along with renewed interdisciplinary 
efforts to avoid disciplinary bias from obscuring 
common and productive research agendas.220 
Same, same but different
A “precedence of difference over sameness” 
has important, and perhaps misunderstood, 
consequences for the pace of cooperation within 
diverse and networked societies.221 Individual 
tendencies to identify points of difference rather 
than sameness may intensify in a globalised 
operating environment, heightening one’s sense 
of uncertainty.222 Perceived challenges to existing 
cultures and identities brought on by exposure 
to a multiplicity of other cultures and audiences 
can motivate “individuals and groups to maintain, 
defend, and even expand their local values and 
practices”.223 This raises the importance of 
focusing on mutual interests, not just between 
people but also among cities, nations and 
countries. It also suggests more attention should 
be focused on the power of ideas, networks and 
agents, the role of socialisation, and the inherent 
path-dependency of existing structures.224 
Academics and decision-makers are now 
considering whether current notions of “global” 
and “local” 225 provide “sufficient purchase 
to understand the complex and rapid set of 
interconnections, processes and aspirations 
through which meanings, goods and people flow, 
coalesce and diverge”.226
Responding to individual and collective 
predispositions requires careful attention on 
the part of policymakers (and researchers 
working on policy challenges) to how facts are 
presented and how policy instruments might 
unite differently-motivated but ultimately shared 
interests. Although we need to take peoples’ 
ideals and perspectives seriously, alternative 
worldviews need not be “static and relentlessly 
oppositional”227. As Henrietta Moore has shown 
in relation to the feminist movement, difference 
can be creative.228 New strategies to frame 
information and policy ideas more appropriately 
are enabling those devoted to “competing ways 
of life” and different worldviews to “converge 
on shared understandings of societal risk and 
the most effective means for abating them”.229 
Presenting information “in forms that affirm 
rather their denigrate” values is just one 
emerging way of responding positively to cultural 
and other biases that impact the way we think, 
in order to progress collective action.230 The 
Commission recognises the depth and breadth of 
different cultures and traditions, and the extent 
of the vital contribution to humanity arising from 
this diversity of histories and perspectives. It 
is concerned, however, by the lack of common 
values that bind members of the international 
system together.
The glass ceiling
Beyond cultural differences, entrenched and 
conservative barriers against women and other 
disadvantaged groups also impede more open 
conversations. IMF Managing Director Christine 
Lagarde claimed “If Lehman Brothers had been 
a bit more Lehman Sisters, we would not have 
had the degree of tragedy that we had.”231 It 
is impossible to know if more women in senior 
financial positions would have avoided the risk-
taking that contributed to the Financial Crisis. 
What is clear, however, is that too often people 
are shut out of critical conversations and key 
decision-making roles based on their gender, 
ethnicity, background, and age, increasing the 
risk of group-think by leaders possessing very 
similar characteristics. 
Gender equality is not simply a moral imperative 
but a policy priority that makes sense. According 
to UN Women, which until recently was led 
by our Commissioner Michelle Bachelet, “the 
evidence is overwhelming and unambiguous: 
women’s empowerment and gender equality 
drive development progress”.232 There is a 
direct correlation between gender parity and 
a country’s level of competitiveness, GDP per 
capita and human development.233 Sidelining 
women from senior roles, paying them less for 
equal work, and barring them from property 
ownership not only damages society’s 
commitment to fundamental human equality, 
it also diminishes the contribution that could 
be made by half of the world’s human capital. 
Only 20.9 percent of national parliamentarians 
across the globe are female.234 Women have 
never occupied the top job at the United 
Nations, the World Trade Organization, the 
African Development Bank, the World Bank or 
the European Commission. As of March 2013, 
only 17.3 percent of directorships of FTSE 
100 companies were headed by females.235 
Ethnic minorities fare little better in business; 
it was 2009 when the first black head of a 
FTSE 100 company was appointed.236 In the 
current French National Assembly, there are 
only nine MPs of ethnic minority origin, out of a 
total of 577. 237 Such figures demonstrate that 
entrenched barriers to participation – including 
discrimination, socio-economic disadvantage, 
and inflexible working practices – are far from 
overcome. 
Today’s professionalised political sphere 
provides another example of the shutting out 
of alternative voices; a Smith Institute survey 
found that 24 percent of the United Kingdom’s 
2010 intake of MPs had an occupational 
background of “politics”, a higher percentage 
than those from any other field.238 Between 
1979 and 2010 the number of Labour MPs 
who had done manual or clerical work dropped 
from 40 percent to just 9 percent.239 Today it 
seems increasingly difficult to imagine a United 
Kingdom politician emerging from a shop floor 
background in the mould of towering political 
figures from the past, such as Welsh miner 
Aneurin Bevan, who spearheaded the creation 
of the NHS or, outside the United Kingdom, 
electrician turned Nobel Prize-winning Polish 
President Lech Walesa. 
It is not only certain citizens, communities 
and classes that are left out of debates and 
decision-making, but countries too. The G7 
stands as a powerful example of a “club” that 
has been reluctant to expand its membership, 
while pronouncing on global responsibilities to 
be shared by every region.240 This is despite 
recent pronounced shifts in the global economic 
order which have seen G7 countries increasingly 
replaced by G20 countries as the group tackling 
the world’s major political and economic issues. 
Smaller and poorer countries have little say in 
these decision-making processes. Leadership 
of international institutions, too, has often been 
restricted, exemplified by the tacit agreement 
that ensures that the World Bank is led by a 
United States citizen and the IMF by a European. 
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By giving voice to the voiceless and sharing best 
practice, alternative perspectives and solutions 
could help address the world’s key challenges. 
What next?
Part B, Responsible Futures, of our report has 
outlined the Commission’s diagnosis of lessons 
from success and failure in addressing vital 
global challenges. We identified a number of 
shaping factors which we believe are impeding 
the capacity to generate change and close the 
gap between knowledge and action. To achieve 
this, a logical sequence of steps is required. We 
need to consolidate a strong knowledge base of 
the issue or challenge; we need to translate this 
knowledge into awareness of the problem, and 
its implications; from awareness, we need to 
mobilise energy to seek change; and, finally, we 
need to shift from mobilisation to action- and 
enforcement of action- in order to achieve the 
necessary change. To assist in this transition, we 
now turn to Part C, Practical Futures. Our aim is 
to provide practical recommendations that draw 
on the lessons above to suggest productive 
pathways for action. Part C provides illustrative 
responses to the challenges identified in  
Part A, Possible Futures by drawing on the 
insights in Part B of what works and what 
does not. We offer design principles and 
recommendations for action which we believe 
will contribute to a more inclusive and  
resilient future. 
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The world is slowly emerging from the 
devastating Financial Crisis. While the recovery 
is fragile, with painfully high costs in many 
societies, the commitment to reform appears 
solid. In this section, we step back to reflect 
on the lessons of this turbulent period and 
suggest ways that we might manage our 
global connectivity more effectively in the 
future. The Commission believes fresh thinking 
is urgently required in order to address 
critical global challenges and prevent future 
crises. By outlining a number of principles for 
action and providing thematic and practical 
recommendations, we aim to contribute 
meaningfully to the necessary strategic and 
institutional renewal. 
The Commission’s recommendations aim to 
assist policymakers, business leaders and 
other decision influencers to overcome the 
current gridlock in meeting a number of today’s 
global challenges, and focus on the bigger 
picture. Our recommendations emphasise 
the importance of innovative partnerships, 
openness and accountability, and underline 
the need to step beyond crisis management to 
invest in the longer-term needs of our societies. 
Five key principles are used to organise our 
recommendations, which we believe can 
guide action and institutional change. Within 
each, we provide illustrative examples of 
recommendations. Some are directed at 
immediate policy debates and offer pragmatic 
ways forward. Others seek to address deeper 
political and cultural dynamics obstructing 
the shift to a longer-term focus. These 
recommendations are not necessarily new, and 
our examples are inevitably selective rather 
than comprehensive. Our aim is to add direction 
and weight to the momentum for action and, 
in so doing, contribute to a better world for 
current and future generations. 
• A Coalition of the Working between 
countries, companies and cities to counteract 
climate change
The Commission is convinced the fight against 
climate change requires renewed vigour in the 
wake of repeatedly stalled multilateral efforts. 
To help kick-start the process, and as a building 
block towards the multilateral negotiations in 
Paris in 2015, we recommend the creation of 
a new multi-stakeholder coalition. The C20-
C30-C40 Coalition would bring the main 
constituencies together, namely countries 
(utilising the G20), companies (selecting 30 
companies affiliated to the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development), and 
cities (working through the existing C40 Cities 
initiative). Embracing “inclusive minilateralism” 
and reporting to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, the Coalition 
could inspire countries, companies and cities to 
undertake meaningful and practical action on 
climate change.1 The Coalition could develop 
targets on areas including: increased LED 
street lighting; decreased commercial energy 
usage; promotion of more energy efficient 
buildings, transport systems and housing 
improvements; increased recycling rates; 
and reduced wastage in both commercial and 
public facilities. The Coalition could also work 
to ensure accelerated market penetration 
of highly efficient vehicles and biofuels, as 
recommended by the International Climate 
Taskforce in 2005.2 Members could be required 
to track their greenhouse gas emissions via a 
carbon calculator, with appropriate benchmarks 
identified depending on the industry sector, 
country or city size. Membership could be 
contingent on performance and an annual 
disclosure process, with an accreditation system 
put in place to reward the strongest performers. 
• A new early cyber warning platform, aimed 
at promoting a better understanding of 
common threats for the shared benefit 
of government, corporate and individual 
interests 
At a time when citizens are becoming increasingly 
sceptical of the ability of governments, 
businesses, banks and other service providers to 
protect their data security, the development of 
more robust, independent and trusted systems 
is required. Too many decisions regarding cyber 
security rely on an inadequate evidence base, 
due to inconsistent data and deficient reporting, 
along with fragmented and inconsistent cyber 
rules across different networks and systems. 
To respond, the Commission recommends the 
establishment of an early warning platform for 
the shared benefit of government, corporate 
and individual interests. CyberEx would act 
as a trusted analyst of select data to identify 
emerging common threats and help to coordinate 
appropriately targeted and accessible responses. 
This initiative could build on existing national 
response systems, whilst also helping to provide 
support in developing countries where cyber 
infrastructure is weakest.3
CyberEx could be an independent exchange, 
funded by participating stakeholders. It could 
work to develop complete, consistent and 
comparable metrics of common threats, 
enabling a more transparent and deeper 
understanding to inform better policies 
over the longer term.4 The platform could 
share information on global cyber system 
weaknesses, suspicious internet traffic and 
malicious software, whilst also helping countries 
and businesses identify and implement minimal 
technical and policy standards of cybersecurity.5 
It could seek to minimise common vulnerabilities 
that enable the theft of sensitive information 
and the distribution of spam through systems, 
and work closely with international and 
domestic agencies to prevent common system 
attacks. The platform could also provide a 
useful mechanism for stakeholders to agree 
responses to collective concerns, such as 
privacy protection. By providing an accessible, 
open platform for information exchange, 
CyberEx could help governments, businesses 
and individuals to understand common threat 
patterns better, identify preventative measures, 
and minimise future attacks. Multi-stakeholder 
governance and transparency will be critical to 
ensure CyberEx is a trusted platform. 
1. Creative Coalitions 
C20-
C30-C40:
Invest in multi-stakeholder partnerships to prompt deeper change, 
learning and practical action.
CyberEx: 
58
• A city-based network to fight the rise of 
NCDs and share practices to minimise the 
costs they inflict on health systems
The Commission recommends the creation of an 
action-focused global network centred on cities 
and dedicated to fighting the rise of NCDs. The 
WHO Draft Action Plan for the Prevention and 
Control of NCDs 2013–2020 was endorsed 
earlier this year by the World Health Assembly, 
along with the associated proposed UN 
Interagency Task Force.6 The “Fit Cities” Network 
could build on this momentum, cognisant of 
the fact that both developed and developing 
economies face a dual burden of communicable 
and non-communicable disease. Fit Cities could 
focus on cities with populations over five million 
and bring food, beverage, and alcohol producers 
to the table in collaboration with public health 
authorities, the UN Task Force, and the civil 
society coalition, The NCD Alliance. In addition to 
encouraging the enforcement of health promotion 
regulation, Fit Cities could focus on the availability 
of healthy food, quality of health education, 
and effective mechanisms to enhance healthy 
lifestyles. The Network could draw inspiration 
from other public health initiatives: the “Move-
to-Improve” scheme recently instituted in New 
York City to help teachers integrate physical 
activity into all areas of the classroom is one such 
example. Participating cities could set measurable 
targets based on the WHO’s Draft Action Plan; 
the most successful city could be awarded a 
prize funded by modest subscriptions from all 
members of the network.
• Develop independent institutions 
accountable to governments but able to 
operate across longer-term time horizons 
To enable governments to “focus more on 
steering rather than rowing”,7 the Commission 
recommends they invest in innovative 
institutions. Such institutions should be 
independent of the short-term pressures facing 
governments of the day but appropriately 
accountable to the political system in question. 
The pressures of day-to-day governing and 
the 24/7 media cycle need not prejudice these 
institutions; rather, they should be charged with 
conducting systematic reviews and analysis of 
longer-term issues impacting their country and 
region. Essential areas of policy formulation, 
evaluation and implementation could benefit 
from more devolved authority and decentralised 
public service delivery. Useful models include 
infrastructure and urban planning authorities 
like those in Australia8 and Singapore,9 and 
the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United 
States.10 The United Kingdom’s National Institute 
for Health and Care Excellence11 and Office of 
Budget Responsibility12 apply similar principles 
in health and fiscal policy. Institutional design 
must naturally respond to the fundamental 
imperatives of legitimacy, accountability and 
effectiveness. Creating institutions that are 
somewhat insulated from short-term political 
agendas or electoral terms may safeguard such 
imperatives,13 particularly if the individuals 
appointed to such institutions are suitably 
protected from short-term biases.14 Political 
debate and decision-making processes also 
benefit from transparent and independent 
expert advice, provided it remains subject to 
appropriate accountability and oversight by 
parliaments or other bodies.15 Regional bodies, 
such as the European Union and the African 
Union, as well as international professional 
bodies, can contribute significantly in advancing 
and upholding standards. Cross-party consensus 
and support of the agenda and objective of 
such independent agencies is vital in order to 
secure their stability, longevity, impartiality and 
effectiveness.16 
• Build sunset clauses into all publicly-funded 
international institutions and require a review 
of accomplishments and mandates to ensure 
they are fit for 21st century purposes
 
The Commission has identified a number of 
areas where new institutions will be valuable, 
and has also recommended reform of existing 
institutions. At the same time, the Commission 
acknowledges the importance of regular review 
of institutional arrangements to ensure they are 
fit for purpose. Since the establishment of the 
UN and the Bretton Woods institutions over 60 
years ago, the number of international agencies 
has steadily grown, with “a spaghetti bowl of 
overlapping mandates”.17 The UN itself has over 
twenty independent agencies and funds, each 
with varying degrees of independence. Whilst 
the mandates of many agencies have changed 
or sprawled18 in different directions, not one 
agency has been closed down.
The Commission recommends the inclusion of 
sunset clauses into the governance structures 
of the majority of international institutions, 
where appropriate. This is to ensure there is 
regular reflection and analysis of organisational 
performance and purpose. Such analysis must be 
transparent and inclusive, and inspire institutions 
to be more innovative and adaptive within 
their mandates in response to 21st century 
demands. Where institutions are shown to 
have fulfilled their mandate and are no longer 
appropriate or adapted to the demands in 
question, their functions should cease, with 
resources and activities redirected to more 
appropriate institutions and challenges. In the 
absence of such constructive review, global 
governance institutions in many cases have failed 
to evolve in pace with the changing nature of 
the challenges, leading to a widening governance 
gap and compounding questions of legitimacy 
and effectiveness. Sunset clauses will not fully 
address these concerns, but will be an important 
step towards a more streamlined, effective, and 
reinvigorated global governance system. 
2. Innovative, Open and 
Reinvigorated Institutions 
Decades,  
not Days: 
Fit for 
Purpose:  
Fit Cities: 
Ensure 21st century institutions and measurements are open, fit for 
purpose and steered towards long-term resilience. 
59
• Optimise new forms of political participation, 
transparency and accountability, whilst 
amplifying the voices of global citizens
The Commission recommends renewed 
commitment to transparent government and 
deeper political engagement. Open government 
has been described as an “essential foundation 
for economic, social and political progress, by 
strengthening the transparency of institutions” 
and enabling more informed decisions based on 
more collaborative conversations.19 Momentum 
is building: commitment to “open data” is 
increasingly seen as a powerful force for public 
accountability and scrutiny, particularly in 
making existing information “easier to analyse, 
process and combine than ever before”.20 More 
needs to be done to enable civil engagement, 
influence, monitoring and participation on 
longer-term issues. Governments should 
maximise the potential of new social media 
tools to act as an arena to galvanise political 
discussion and debate. Other “experiments” 
in more inclusive government should also be 
tested, such as deliberative tools that empower 
citizens in decision-making.21 
The Open Government Partnership (OGP) is a 
particularly welcome development. Initiated by 
Brazil, and now boasting over 50 participating 
countries, this multilateral initiative works 
to “secure concrete commitments from 
governments to promote transparency, empower 
citizens, fight corruption, and harness new 
technologies to strengthen governance”.22 The 
OGP collaborates with individual countries to 
develop action plans on citizen participation, 
“access-to-information” laws, and anti-corruption 
disclosures, together with measures to improve 
services, promote innovation and appropriately 
manage resources. The OGP publicly tracks 
progress and provides independent reports and 
assessments in order to promote accountability 
between member governments and citizens. The 
Commission calls for the OGP platform to be 
adopted by other institutions and governments, 
and for the platform’s work to be expanded to 
strengthen coordination between citizens across 
countries. Such coordination would enable a 
stronger voice amongst global citizens on policies 
to address longer-term global challenges. As 
the Center for Global Development’s Nancy 
Birdsall has argued, global society needs better 
channels through which to influence global 
polity,23 and OGP is well placed to act as this 
platform. Global governance agencies could, 
for example, be required to commit to OGP’s 
independently assessed “openness” action plans, 
whilst more bottom-up techniques to harness 
global voices could be a powerful addition to 
the multilateral negotiations which are currently 
stymied. Individual leaders and decision-makers 
also need to be held to account. To this end, 
the Commission commends initiatives like the 
one recently announced by the World Economic 
Forum and the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik 
School of Government to develop a metric 
for measuring the performance of heads of 
international organisations.24 
• Establish Worldstat, a specialist agency 
charged with putting confidence into our 
statistics over the long term
Statistics underpin almost all key government 
and business decisions, yet there are legitimate 
questions about the rigour of the numbers on 
which we rely. To address this shortcoming, the 
Commission calls for the creation of “Worldstat” 
to undertake quality control of global statistics, 
assess domestic practices, regulate misuse, and 
improve data collection. Worldstat would not be 
a substitute for existing institutions such as the 
United Nations Statistical Commission or the 
United Nations Statistics Division (both of which 
sit within the UN’s Economic and Social Council). 
These UN agencies would continue to focus on 
agreeing international statistical methodologies 
and standards suitable for the developed and 
developing worlds, which are adapted to the 
contemporary environment and facilitate 
international comparisons. 
Worldstat, as a specialised agency or a separate 
entity, would ideally possess budgetary and 
resource capabilities on a scale comparable 
with Eurostat, and could focus its attention 
on the implementation of agreed standards 
and capacity building for the accumulation 
and interpretation of data, particularly in the 
developing world. Worldstat could also fast-
track work done at the international level on 
new or emerging indicators for sustainable 
development, and direct its attention to 
capacity building on this front. This might 
include investing in deficient or absent civil 
registration systems so that the progress 
of sustainable development policies can be 
properly tracked. Another key task for Worldstat 
could be to hasten the implementation of the 
recommendations of the 2009 Commission on 
the Measurement of Economic Performance 
and Social Progress25, reinforcing the work being 
done to take forward those recommendations 
by the International Statistical Institute and 
the International Economic Association. These 
efforts would also heed recommendations 
made by the World Bank on the measurement 
of employment and “linking information 
on a household’s income or consumption 
with information on the employment of its 
members”.26 Worldstat could also strive for 
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greater quality control by benchmarking states 
and regions against best practice and fostering 
greater sharing of data collection technology 
and expertise, interpretive know-how, and 
the training of local actors. Worldstat would 
seek to work closely with sector specific 
global initiatives such as the Global Burden of 
Disease project, a collaborative study led by the 
Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation which 
measures the impact of hundreds of diseases, 
injuries and risk factors across more than 20 
regions. Worldstat would also utilise and invest 
in new technological tools and partner with 
businesses and universities for the purposes 
of generating, collecting, aggregating and 
interpreting data.
• Establish a Voluntary World Taxation and 
Regulatory Exchange 
In order to help harmonise company taxation 
arrangements, promote information sharing, 
and enhance transparency, the Commission 
recommends the establishment of a Voluntary 
World Taxation and Regulatory Exchange. The 
aim of the Exchange would be to encourage 
multinational corporations to disclose their tax 
planning and transfer pricing arrangements 
(either confidentially or on the record) and for 
governments to reveal rulings on preferential 
tax regimes, including the percentage of 
activity required for preferential treatment. The 
Fiscal Affairs Department of the IMF could be 
considered as a possible site for the Exchange, 
which would enhance information sharing 
between tax administrations internationally, and 
raise public pressure on tax abuse and avoidance 
schemes. The Exchange is intended to reinforce 
the overall framework of the OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Action Plan (“BEPS 
Project”) to ensure that multinationals pay their 
fair share of tax and that profits generated in the 
digital economy are not unfairly and artificially 
shifted to other jurisdictions. The Exchange is 
intended to be voluntary, such that collective 
pressure is generated by increased transparency 
and by companies electing to set an example. 
As anticipated by the OECD/G20 BEPS Project, 
such commitments could be formalised in due 
course by a multilateral instrument.27 
• Financial institutions and businesses should 
look beyond the next reporting cycle
The Commission urges that priority be given to 
implementing the recommendations made by the 
Group of 30 on Long-term Finance, particularly 
the proposals surrounding long-term accounting 
frameworks, development of infrastructure for 
capital markets in developing countries, and the 
redirection of structural surpluses in national 
savings to diversified sovereign wealth funds 
with a long-term investment mandate.28 In 
particular, the Commission believes the G30’s call 
for the creation of dedicated long-term financial 
institutions should be prioritised. This requires 
the public and private sectors to work together 
to establish lending institutions and investment 
intermediaries with long-term mandates. 
Such institutions could include infrastructure 
banks, green finance, small business banks and 
innovation funds, whereby funding is provided 
directly through a public sector institution or 
indirectly through guarantees to the private 
sector. On a related front, the International 
Accounting Standards Board of the IFRS, in 
conjunction with the World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development, UN Global Compact, 
the new B-Team initiative, and other forward-
looking business initiatives and private-public 
partnerships, could work together to promote 
longer-term business horizons and potentially 
develop a “health” assessment for listed 
companies. This assessment would concentrate 
on long-term value creation and absolute 
performance, taking into account portfolio churn, 
remuneration incentives, length of investments, 
shareholder voting rights, organisational talent 
and tenure, time dedicated to long-term strategy 
deliberations, and innovative capacity. A specific 
spotlight on the long-term health of companies 
could help to “build long-termism into companies’ 
DNA”. This would reinforce proposals in the Kay 
Review of United Kingdom Equity Markets and 
Long-Term Decision Making to “reduce the 
pressures for short-term decision-making that 
arise from excessively frequent reporting of 
financial and investment performance (including 
quarterly reporting by companies), and from 
excessive reliance on particular metrics and 
models for measuring performance, assessing 
risk and valuing assets”.29
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• End discrimination against future generations
The Commission does not believe that future 
generations should be discriminated against 
simply because they are born tomorrow and 
not today. Discounting is an essential tool used 
to calculate the future value of something 
today. It plays a central task, for example, in 
weighing up the costs of taking action now 
to avoid climate disasters later this century. 
Governments frequently make decisions, such as 
in infrastructure investment or climate change 
policy, which have significant implications for 
future generations. In doing so, they weigh up 
costs and benefits that will occur at different 
points in time. Too often, these calculations give 
less weight to the worth of future generations, 
and to the implications of certain decisions on 
them, in large measure because of a casual, 
mechanical, and partially-understood approach 
to discounting. The Commission believes future 
generations should not be discriminated against 
simply because they exist in the future and do 
not currently have political or economic influence. 
Any discounting of impacts on future generations 
of today’s decisions should be made in relation to 
the expected change in their well-being, which 
may be positive or negative, not simply because 
these generations are born at a later date. We 
wish to emphasise that unless strong action is 
taken on climate, the environment and resources, 
there is a real risk that they will be worse off. 
The Commission believes greater attention 
should be given to the considerable implications 
generated by assumptions in current discounting 
models and their bias against future generations. 
The Commission believes short-term market 
rates of return on interest in imperfect 
markets are of limited relevance to collective 
decisions concerning ethics for the long term. 
These considerations imply that in a world of 
considerable uncertainty about future levels 
of well-being it would be wise to work with 
discounts that rely less heavily on extrapolation, 
including for infrastructure and resources issues. 
Whilst it is recognised that discounting is used 
for different purposes and under different 
circumstances, it is the Commission’s belief that 
the rate used should be lower, rather than higher. 
When evaluating the costs of action and inaction, 
policymakers need to ensure discounting 
embraces a more sophisticated appreciation of 
the role of ethics, risk, and the scale of possible 
damages in the future. 
• Remove price-distorting perverse subsidies 
on hydrocarbons and agriculture, with 
support redirected to targeted pro-poor 
transfer 
Our Commissioner Kishore Mahbubani describes 
price-distorting subsidies on hydrocarbons 
and agriculture as “the dragon that needs to 
be slayed for a better world”. The Commission 
agrees. Creating a more level playing field is 
essential for the restoration of economic growth, 
the reduction of global inequalities, and for 
sustainable development. In matters related 
to trade, the Commission believes that the 
successful conclusion of the Doha Trade Round 
should be given greater priority. Alongside these 
efforts, concerted effort must be directed 
towards price-distorting subsidies. Perverse 
subsidies on activities and industries that cause 
climate change result in a loss of forests, damage 
our biodiversity and waste natural resources, 
and are estimated to cost over a trillion United 
States dollars per year globally.30 Efforts such as 
the 2009 G20 pledge to phase out hydrocarbon 
subsidies in the “medium-term” are encouraging, 
but tangible action is required immediately. 
In reducing global dependency on agricultural 
and hydrocarbon subsidies, the savings made 
by removing subsidies could at least in part be 
redirected to targeted, pro-poor transfers. Such 
transfers, if properly designed and implemented, 
could contribute both to long-term poverty 
reduction and environmental sustainability. 
Several countries have already taken the 
lead in reducing fossil fuel subsidies; India has 
implemented Aaadhar (unique identification 
number) based Direct Benefit Transfer for LPG 
consumers with the aim of improving subsidy 
administration of LPG across the country; Ghana 
cut subsidies in February 2013; Indonesia 
announced policies to reduce subsidy expenditure 
in May 2012; and Iran substantially reduced 
energy subsidies in December 2010 as part of a 
wider five-year programme to gradually increase 
prices of oil products, natural gas and electricity 
to full cost prices.31 
In agriculture, pro-poor transfers could include: 
subsidising fertilisers for the poorest farmers 
in low-income countries and encouraging 
“evergreen” agricultural practices (as used 
in Malawi)32; monetary incentives for more 
sustainable land-use practices such as crop 
diversification and recycling; and support for 
rights-based land tenure and agrarian reform. 
As is the case in agriculture, hydrocarbon 
subsidies are currently highly regressive, so it 
is vital to alleviate their undue burden on the 
poorest whilst ultimately shifting investment 
towards more renewable energy sources. The 
Commission also suggests these policy changes 
should, wherever possible, be considered 
alongside a reduction of subsidies on harmful 
crops such as tobacco, palm oil and sugar. 
Reducing subsidies can be politically difficult, 
as evidenced by the reactions to the removal 
of subsidies in Nigeria in 201233 and recent 
similar controversies over rice in Thailand.34 To 
overcome this, governments should analyse 
and articulate the regressive disadvantages 
and waste associated with current subsidies, 
and highlight the benefits of a well-targeted, 
more sustainable social programme.35 Clear, 
transparent data and communication is critical, 
as is providing a realistic time frame and notice 
period to assist in the transition and adaptation 
to the elimination of perverse subsidies. 
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• Success in governance and anti-corruption 
efforts should spur the creation of an index 
focused on long-term impact
 
Building on the advances of the World Bank, 
the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, Transparency 
International and other agencies in measuring 
governance, the Commission recommends the 
development of a Long-Term Impact Index (“the 
Index”). The Index would highlight the importance 
of investing in appropriate infrastructure and 
decision-making processes that enhance longer-
term resilience and inclusiveness. The Index would 
rate the effectiveness of leaders of countries, 
companies and international organisations in 
addressing longer-term challenges. Given its 
focus on long-term goals, the Index would 
primarily assess processes and policies, rather 
than deliverables. A small, manageable number 
of indicators and a select group of countries, 
companies and organisations would be included 
in the first instance to test and develop the 
Index. The indicators might include tracking of 
median (rather than average) household income; 
biodiversity protection; quality of civil registration 
systems; the nature and scope of long-term 
institutions, committees and infrastructure; 
planning and budgeting horizons; company 
“health” metrics; transparency of tenure and 
selection of leaders; openness of decision-making 
processes; measures to enhance female and 
youth participation; rule of law deference 
and stability; carbon neutrality; and change in 
inequality over time. To complement the Index, 
the Commission suggests the establishment 
of a prize that recognises contributions to 
posterity and a commitment to practices and 
procedures oriented towards the long term. The 
prize would be supported by a range of partners 
in business, civil society and academia, and be 
based on data drawn from Worldstat and other 
collaborators. It would be awarded every two 
years, alternating between best performer and 
most improved.
• Break the inter-generational persistence 
of poverty through social protection 
measures such as conditional cash transfer 
programmes
As demonstrated in Part B, crisis can be an 
essential element in inspiring transformative 
policy change. In the 1930s, the Great 
Depression led to new forms of social 
protection through the New Deal, which was 
credited with raising living standards and 
domestic demand in the United States. As 
we slowly emerge from the current Financial 
Crisis, now is a historic opportunity to “rethink 
the relationship between growth, public 
intervention and social protection”.36 The 
Commission believes it is time to address the 
inter-generational persistence of poverty 
through social assistance measures, such as 
conditional cash transfers. Such measures 
should complement sustained investment in 
health and education infrastructure to ensure 
that children are able to reach their full potential 
throughout all stages of life. Support for 
research and innovation is also critical to drive 
economic growth and provide opportunities 
for younger generations, not least if local 
knowledge and expertise can be enabled and 
applied to addressing local issues and priorities. 
Falling into poverty during childhood can last 
a lifetime. Missed opportunities in education 
or inadequate nutrition can have devastating 
impacts on a child’s long-term development, 
leaving them vulnerable to life-threatening 
diseases, and more likely to underperform 
as adults. As UNICEF argues, “child poverty 
threatens not only the individual child, but is 
likely to be passed on to future generations, 
entrenching and even exacerbating inequality 
in society”.37 The Commission calls for more 
countries to consider protective, preventative, 
and transformative measures, such as 
conditional cash transfers, as a critical part 
of a strategy to address inter-generational 
poverty. Experience from countries such 
as Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, Malawi and 
Zambia suggests that cash transfers can have 
positive impacts on reducing children’s poverty, 
either through measures directly targeted at 
children or indirectly through raising household 
income.38 Poor families use cash transfers 
to invest in their children, often paying for 
education and health care, which can have 
multiplier effects through boosting funding into 
the local economy. In resource-rich countries, 
such initiatives can help redistribute resource 
revenues to the less advantaged in society. 
Investment in such social interventions must be 
accompanied by appropriate infrastructure and 
oversight mechanisms to ensure funds are used 
most effectively and reach those most in need. 
The Commission is encouraged by evidence 
that in middle and higher income countries 
approximately 25 percent of fiscal stimulus 
measures post-crisis have been targeted at 
social protection measures: this momentum 
must not be lost.39 
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• Invest in youth guarantees to reduce 
“scars” of long-term unemployment and 
disconnection
The Commission calls for urgent priority to 
be given to the dual global challenges of 
unemployment and underemployment. We 
accept there are no easy, one-size-fits-all 
solutions to these problems, but identifying 
initiatives to facilitate a more inclusive, 
productive and flexible workforce must be a 
higher priority for government and business 
leaders. Of greatest urgency is the need 
to address the youth employment crisis. 
Approximately 75 million young people are 
out of work globally, of whom 6 million have 
given up looking for a job, whilst more than 
200 million young people work in informal, low 
productivity or insecure jobs.40
The social and economic characteristics of 
youth unemployment vary amongst countries 
and regions. Nevertheless, young people 
need to be assigned higher priority within 
broader macroeconomic and labour market 
policies which aim to foster pro-employment 
growth and decent job creation. To assist 
in this endeavour, the Commission calls for 
sustained investment in youth guarantee 
programmes. Youth guarantees typically 
include a combination of education and training 
(general education, vocational education and 
training); employment services and programmes 
(employment planning, job-search assistance, 
workshops or rehabilitation); and active labour 
market measures (on-the-job training and 
apprenticeships, community services, business 
start-up programmes). Collectively, these 
guarantees aim to promote a smooth transition 
from education to work and prevent long-
term unemployment for young people. The 
Commission believes youth guarantees should 
be available to all who fit a pre-defined criteria 
related to age (typically between 15 and 29 
years old) and duration of unemployment 
(ideally between one and six months of 
inactivity). Modelled on successful programmes 
in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Austria, Germany, 
the Netherlands and Poland, the ILO estimates 
youth guarantees can be implemented at an 
annual cost of between 0.5 and 1.5 percent 
of GDP (depending on existing infrastructure 
capacity to deliver the programme, and the 
size of the eligible population).41 Whilst this 
is a significant investment, which needs 
to be tailored to each country’s needs and 
resources, not least in developing countries, the 
Commission believes the benefits of investing 
in an active and inclusive workforce for 
young people outweigh the costs. To be truly 
successful, however, youth guarantee schemes 
require a broader partnership of government 
agencies, employers, youth and student 
organisations, education and training providers, 
and young people themselves.42 Involving 
these different groups in the formation of 
such policies will ensure they are appropriately 
adapted to the national context and contribute 
to the overall success of the schemes. This is 
especially important in developing countries 
where governments face greater financial or 
institutional constraints. Nevertheless, recent 
policy innovations in countries like Kenya and  
Sri Lanka reveal how some of these constraints 
can be tackled.43 
 
• Articulate a common global vision and 
ambition
It is the Commission’s view that efforts 
to address today’s global challenges are 
undermined by the absence of shared global 
values and a shared vision for global civilisation. 
As Commission Chair Pascal Lamy has stated, 
global governance and cooperation will remain 
an alien concept as long as there is no feeling 
of global belonging amongst citizens.44 Too 
many countries feel that current global models 
and methods are embedded in a historical, 
“Western” framework. In today’s interconnected 
world, we need a common platform for dialogue 
that speaks to all cultures and countries and 
seeks to advance common understanding and 
build a better world for future generations. It is 
the Commission’s view that the pressures of a 
deeply interconnected world require a stronger 
collective vision regarding our future and the 
longer-term needs of our societies, including 
mutual respect and adherence to a set of 
universal norms which have been collectively 
developed and agreed.45 The Commission 
supports an incremental commitment to a 
platform of common values, building on the 
aspirations of the United Nations Charter and 
work that has already been undertaken by 
the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, as 
well as by civil society initiatives such as the 
Earth Charter46 and the InterAction Council’s 
proposed Universal Declaration of Human 
Responsibilities.47 Such a shared platform, 
developed through a wide-ranging dialogue 
between different political leaders, faiths, 
scholars and citizens, would elucidate a shared 
set of goals for humanity. By seeking to support 
and add momentum to existing initiatives, the 
process of creating such a shared understanding 
of our key interests could also help foster 
reconciliation between different countries and 
groups of countries. The United Nations Charter, 
with its inspiring preamble (“We the peoples 
of the United Nations…”), remains a vital 
cornerstone of shared global norms and values. 
Yet our world requires a renewed pledge for 
the future. If we care about the prospects for 
our children and future generations, as well as 
our planet, articulating an updated set of broad 
concerns and shared principles could provide a 
useful foundation for action. 
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What Next? 
In Part A of this report – Possible Futures – the Commission identified 
some of the key megatrends and challenges that are likely to shape our 
future and introduced possible responses to them. In Part B – Responsible 
Futures – we sought to draw lessons from examples of where global 
action was successful, and where it had failed, identifying the shaping 
factors that undermine our collective ability to act today. In Part C 
– Practical Futures – we have outlined a number of broad principles 
and more practical recommendations, aimed at providing impetus to 
overcome obstacles and inspire action. Our hope is that readers will 
be spurred to explore these ideas further, and will find them helpful as 
they seek to improve the lives of current and future generations. As a 
Commission, we will continue to engage with governments, businesses, 
NGOs and civil society in order to take our recommendations forward. 
We hope our readers will find ways to contribute to raising awareness of 
the challenges we face and through their actions bridge the current gap 
between our knowledge of the challenges and the associated actions. By 
so doing, we hope that together we can contribute to the construction of 
a sustainable world for current and future generations.
We invite you to engage with us on these issues at  
www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/commission
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